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STATE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
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AARON XAVIER FELLMETH*
ABSTRACT
In Part I, this Article presents the first published, worldwide
survey of internationalpractice in interpreting and applying various
international human rights norms to the issue of sexual freedom,
with a special emphasis on the rights to privacy, family life, and
freedom from arbitrary discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Although progress toward general recognition of such rights by
international authorities and states has been extremely rapid over
a very short period, such recognition continues to vary geographi-
cally and according to the subject matter. For example, some rights,
such as the right to consensual, adult, private intercourse have
achieved more widespread recognition than others, such as equal
rights to nondiscrimination in employment or equal access to
marriage. The respective roles of legislative and judicial reforms in
these developments are explored in this part as well. In Part II, the
Article analyzes the rationales adopted by state elites for accepting
or denying equal rights to sexual minorities and discerns a trend
toward a complex approach of sometimes applying libertarian
theories of human rights law, sometimes applying increasingly
nuanced nondiscrimination norms, and sometimes using both
approaches at once. Countervailing pressures, especially widespread
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religious opposition to the recognition of equal human rights, as well
as the problems of using libertarian theories, are explored. The
Article further discusses the limits of the role that international
human rights law has played in the evolution of state practice on
this subject and explains how international human rights law is
balanced unstably between the incomplete application of human
rights to sexual minorities and the disadvantages of logical and
theoretical inconsistency in human rights doctrine. It concludes by
observing how the case of evolving human rights in this field
illustrates the potential power of ideational norms in shaping state
expectations and behavior.
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I. THE TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEXUALITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
A large part of the international community continues to deny
many of the protections of human rights law to homosexuals,
bisexuals, and other sexual minorities. Few states do so in the
conviction that sexual minorities lack the same basic human needs
as everyone else. Nor, if they are forthright, do states deny them
human rights because they believe sexual minorities undermine
national security, economic prosperity, or other legitimate state
interests. Nor yet do they do so because sexual minorities infringe
on the human rights of others by their intimate personal choices
and conduct. They do so primarily because political elites or their
constituents, or both, are offended by unconventional sexuality for
cultural and religious reasons.
It may seem strange that most of the world's states systemati-
cally deny millions of individuals equal treatment and vigorously
force them into the position of an underclass, causing them
humiliation and material disadvantage in life, because of prefer-
ences so minutely affecting anyone but themselves. Unraveling the
mystery of how so many states have arrived at the conclusion that
the perceived evils caused by the unconventional sexuality of a few
outweigh that minority's fundamental human rights to freedom of
conscience and speech, public and intimate association, privacy, and
family life teaches much about the underlying theories of interna-
tional human rights law that states practice within their own
borders. Additionally, a close view of the conflict between majority
prejudices and minority claims for equal rights in this case offers
lessons about how states cope with opposition in their internal
power structures against evolving norms of the international
community.
Part of the explanation may be implicit in the rationales offered
by the states that have recently reversed longstanding positions
on the human rights of sexual minorities. The acceptance within
the international community that some, if not all, international
human rights laws should protect sexual minorities specifically,
and unconventional sexual practices generally, is both recent and
800 [Vol. 50:797
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radical. While the decriminalization of homosexual intercourse
spread throughout most of western Europe in the nineteenth
century, it remained widely illegal elsewhere until the end of the
twentieth century. Most laws taking the further step of prohibiting
discrimination against sexual minorities and recognizing equal
rights to family life date back less than twenty years almost
everywhere they have been adopted. Why, then, the sudden change
of attitude? Does it merely reflect changing social perceptions of
sexual minorities in some geographical regions? If so, are interna-
tional human rights sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
sacrifice of minority group interests in every case of majority
disapproval, so long as that disapproval is framed in moral or
cultural terms? Or is international law evolving toward requiring
principled limitations on lawmaking by states whenever their laws
and policies threaten human rights? If so, are sexuality and
intimacy treated differently, and should they be treated differently,
than other human interests? A study of the rapid expansion of
human rights to sexual minorities in the international community
offers important insights into the answers to these questions.
This study is complicated by the lack of specificity on sexual
matters in the major international human rights instruments.
Far from offering clear guidance on the content of human rights
law relating to sexuality, these documents merely state general
norms of personal and familial privacy and free association
intended to protect individuals from arbitrary government intrusion
into intimate relations. Most of these instruments include express
guarantees of freedom of association,' rights against arbitrary or
unlawful interference with privacy,2 and protection of family life
1. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Freedoms, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, art. 10(i), 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986
[hereinafter African Charter]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 22(1),
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11, opened for signature Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 A(III), art. 20(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Union art. 12(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
[hereinafter European Charter].
2. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, opened for signature Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 17; ECHR, supra
note 1, art. 8; UDHR, supra note 1, art. 12; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
2008] 801
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and the right to marry.3 In this context, the right to privacy is
usually construed not merely as the freedom to maintain secrecy,
but as freedom of intimate conduct, association, and expression
without fear of arbitrary state interference.4 These rights have
of Man art. V, O.A.S. Res. XXX, May 2, 1948, translated in INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS (1979) [hereinafter American Declaration]; European Charter, supra note 1, art. 7.
In a 1989 advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that the
American Declaration could be "a source of international obligation." See Interpretation of
the American Declaration, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 10, para. 45 (July 14, 1989).
The African Charter does not clearly specify a right to privacy. It does, however, provide:
"Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and
the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right." African Charter,
supra note 1, art. 4.
Unlike the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has interpreted Article 8 of
the ECHR very broadly to encompass a general right to freedom from state interference in
one's private life, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has tended to interpret the right to
privacy guaranteed by ICCPR Article 17 in the very narrow sense of the right to secrecy of
information. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 16: The Right to Respect of
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Art.
17), 7, 10 (Apr. 8, 1988).
3. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 18; ACHR, supra note 2, art. 17; ICCPR,
supra note 1, art. 23; ECHR, supra note 1, art. 12; American Declaration, supra note 2, art.
VI; European Charter, supra note 1, arts. 9, 33(1); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) ('The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
4. See Emma Henderson, Of Signifiers and Sodomy: Privacy, Public Morality and Sex
in the Decriminalisation Debates, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1996); Derek McGhee,
Persecution and Social Group Status, 14 J. REFUGEE STUD. 20, 25 (2001). There is a tension
between these approaches in both national practices and in decisions of regional and
international human rights authorities. For example, although the ECtHR's holdings on
these issues tend to be premised on violations of Article 8 of the ECHR (a right to privacy),
the UN Human Rights Committee has found similar state discrimination to violate Articles
2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR (relating to discrimination) rather than Article 17 (privacy).
Invoking a narrow view of privacy, as the ECtHR has sometimes done in this context in the
past (but rarely does today), may be inimical to the human rights of sexual minorities-the
concession typically granted by homophobic societies to such minorities is typically framed
as tolerance so long as their conduct remains private, and the state and public remain free
to vilify it. As the Supreme Court of Canada aptly observed in Vriend v. Alberta, "[C]on-
cealment of true identity ... must be harmful to personal confidence and self-esteem.
Compounding that effect is the implicit message conveyed by the exclusion, that gays and
lesbians, unlike other individuals, are not worthy of protection." Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 493, 102 (Can.); accord In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 34 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). This was the case with respect to the
Finnish broadcasting regulations in 1982, some Australian refugee cases, and elsewhere. See,
e.g., Hertzberg v. Finland, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(1982); Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Milibank, Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002, A
Gay Refugee Couple from Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 97, 105-07 (2003); Meredith Weiss,
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obvious, but as yet largely unrealized, implications for sexual
minorities and others who practice unconventional sexuality.
Another accepted norm of international human rights law is
nondiscrimination in the protection of human rights or grant of
state benefits based on specific intellectual, cultural, or physical
attributes of a class of persons, such as race or sex. The major
human rights instruments do not necessarily guarantee uni-
formly the same kinds of rights or interests from the same kinds
of discrimination, but they contain catch-all protected categories
requiring state parties to guarantee all of the human rights set
forth in the respective instruments without distinction based on
sex, birth, or "other status."5 With the notable exception of the
ECHR, these instruments extend the nondiscrimination obliga-
Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis? Economic Positioning and Social Reform in Singapore,
27 NEW POL. SCI. 267, 272 (2005) (quoting the Singaporean Prime Minister as warning that
"the more [homosexuals] lobby for public space, the bigger the backlash they will provoke
from the conservative mainstream. Their public space may then be reduced."); Alex
Rodriguez, Russia Gays Hear Call: Go Back to the Closet, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2006, at 13
(quoting a "prominent member" of Russia's Motherland Party as saying that, if homosexuals
seek public rights and recognition, "that encroaches on our rights--our right to a normal
life"); Gary Younge, Troubled Island, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2006, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uklworld/2006/apr/27/gayrights.comment/print (quoting a member of parliament
of Jamaica as saying, "At the same time there is a general homophobia against people who
exhibit homosexual tendencies.... Nobody cares unless they openly exhibit it. That's when
they take offence.').
Until recently, the United Kingdom commonly denied refugee status to sexual minorities
on the theory that they could avoid persecution by hiding their sexual orientation, apparently
in the belief that being forced to spend one's life hiding one's sexual orientation is not a form
of severe persecution. See Jenni Millbank, A Preoccupation with Perversion: The British
Response to Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1989-2003, 14 Soc. & LEG.
STUD. 115, 116, 118, 133 (2005). The United Kingdom has, moreover, even recently held that
prosecution and punishment (including such punishments as one hundred lashes or a year
in prison) for homosexuality was not "persecution" for refugee status purposes and was,
indeed, "lenient." See id. at 126.
Some courts, such as the South African Constitutional Court, have expressly interpreted
the right to privacy more broadly, finding it to extend to the right to "private intimacy and
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without
interference from the outside community." Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister
of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) 32 (S. Afr.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36; see
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205-14 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). "Privacy" in this sense means something more
akin to a general freedom to act privately without unnecessary government interference.
5. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 2; ACHR, supra note 2, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note
1, arts. 2(1), 3; ECHR, supra note 1, art. 14; UDHR, supra note 1, art. 2; American
Declaration, supra note 2, art. II.
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tion beyond the rights enumerated in each respective instrument
to encompass unequal treatment under any law.6 Like the guar-
antees of privacy, association, and family life, this guarantee would
seem to offer sound protection against arbitrary discrimination
based on sexual orientation or sexual minority status, but it has
been interpreted this way only recently and not uniformly.'
A single major human rights instrument-the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Union
(European Charter)-grants explicit rights to nondiscrimination
based on sexual orientation or sexual minority status.8 Sexual
minorities get cold comfort even from this concession; the European
6. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 19; ACHR, supra note 2, art. 24; ICCPR, supra
note 1, art. 26; UDHR, supra note 1, art. 7; see U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment
No. 18: Non-discrimination, 12 (Nov. 10, 1989).
The ECHR, unlike the ICCPR and other human rights instruments, has not usually been
read by the ECtHR to comprehensively prohibit discrimination based on sex, birth, or other
status. Instead, it is thought to permit arbitrary discrimination unless one of the specific
guarantees in the ECHR is violated. See Willis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36042/97, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 29 (2002). The ECtHR has asserted, however, that the "application of Art. 14 does
not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights protected by the
Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall within the
ambit of one or more" articles of the Convention. E.B. v. France, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21, 47
(2008). The ECtHR has sometimes accordingly interpreted the ECHR to provide a guarantee
against arbitrary discrimination based on something that is not guaranteed by a the
Convention as a human right but that falls within the same general subject matter as the
human right. Optional Protocol No. 12 to the Convention (CETS No. 177), signed in April
2000, addresses this problem, but it has only been ratified by sixteen states as of 2008, which
number excludes almost all of the major European powers. Article 3 of the Protocol
effectively treats Articles 1 and 2 as an amendment to the Convention to preclude any
arbitrary discrimination based on prohibited grounds.
7. Even the ECtHR itself has sometimes signaled that discrimination against
unconventional sex is permissible, at least in a commercial context. In F. v. Switzerland, the
court held that a law that criminalized homosexual but not heterosexual prostitution did not
violate the ECHR because prostitution falls outside of one's "private life" protected by Article
8. App. No. 11680/85, 55 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 178, 180-81 (1988); cf. People v.
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (N.Y. 1980) ("Absent is the factor of commercialization with the
attendant evils commonly attached to the retailing of sexual pleasures .... "); see also Reiss
v. Austria, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 90 (1995) (determining that the display of a homosexual
pornography videotape in a bar was not protected by Article 8). The right to free expression
may protect some sexual conduct in a commercial context, however. See, e.g., Scherer v.
Switzerland, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 276, 284-87 (1994) (finding a violation of Article 10 where the
appellant was convicted for showing a pornographic film privately in a commercial
establishment). The applicant in Reiss v. Austria might have had more success had he
invoked Article 10 instead of, or in addition to, Article 8.
8. European Charter, supra note 1, art. 21.
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2008] STATE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY 805
Charter applies only to the limited membership of the EU9 and is
not legally binding even there.1" At best, it may be used as an
interpretive resource for other EU sources of law. Nonetheless,
together, the norms of free intimate association, privacy, family life,
and nondiscrimination might be thought to suggest that states
bear a heavy burden to justify singling out a specific class of
persons and regulating their private sexual behavior, or basing
legal and political restrictions or advantages on specific sexual or
gender characteristics. Today, a minority of states continue to
criminalize homosexual intercourse and, while state-sponsored or
tolerated discriminatory treatment against sexual minorities
remains rampant, it has become much rarer and often less virulent
in form. Doors formerly closed to sexual minorities, such as state-
recognized relationships carrying some of the benefits of marriage,
have cracked open.'1
9. As of 2008, the EU will have twenty-seven members. See Member States of the EU,
http://europa.eu/abc/europeancountries/eumembers/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). In
contrast, the Council of Europe, which is bound by the ECHR, boasts forty-seven members.
See About the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/comaboutcoe/ (last visited Nov. 20,
2008).
10. The European Charter was incorporated in the draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe submitted to the European Council in 2003. See European
Convention Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 7, CONV 848/03 (July
18, 2003). Although the Treaty to establish a constitution was signed by twenty-five heads
of state, it ultimately failed to achieve ratification and was abandoned in favor of the Treaty
of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, signed Dec. 13, 2007, 50 O.J. (C 306)01 (2007), and which is expected
to enter into force on January 1, 2009. See A Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eul
scadplus/constitutionlintroductionen.htm. The Treaty of Lisbon incorporates norms of
nondiscrimination and tolerance into the Treaty on European Union in a new Article la, but
does not mention sexual orientation.
11. See infra Part I.C.1. Perhaps the most telling indicator of public acceptance of
homosexuality is its political representation. The first openly homosexual U.S. congressional
representative (Gerry Studds) was elected in 1972 (although his homosexuality may not have
been widely known until after the election). See First Openly Gay Congressman Dies, CBS
NEWS, Oct. 15,2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/14/politics/printable2089735.
shtml. In Japan, transsexual and openly homosexual politicians were elected in 2003. See
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan's Transsexuals Emerge from the Dark, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at
A34. The European Parliament has several gay and lesbian members, such as Michael
Cashman, the president of the Parliament's Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights
Intergroup. See European Parliament's Intergroup on Gay and Lesbian Rights, Our Officers,
http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/plugins/content/content.php?cat.8 (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). That
said, homosexuals remain exceedingly underrepresented in positions of political power
worldwide. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446-47 (Conn.
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The source of contention may be traced to a qualification to
many human rights expressed in the relevant treaties that include
explicit exceptions for measures taken by the state to maintain
public morals and welfare. The ICCPR allows states to restrict the
exercise of association by any laws that "are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordrepublic), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."' 2
Article 11 of the ECHR and Article 16 of the ACHR contain
virtually identical language."3 This same exception qualifies the
right to privacy, as in Article 8 of the ECHR, 14 although none of the
other major international human rights instruments contains a
similar explicit exception to privacy. The UDHR does, however,
provide generally that the rights set forth therein may be limited
by state action necessary for "meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society."' 5 Even where textually absent, however, these same excep-
tions are typically and understandably considered implicit in both
privacy rights and the right against discrimination. In interpreting
the ICCPR, for example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
concluded that discrimination may be justified "if the criteria for
such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is
to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant."'6
Thus, although the philosophical underpinnings of international
human rights treat liberty as the basic condition, they permit
state regulation when justified for the protection and enrichment
of the public.' v The necessity of regulatory exceptions is evident,
for example, when the human right of familial privacy is invoked
to preclude state action that would otherwise prevent domestic
violence or child abuse. Several U.N. Human Rights bodies and
2008) (describing the exceeding rarity of open homosexuals in positions of high political and
economic power in the United States).
12. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 22.
13. Compare ACHR, supra note 2, art. 16(2), with ECHR, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
14. See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8.
15. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 29(2).
16. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, 1 13.
17. See UDHR, supra note 1, art. 3. See generally GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY
LIBERALISM 162-66 (1996).
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state authorities have also thought it necessary to prevent polyg-
amy and other variations on family choices in societies in which
such arrangements are thought to demean women, lead to child
abuse, or attenuate the benefits of supportive intimate relation-
ships."
On the other hand, there is always a risk that states will rely on
these broadly drawn exceptions to intrude into interpersonal
relations unnecessarily. The flexibility inherent in the ordre public
and morality exceptions has long been used by states to justify the
systemic oppression of and discrimination against classes of
persons defined as sexual "deviants" and repression of masturba-
tion, fornication, oral or anal intercourse, 9 and other sexual
practices. ° For example, the state may claim that outlawing the use
of contraceptives in private sexual relations advances an important
public policy of maintaining population growth2 or preventing
condemned fornication,22 and thereby constitutes permissible state
18. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., 46th mtg, 44-
50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/SR.46 (Dec. 5, 1995); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment
No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar.
29, 2000) (Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination
against women. Consequently, it should be definitely abolished wherever it continues to
exist."); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimin. Against Women, Gen. Recommendation No.
21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 14, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1, at 90 (July
29, 1994); see also Regina v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 454 (Can.) (restrictions on free
speech justified as necessary to protect women from degrading and dehumanizing
pornographic treatment).
19. The term "sodomy" in the laws of U.S. states and elsewhere is often applied to oral
and anal intercourse. In the common law, the term reportedly referred only to anal
intercourse between men, see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,491 (Ky. 1993), but
its modern meaning has come to encompass any oral or anal intercourse, homosexual or
heterosexual. See 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 925 (2d ed. 1989). This Article will avoid
the use of the term "sodomy" because of its negative connotation and confused history.
20. This is obviously not intended to be a complete list of unconventional sexual practices
relevant to the subject matter of this Article, but it should be noted that certain
unconventional sexual practices, such as pederasty and bestiality, will not be discussed here,
as they raise complicating issues of social policy (e.g., issues of consent, health, and cruelty
to animals).
21. See, e.g., Lucian Turcescu & Lavinia Stan, Religion, Politics and Sexuality in
Romania, 57 EUR.-ASIAN STUD. 291, 291 (2005).
22. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:110:1 (West 1977) (prohibiting fornication), repealed,
found unconstitutional by State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977); Islamic Penal Code
of Iran art. 637 (1996) (fornication punished with ninety-nine lashes), available at
http://mehr.org/IslamicPenal_ Code-of Iran.pdf; Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood)
Ordinance (Ordinance VII of 1979), Feb. 10, 1979, P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 51 (Pak.),
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regulation of sexuality and other intimate relations. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) consistently interprets the
limitation on the morality exception-"necessary in a democratic
society"-to require that the impugned measure must answer "a
pressing social need and, in particular, [be] proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued."23 But its judgments are binding only
among the forty-seven Council of Europe states, and in any case
they leave open for debate critical and relatively subjective
decisions about what kind of regulation is necessary, what social
needs are pressing, and what kind of regulation is proportionate to
the aim pursued. As a result, the ECtHR's judgments respecting
discrimination based on sexual orientation have sometimes suffered
from troubling inconsistencies.
Although the ICCPR contains no specific limitation on the
privacy right based on "morality" or ordrepublic, in 1985, the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
adopted the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
of Provisions in the ICCPR (Siracusa Principles),24 which interpret
the term "public order" as limited to the rules that "ensure the
functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which
society is founded."25 The Sub-Commission interpreted "public
morals" somewhat more expansively as "essential to the mainte-
available at http://www.sindhpolice. gov.pk/PDFs/offence of_zinaordinance_1979.pdf, cited
in Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'LL. 759,
808 n.160 (2004); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee, Sudan, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add.85 (Nov. 19, 1997) (noting that Sudan
imposes the death penalty for "illicit sex"); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Shariah: A
Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in ISLAMIC LAWAND JURISPRUDENCE 177, 193,
195 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990) (Libya, Pak. & Sudan); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Libyan
Legislation in Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual Mores, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 297 (1980)
(Libya).
23. See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 7 87-89 (2000);
Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 7 80 (1999); Norris v.
Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, IT 41, 44 (1989); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 149, 53 (1982).
24. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on H.R., Status of the International Covenants
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nance of respect for fundamental values of the community."2 This
interpretation, besides suggesting that universal human rights are
not universal at all (unless by "community" the Sub-Commission
intended the world community), leaves undefined what kind of
communal "fundamental values" are worthy of respect and justify
derogation of human rights, what kind of regulation is essential to
ensure the maintenance of those values, and so forth. For example,
it says nothing about whether a society in which undeviating
adherence to a state-sponsored religion is a "fundamental value"
that could justify the expulsion or execution of apostates, much less
the systematic denial of public sector jobs to them, in derogation of
principles of freedom of religion, conscience, and speech. The
answer to these questions suggested by the Siracusa Principles
reminds us that even the core principles supporting international
human rights law remain contested by many states.
There is, in short, an inherent tension in these rules and their
exceptions that authorities interpreting international human rights
law must struggle to resolve on a more or less case-by-case basis.
This leaves politically unpopular groups such as sexual minorities
vulnerable to a restrictive reading of the human rights instruments
by states and international authorities. Until recently, the morality
and public order exceptions in ECHR Articles 8 and 11 were con-
sistently invoked to justify interference in unconventional sexuality
in a highly discriminatory manner.27 Recently, the ECtHR has come
to assess these factors more strictly in cases involving private
sexual conduct: "[Wihen the relevant restrictions concern 'a most
intimate part of an individual's private life,' there must exist
'particularly serious reasons' before such interferences can satisfy
the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Convention."2" Many states
have similarly adopted this position either in legislative session or
through judicial interpretation of their constitutions, statutes, and
common law.2"
26. Id. 7 27.
27. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 354, 1 3 (1984); X. v. United
Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 63, 77 127-30 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1978).
28. Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 89 (quoting Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 77
52, 59).
29. See, e.g., Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 37 (2004).
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But to say that many states have come to accept and even
protect sexual minorities in limited ways does not necessarily
mean that they recognize a fundamental or unrestrained human
right to freedom of sexuality and family life. Two observations
demonstrate the problem of imputing the trend toward acceptance
and protection of sexual minorities with recognition of inter-
national human rights to complete freedom of sexuality and
nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation. The first, noted
above, is that no major international human rights treaty clearly
provides that homosexual behavior, transsexuality, or other uncon-
ventional practices are protected by the norms of privacy, intimate
association, or nondiscrimination. Indeed, as will be discussed, the
states accepting sexual minority rights have done so for domestic
political reasons or pursuant to regional human rights treaties or
declarations rather than universal human rights treaties or opinio
iuris sive necessitatis.3 ° The second is that there remains a signifi-
cant number of states that dispute that international human rights
law encompasses rights for sexual minorities, and these states
behave accordingly in their domestic and international conduct.
They actively discriminate against sexual minorities in extremis, in
some cases to the point of imposing capital punishment for same-
sex intercourse.31
Probably the most telling demonstration of the international
schism on the question of sexual minority human rights is the fate
of the joint Brazil/European Union 2003 draft resolution in the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. 32 The resolution, entitled "Human
Rights and Sexual Orientation," was the first draft Human Rights
Commission resolution to call on "all States to promote and protect
the human rights of all persons regardless of their sexual orienta-
tion. ' 3 After a brief but intense debate on the draft, Pakistan, on
behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, proposed a
motion of no action, which was barely rejected (twenty-two votes in
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. Comm'n on H.R., Draft Resolution: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation, 59th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.92 (Apr. 16, 2003).
33. Id. 3; see also Johann Hari, At Last the UNRecognises the Need for Gay Rights, THE
INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 25, 2003, at 17.
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favor, twenty-four against, six abstentions).34 The Commission then
voted on a motion to postpone the resolution until the next (sixtieth)
session, which succeeded with a vote of twenty-four to seventeen,
with ten abstentions.35 During this sixtieth session, Brazil refrained
from reintroducing the motion due to ongoing negotiations, and
the Commission decided by consensus to defer a vote on the
resolution until the sixty-first session.3" Brazil declined to reintro-
duce the motion at the sixty-first session for lack of support in the
Commission. The U.N. decision to replace the Commission with the
U.N. Human Rights Council does not appear to have altered the
disposition of the issue, as it was not raised in the Council's June
2006 draft agenda and is, to all appearances, now dead in the
water.37
Yet, there has been an undeniable, if gradual, trend toward
recognition of freedom from state interference in sexual conduct and
nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation in the corpus of
international human rights law through state domestic practices.
The momentum has accelerated recently and shows signs of general
acceptance in the foreseeable future among the world's most
politically, economically, and culturally influential states. Although
purely domestic and unilateral acts in many states are creating a
consensus to recognize such human rights, several important
international events have reinforced and accelerated the trend. This
is far from saying that a mature set of norms of international law
has fully developed, but, as will be discussed, customary interna-
tional law is in the process of expanding to encompass human
rights to liberty, privacy, and nondiscrimination in the realm of
sexuality and intimate association for all persons, including sexual
minorities.38
34. Press Release, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights
Approves Measures on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Other Issues (Apr. 24,
2003), available at http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/cnO355e.htm.
35. Comm'nonH.R.,Decision2003/118, U.N. Doc. ECN.4fDEC/2003/118 (Apr. 25,2003).
36. Comm'n on H.R., Report to the Economic and Social Council on the Sixtieth Session
of the Commission, Decision 2004/104, Annex at 72, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/2004/L. 11/Add.6 (Apr.
21, 2004).
37. See Hum. Rts. Council, Adoption of the Agenda and Organization of Work: Note by
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/1 (June 22, 2006).
38. See infra Part I.C.
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Among the most fundamental violations of the human rights of
sexual minorities are the repression of free speech and political
association. Nicaragua, for example, broadened its antisodomy laws
in 1992 to penalize "inducing, promoting or propagandizing" same-
sex intercourse,39 a rather blatant infringement on the right to free
political speech. Even the ECtHR has inexplicably upheld laws
criminalizing blasphemy-properly called religious dissent-as
consistent with the right to freedom of speech when religious icons
have been portrayed as homosexual or bisexual.4 ° The denial of
these rights not only prevents sexual minorities from engaging in
peaceful advocacy to persuade the public and political elites of the
legitimacy of their claims to human rights. It also shuts down their
ability to organize in order to support and assist one another in
dealing with legal disadvantages and detrimental social prejudices
by criminalizing their organization. Even limited restrictions on
"obscene" or "immoral" speech may be oppressively used to obstruct
the rights of sexual minorities and their advocates to try to
persuade the public of the need for legal reform.4' The most sterile
and tactful advocacy of gay rights may be labeled obscene or
immoral by homophobic governments. Numerous countries have
systematically denied sexual minorities this most fundamental of
human rights in blatant violation of treaties to which they are
parties.12 In these states, the possibility of free expression and
39. See Martha I. Morgan, The Bitter and the Sweet: Feminist Efforts to Reform
Nicaraguan Rape and Sodomy Laws, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 439,446,460-61(1995).
40. See Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1997) (upholding U.K. refusal
to grant a distribution license to a "blasphemous" video work portraying St. Teresa of Avila
kissing another woman); see also Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123
(Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rts. 1983) (upholding U.K. criminal prosecution of a magazine that
published a poem representing Jesus Christ as homosexual). But see Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952) (holding that a New York law prohibiting "sacrilegious" motion pictures was
in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution).
41. Cf. DAVIDA.J. RIcHARDs, THECASEFORGAYRIGHTS 31-32 (2005) (opining that sexual
minorities in the United States considered the narrowing of the category of "obscene speech"
by the Supreme Court to be "much the most important ... development" in their progress
toward nondiscrimination).
42. See generally DANIEL O'TOSSON, INT'L LESBIAN & GAY ASS'N REPORT, STATE-
SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME-SEX ACTIVITY
BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.ilga.org/statehomo
phobia/State-sponsored-homophobiaILGA_07.pdf; Int'l Lesbian & Gay Ass'n, World Legal
Survey, available at http://www.ilga.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter World
Legal Survey]. Sexual minorities and their advocates frequently encounter government
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political association for sexual minorities remains hypothetical, as
any attempt to organize or advocate for group rights is likely to be
met with state repression or public violence.43 The inconsistency of
such repression with international human rights law is sufficiently
evident to preclude any need for elaboration." It is, in any case,
becoming increasingly rare. The more difficult legal issue, and the
one addressed here, is how states have applied (or not applied) the
more protean rights to privacy, freedom of association, family life,
and nondiscrimination with respect to unconventional sexuality.
Specifically, states discriminating against sexual minorities or
unconventional sexuality in one way or another have had to justify
discrimination and harassment when attempting to form associations or advocate for
gay legal rights. See, e.g., Decision 21/1996, Hung. Const. Ct. (May 17, 1996), discussed in
YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 133 n.16 (2002) (Hungary); Resolution on
Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6TA(2006)0018, 3 (unnamed European
countries); INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM'N, VIOLATIONS OFTHE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY, AND ASSOCIATION RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER
IDENTITY AND GENDER EXPRESSION 4-7 (Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.iglhrc.
org/files/iglhrcprogram-docs/IGLHRC-Rep-to-UN-SRs30Oct2007.pdf (Argentina, Georgia,
Ghana, Indonesia, Moldova, Russia, Singapore, Turkey, Uganda); Stephen Brown, The
Lesbian and Gay Movement in Argentina, 29 LATIN ANN. PERSP. 119, 124 (2002); Keith
Goddard, A Fair Representation: GALZ and the History of the Gay Movement in Zimbabwe,
16 J. GAY & LESBIAN Soc. SERv. 75, 79, 93 (2004) (Zimbabwe); Douglas Sanders, Getting
Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 67, 77
(1996) (Turkey); Weiss, supra note 4, at 278-83 (Singapore). Nigeria even proposed legislation
to criminalize political associations and free expression of sexual minorities. See Amnesty
Int'l, Nigeria: Same Sex Bill Negates Nigeria's Obligations to Fundamental Human Rights,
Al Index: AFR 44/013/2006 (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
document.php?lang-e&id=ENGAFR440132006.
43. In much of Eastern Europe and Africa, parts of Latin America, and the entire Middle
East, sexual minorities are still commonly denied rights to free expression and association.
See OTTOSSON, supra note 42; see also Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Situation of Lesbians and
Gays in Council of Europe Member States, Draft Recommendation Explanatory Mem., Doc.
No. 8755, 17-19 (2000) [hereinafter Council of Europe Doc. 8755] (Romania); Amnesty
Int'l, Poland. LGBT Rights Under Attack, AI Index: EUR 37/002/2005 (Nov. 25, 2005),
available at http://web.amnesty.orgen/library/asset/EUR37/002/2005/en/dom-EUR 3 7 0 0
22005en.html (reporting that Polish homosexuals were denied the right to organize a
parade in Warsaw, but homophobes were permitted to parade); Poland to Probe if Teletubbies
Are Gay, REUTERS NEWS, May 29, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
entertainmentNews/idUSL2832037420070528; Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 13 (Russian
homosexuals denied the right to organize a parade in Moscow); Press Release, Eur. Parl.,
MEPs Urge Member States to Ensure Respect for Same-Sex Partnerships (Jan. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter MEPs Urge Member States] (condemning the recent "banning of gay pride and
equality marches" in "a number of EU member states').
44. See generally Baczkowski v. Poland, App. No. 1543/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 24, 2007).
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this discrimination to their domestic populations and to the
international community as consistent with the exceptions in
human rights instruments for public morality and ordre public.
The most difficult forms of regulation to justify are criminal pro-
hibitions on unconventional sexual behavior, as these entail the
most intrusive form of state regulation into the most private and
personal of behaviors. Criminal prohibitions consequently represent
the fastest receding area of state discrimination against sexual
minorities. Other forms of discrimination have, however, proven
more tenacious. Among these are discrimination in the age of legal
consent to sex, bans on military enlistment, and state tolerance of
private persecution of sexual minorities. When sexual minorities
seek state license on equal terms for benefits provided freely to
heterosexuals, such as marriage and parental rights, states have
shown the most recalcitrance.
The present study uses the evolution of human rights law in the
field of sexuality generally and the rights of sexual minorities
specifically as a platform for analyzing the evolution of human
rights legal theories as understood by state and international elites
themselves. Before examining the reasoning upon which political
and legal elites have relied in denying or granting relief from
discrimination to sexual minorities, then, it will be helpful to
summarize state practice. Only with a clear picture of the trends in
state practices can we understand the role of justifications for these
practices under customary international law.
A. Decriminalization of Unconventional Sexual Behavior
On August 1, 2003, Europe became totally free of laws crim-
inalizing same-sex, adult, consensual intercourse for the first time
in over a millennium.45 This achievement was accomplished largely
through the influence of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly; the EU Parliament; the governments of the Netherlands,
Belgium, and the Nordic states; and the increasingly progressive
45. Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International Law, INT'L
LESBIAN & GAY ASS'N, July 17, 2005, http://www.ilga.org/news-results.asp?FileCategory-
44&ZoneID=7&FileID=577 (last visited Nov. 20,2008). On August 1, 2003, Armenia became
the last country in Europe to repeal its prohibition on same-sex intercourse. Id.
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ECtHR. But Europe's policies are not yet representative of the
global attitude toward unconventional sexuality. As of 2008, same-
sex intercourse remains subject to criminal penalties in 41 of the
192 United Nations member states for women and in 81 states and
3 sub-state provinces for men, including almost all of Africa and the
Middle East, and much of Asia.46 This number includes some states
that have no laws forbidding homosexual intercourse eo nomine but
that nonetheless prosecute it under nebulous prohibitions on
"immorality," "debauchery," "obscenity," or "hooliganism."47 In these
countries, homosexuality is as illegal de facto as it is in countries
that formally forbid homosexual conduct.48 As of 2008, laws and
46. See OTTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42. I have verified,
corrected, and updated this information through the following sources: Council of Europe
Doc. 8755, supra note 43, Recommendation 4 & Explanatory Mem. 16 (Andorra, the
Czech Rep., Malta); Edwin Cameron, Constitutional Protection of Sexual Orientation and
African Conceptions of Humanity, 118 S. AFRICAN L.J. 642 (2001) (Zimbabwe); Goddard,
supra note 42, at 88 (Zimbabwe); Dianne Hubbard & Elizabeth Cassidy, Namibia: Family
Law Reform in Namibia: Work in Progress, in INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW, 2002
EDITION 255, 264 (A. Bainham ed., 2002) [hereinafter 2002 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY]
(Namibia); Weiss, supra note 4, at 268, 274-75 (Singapore); Donna Abu-Nasr, Gay Arabs
Venture Out, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2005, at M07 (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia); British Man on
Trial for Sodomy in Ghana, INT'L HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.iht.
com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8214 8 58; Gays Arrested in Dubai Could Face Punishment,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 2005, at A61 [hereinafter Gays Arrested in Dubai] (United Arab
Emirates); Andrea Huncar, A Subtle Struggle in Africa, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 29, 2004, at F2
(Uganda); Stephanie Nolen, Gays Take Cautious Steps to Come Out in Africa, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 22, 2006, at A15 (Botswana, Cameroon, Nigeria & Uganda); Jeremy
Seabrook, It's Not Natural, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 3, 2004, at 21 (Zambia, Nigeria,
Uganda, Botswana, Tanzania); The Denial of Sexual Rights in Botswana: A Threat of the
Health of Sexual Minorities, HUM. RTS. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2005, 2005 WLNR 23190655
(Botswana); Younge, supra note 4, at 6 (Jamaica); Behind the Mask, http://www.mask.org.za
(last visited Nov.20, 2008) (penal laws in Africa); News Release, Human Rights Watch,
Morocco: Overturn Verdicts for Homosexual Conduct, Dec. 12, 2007, available at
http://hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/11/morocco-overturn-verdicts-homosexual'conduct; Press
Release, Int'l Gay & Lesbian Hum. Rts. Comm'n, Singapore Update: Law Against
Homosexuals to Remain, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/
section.php?id=pos=O&print=l&detail=79 2 .
47. Especially in many African states, homosexual intercourse may go unmentioned in
the criminal laws, but social pressures and police harassment combine to create a de facto
prohibition. See Huncar, supra note 46, at F2 (citing Eritrea and Egypt as examples). States
may further seek to reinforce or inflame social stereotypes of and prejudice toward sexual
minorities by publicizing information about the sexual orientation or private sexual conduct
of citizens identified as homosexuals. See Caroline Hawley, Anger Over Egypt Gay Trial, BBC
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1493041.stm (last visited Nov.
29, 2008).
48. See Concluding Observations of the Comm. Against Torture: Egypt, U.N. Doc.
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policies in countries prohibiting homosexual intercourse directly or
indirectly regulate the behavior of some 2.5 billion of the world's 6.7
billion people, more than a third of the world's population.49
Penalties for homosexual conduct in most of these countries are
disproportional to whatever harm the crime is imagined to cause,
and range from long terms of imprisonment (up to life) to physical
punishment to execution.5 ° At least seven countries are known to
prescribe the death penalty for homosexual conduct-Afghanistan,
Iran, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.5
Other forms of unconventional sexuality may receive lesser but still
harsh punishments. For example, in addition to capital punishment
for sodomy, the Iranian penal code prescribes a punishment of one
hundred lashes for the offense of Tafhiz ("the rubbing of the thighs
or buttocks" between two men), sixty lashes for male kissing, and
one hundred lashes for the first three convictions for the offense of
Mosaheqeh (lesbianism) and death for the fourth.52 While reliable
calculations of actual executions do not exist, Iran has reportedly
imposed the death penalty on homosexuals numerous times.53
Capital punishment clearly violates ICCPR's Article 6 prohibition
on the imposition of the death penalty for any but "the most serious
CAT/C/CR/29/4, 5(e) (Dec. 12, 2002); Comm'n on H.R., Opinions Adopted by the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 7/2002 (Egypt) (Sept. 3, 2001), 28-29; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, IN A TIME OF TORTURE: THE ASSAULT ON JUSTICE IN EGYPT'S CRACKDOWN ON
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT 13-16 (2004).
49. Calculations performed based on populations given by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2008 EDITION, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/ [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK 2008].
50. See, e.g., Gays Arrested in Dubai, supra note 46, at A61 (noting that punishment for
homosexuality in the UAE includes lashing, up to five years imprisonment, and forced
hormone treatments).
51. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
Sudan, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 (1997) (noting that Sudan imposes the death
penalty for "committing a third homosexual act); OTTOSSON, supra note 42, at 6, 17, 23, 32,
35, 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; Nazila Fathi, Despite President's Denials, Gays
Insist They Exist, if Quietly, in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at All (execution of gay
teenagers in Iran); Homosexuality in Pakistan, UNITED NATIONS IRIN NEWS SERV., May 23,
2005, available at http://www.ilga.org/news-results.asp?FileCategory=9&ZoneD=38&File
ID=604. Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates may be an eighth and ninth. See OTTOSSON,
supra note 42, at 27, 40.
52. Islamic Penal Code of Iran, supra note 22, arts. 108-10, 121-22, 124, 127, 129, 131;
James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 1, 28 (1994).
53. See Wilets, supra note 52, at 28-29 nn.93-94.
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crimes,"54 but the fact that over one-third of the states in the world
impose criminal punishment for unconventional sexuality with
impunity seems to indicate very significant disagreement about the
limitations that international human rights law imposes on the
state's power to dictate how individuals behave in their private and
intimate associations.
Perhaps what is most surprising about international human
rights law relating to sexuality is not the number of states that
continue to criminalize unconventional sexuality, but rather the
rapidity with which a majority of the world's states have decrimi-
nalized it. A handful of states stopped penalizing homosexual in-
tercourse before the twentieth century, 5 but most of the remainder,
including almost all of the politically and economically powerful
states of the world, have decriminalized unconventional sexual
conduct in the past fifty years. Until 1982, decriminalizations
trickled along. Denmark, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden decrim-
inalized homosexual intercourse in the 1930s and 1940s.56 Most of
greater Europe followed in the 1960s and 1970s.57 In 1963, the
Supreme Court of Israel nullified the provisions of the Israeli
criminal law prohibiting homosexual intercourse, 8 and it was
formally abolished from the criminal laws in 1988."9 England and
54. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(2); see also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Sudan, supra note 22, 8 ('The imposition
in [Sudan] of the death penalty for offences which cannot be characterized as the most
serious, including ... committing a third homosexual act, illicit sex, [etc.] ... is incompatible
with article 6 of the Covenant.").
55. France and the Netherlands decriminalized homosexual intercourse in 1810, Belgium
in 1867, and Italy in 1889. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 328-29 tbl.4. The International
Lesbian & Gay Association reports that Brazil decriminalized homosexual intercourse in
1823. See Int'l Lesbian & Gay Ass'n, World Legal Survey: Brazil, available at http://
www.ilga.org. Spain followed much later, decriminalizing homosexual intercourse in 1932.
See MERIN, supra note 42, at 328-29 tbl.4.
56. See Sanders, supra note 42, at 70-71.
57. See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act 1967 (c.60), § 1(1) (U.K.); Smith & Grady v. United
Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 511-12, 44 (2000); MERIN, supra note 42, at 328-29 tbl.4;
Sanders, supra note 42, at 71; Judit Szakacs, Hungarian Politics: A Gay Old Time,
TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Apr. 21, 2005; BUNDESGESETZBLATT, June 30, 1969, pt.I, at 653 (W.
Ger.).
58. See El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749 (Isr. Sup. Ct.)
(Dorner, J., concurring), available at http://www.tau.ac.i/law/aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm
(citing Yosef Ben Ami v. Attorney General, 18 P.D. 225, 238 (1963) (Isr.)).
59. See id. 9.
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Wales decriminalized sodomy in 1967,6° with Canada following in
1969,6" and Scotland in 1980.62
Beginning in 1982, the trend toward decriminalization of un-
conventional sexuality was buttressed and accelerated by two
European developments. The first was the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe's Resolution 924, which urged member
states to decriminalize homosexual intercourse and to ensure
equality of treatment between heterosexuals and homosexuals.63
This was followed in 1984 by the European Parliament's adoption
of recommendations to eliminate workplace discrimination based
on sexual orientation.64 These resolutions established the first
Europe-wide public policy of treating some kinds of discrimination
based on sexual orientation as inconsistent with state policies
respecting personal freedoms and the limits of governmental regu-
lation.
The second development was the ECtHR's 1981 decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.65 In Dudgeon, the court heard a
challenge to Northern Ireland's criminal prohibition on oral and
anal intercourse, described in the statutes at issue as "buggery" and
"gross indecency."66 In considering whether this invasion of the
private life of the applicant could be justified for the protection of
morality, the court found that none of the various social and
political factors it considered could qualify the legislation as
"necessary or appropriate" in a democratic society.67 Instead, the
court held:
Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as
immoral may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the commis-
sion by others of private homosexual acts, this cannot on its own
60. Sexual Offenses Act 1967 (c.60), § 1(1) (U.K.).
61. Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement of Formal
Legal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1143, 1149 (2004).
62. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (c.62), § 80(1); see Millbank, supra note 4, at 122.
63. Council of Eur., Parl. Ass., Recommendation on Discrimination Against Homosexuals,
Recommendation 924 (1981), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta8l/EREC924.htm.
64. EUR. PARL. RES. 1-1358/83, O.J. (C 104), at 46 (1984).
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warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting
adults alone who are involved."8
The basis of the decision-a violation of the Article 8 right of
privacy without reference to Article 14 (discrimination)--evidences
an approach concerned with protecting sexual liberty in general
from unjustified state interference. The ECtHR has reiterated the
Dudgeon holding on this point several times since, striking down
statutes in Ireland and Cyprus criminalizing adult, consensual
homosexual intercourse.69 The court's decision on the matter binds
all forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe.7 °
A steady stream of liberalizations followed Dudgeon over the
next two decades. Domestic courts and legislatures around the
world began striking down prohibitions on adult, consensual
homosexual conduct with great rapidity. Northern Ireland was
the first following Dudgeon in 1982 to decriminalize homosexual
intercourse, 71 while France repealed its law making homosexuality
an aggravating circumstance in the offense of public indecency.72 In
1984, Cuba decriminalized same-sex intercourse, and in 1986, New
Zealand did as well.73 In 1991, Hong Kong decriminalized oral and
anal intercourse.74 After liberation from communist dictatorship in
the early 1990s, almost all of the former Soviet republics of Eastern
Europe, the Baltics, and several in Central Asia decriminalized
homosexual intercourse as well.75
68. Id.
69. See Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 186 (1989).
70. Ireland did not comply with the judgment until 1993, however. Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Act 1993, No. 20, §§ 2-4 (July 7, 1993) (Ire.).
71. Sanders, supra note 42, at 71.
72. Loi de 4 aofit 1981, Journal officiel (5 aofit 1982) (Fr.).
73. Sanders, supra note 42, at 71.
74. Phil C.W. Chan, The Lack of Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Legislation in
Hong Kong: Breach of International and Domestic Legal Obligations, 9 INT'LJ. HUM. RTs. 69,
71 (2005).
75. Latvia decriminalized homosexual intercourse in 1993. See Katrina Z.S. Schwartz,
Gay Rights: United In Hostility, TRANSITIONS ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2005. Russia, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine decriminalized homosexual intercourse soon after liberation,
followed in 1997 and 1998 by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. See Mark Ungar,
State VIolence and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Rights, 22 NEW POL.
Sci. 61, 62 n.1 (2000).
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In 1994, the U.N. Human Rights Committee put an international
spin on these mostly isolated events. In Toonen v. Australia,76 the
U.N. Human Rights Committee found that prohibitions on homo-
sexual intercourse constituted a violation of Articles 17(1) (privacy),
26 (equal protection of the laws) and 2(1) (nondiscrimination) of the
ICCPR. 77 After acknowledging that adult, consensual sexual activity
conducted in private falls within the scope of Article 17 privacy,
the Committee stated that interference in such a right could only
be justified if "reasonable in the circumstances"-a phrase the
Committee interpreted in harmony with the ECtHR's interpretation
of Article 7 of the ECHR v8 to mean "proportional to the end sought
and ... necessary in the circumstances of any given case."79 The
Committee rejected Tasmania's proffered justification for the
legislation as necessary to secure public morality on the ground
that such a rationale could justify virtually any invasion of
privacy.8" The Committee found that, because the criminal law
prohibiting homosexual intercourse went mostly or entirely
unenforced, it could not be deemed "necessary" or "essential" to
protect morality.8 In concluding, the Committee opined that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation was forbidden by Articles
26 and 2(1) under the rubric of discrimination based on "sex." 2 The
76. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., Commc'n No. 488/1992, at 226, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Toonen].
77. Id. 6.14, 7.1, 73.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
79. Toonen, supra note 76, 8.3-8.4.
80. Id. 8.4-8.6.
81. Id. 8.6.
82. Id. 8.7. As noted by Heifer and Miller, the more common classification seems to be
"other status." See Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human
Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 61,
70-71 (1996). The author is aware of only one other case in which a tribunal (a U.S. state
court) classified the issue as sex discrimination rather than sexual orientation
discrimination. See Deane v. Conaway, 2006 WL 148145, at *5 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006);
accord Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring); see also
SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBiA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM passim (1988); Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
197, 255-57 (1994). But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438 (Cal. 2008) (holding that
"judicial decisions in a variety of contexts similarly have concluded that statutes, policies, or
public or private actions that treat the genders equally but that accord differential treatment
either to a couple based upon whether they are persons of the same sex or of opposite sexes,
or to a person based upon whether he or she generally is sexually attracted to persons of the
same gender rather than the opposite gender, do not constitute instances of sex
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Human Rights Committee now often includes prohibitions on
homosexual intercourse among the state measures condemned in its
reports.8 3 More recently, it has broken a new barrier, calling for the
United States to outlaw employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation altogether.'
Neither the Toonen guidance nor the HRC's subsequent practice,
however, further accelerated the trend toward decriminalization.
Decriminalization proceeded on an individual state basis largely as
before. In 1994, Australia reacted to the Toonen guidance by en-
acting a blanket prohibition on provincial laws prohibiting "[s] exual
conduct involving only consenting adults acting in private." 5 Also
in 1994, the European Parliament called expressly for the decrimi-
nalization of homosexual intercourse in all EU member states.8 6 In
1995, Albania, Cyprus, Macedonia, and Moldova repealed their
bans on homosexual intercourse.87 In 1996, the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court struck down that country's laws criminalizing adult,
consensual homosexual sex, 8 and Iceland repealed a similar law. 9
In the following year, the People's Republic of China repealed its
laws forbidding "hooliganism,"90 which had often been used to
discrimination").
83. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee: El
Salvador, July 22, 2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/SLV, 16; Concluding Observations of the
U.N. Human Rights Committee: United Republic of Tanzania, Aug. 18, 1998, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.97, 23.
84. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States, Dec. 18,
2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1, 25, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/.
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) tried to answer the call by introducing just such a
law, see Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2007), but it was never reported to the House by the Committee on Education and Labor
despite having 184 cosponsors. See H.R. 2015: Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007
(GovTrack.us), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-2015.
85. Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act, 1994 AUSTL. ACTS P., § 4(1) (Austl.). For an
account of the dynamic between Tasmania and Australia, see Heifer & Miller, supra note 82,
at 68-69.
86. EUR. PARL. RES. A3-0028/94 (Feb. 8, 1994), 5-6.
87. Int'l Gay & Lesbian Ass'n, Euroletter No. 44, Sept. 1996 (Albania and Cyprus); Int'l
Gay & Lesbian Ass'n, Euroletter No. 41, Apr. 1996 (Macedonia); Int'l Gay & Lesbian Ass'n,
Euroletter No. 34, July 1995 (Moldova).
88. Sentencia No. C-098/96, 9 4 (Const. Ct. 1996), available at http://web.minjusticia.
gov.co/jurisprudencia/CorteConstitucionall1996/Constitucionalidad/C-098-96.htm.
89. Int'l Gay & Lesbian Ass'n, Euroletter No. 44, Sept. 1996.
90. CHOU WAH-SHAN, TONGZHI: POLITICS OF SAME-SEx EROTICISM IN CHINESE SOCIETIES
110 (2000).
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persecute homosexuals,9 while the Constitutional Court of Ecuador
struck down that state's antisodomy law. 92 In 1998, the South
African Constitutional Court, referring to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee's decision in Toonen,93 struck down a similar law on
constitutional grounds.94
Beginning in 2000, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly formalized the trend by announcing a policy of accepting
for membership only those states that had abolished criminal
prohibitions on homosexual intercourse.95 This pushed the last of
the Eastern European holdouts into liberalization. Romania soon
thereafter decriminalized homosexual intercourse after threats of
sanctions from the Council of Europe overcame strident church
opposition. 6 The United States is a relatively late bloomer. Until
1961, every U.S. state outlawed homosexual conduct between
consenting adults; that number was halved by 1986 when the
Supreme Court decided in Bowers v. Hardwick9" that adult homo-
sexuals had no constitutional right to engage in "sodomy."98 In the
2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,99 the Supreme Court overruled
Bowers, finding state statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct to
be an unconstitutional intrusion on freedom and privacy. India may
be the next state to decriminalize homosexual intercourse, 10 ' which
91. See Junling Cui, China's Cracked Closet, FOR. POLY, May 1, 2006, at 90.
92. Sentencia No. 111-97-TC, Registro Official, Supp., No. 203, at 6-7 (Nov. 27, 1997).
93. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
94. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC)
(S. Afr.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36; Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v.
Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Aft.).
95. See Council of Europe Doc. 8755, supra note 43, 4 & Explanatory Mem. 1.
96. See Turcescu & Stan, supra note 21, at 292-94.
97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
98. Id. at 192-94; accord State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Mo. 1986).
99. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
100. India's Supreme Court recently ordered a lower court to reconsider a
nongovernmental organization's (NGO) challenge to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code,
which criminalizes same-sex intercourse between males. See Damayanti Datta, Libido and
the Law, INDIA TODAY MAG., Apr. 22, 2006, at 60, available at http://59.92.116.99/
website/DOCPOST/LegalRights/mayo6/MayO6-legal-rights/RF60-libido%20and
%20the%201aw.pdf. Soon after the court order, an Indian government agency, the National
AIDS Control Organisation, filed an affidavit with the Delhi High Court siding with the
NGO. See Govt's AIDS Cell Pushes To Legalise Homosexuality, TIMESOFINDIA, July 20, 2006,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1779097,prtpage-1.cms. The
outcome of the litigation remains uncertain as of the publication of this Article, although the
Indian government is currently considering recommendations by several expert groups to
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would at one stroke nearly cut in half the world's male population
being subjected to laws criminalizing same-sex intercourse (homo-
sexual intercourse between females is not illegal in India).1"' Very
few of these states have bucked the trend and recriminalized
homosexual intercourse after decriminalizing it.' 2
Several interesting trends are evident from this changing state
practice. First, the primum mobile for decriminalization in Europe
seems to be legislation, but outside of Europe most reforms have
resulted from decisions of domestic constitutional courts (Australia
and China being important exceptions). This may indicate that the
main push for decriminalization in Europe is changing culture,
while the main thrust elsewhere (including Canada, South Africa,
Latin America, and the United States) originates in changing
attitudes of legal and political elites. In other words, recognition of
a human right to unconventional sexuality seems mainly judicially
motivated outside of Europe, although it has been accelerated
worldwide by judicial support.
Second, in most of the cases overturning state restrictions on
unconventional sexuality, the tribunals emphasized the intimacy of
sexual behavior and the centrality of sexual conduct to one's
identity and personality as a reason for treating the matter as
falling within a right to privacy.' 3 There is a definite trend in the
cases toward treating sexuality as in some ways sui generis, which
may be intended to set sexuality apart from other forms of state
regulation of private conduct, giving it a privileged status based on
its importance to individual identity and self-actualization.
Third, although a few of the courts in states that have decrimi-
nalized same-sex intercourse referenced international human rights
treaties and declarations, as well as occasional ECtHR decisions
decriminalize same-sex intercourse.
101. India's population as of July 2008 is estimated at just under 1.1 billion. See WORLD
FACTBOOK 2008, supra note 49.
102. The lone exception seems to be Nicaragua, see Sanders, supra note 42, at 71, but, as
noted, this legislation was struck down as unconstitutional.
103. See, e.g., Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR
1517 (CC) 32 (S. Aft.) (Sachs, J., concurring) ('Respect for human rights requires the
affirmation of self, not the denial of self."), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36; Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 60 (1982) ("The Convention right affected by the
impugned legislation [prohibiting oral and anal intercourse] protects an essentially private
manifestation of the human personality.").
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or U.N. Human Rights Committee observations, not one of them
expressly relied on international law as a basis of authority for
striking down criminal prohibitions on such intercourse. For
example, in overturning the Texas prohibition on oral and anal
intercourse in Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court relied not
on a perceived obligation arising under international human rights
law, but rather on constitutional principles of "substantive due
process."'1 4 The Court did make passing reference to the ECtHR's
decisions on the matter as well as several foreign court decisions, 1
05
but the Court did not postulate that a new rule of human rights law
had arisen, much less that one dictated the outcome of the case
before it. Although the term "fundamental human rights" some-
times made its appearance in the opinion, 106 the liberalization was
justified as necessitated by the internal constitutional law of the
United States rather than an obligation arising under international
law.0 7 The South African Constitutional Court similarly used the
Toonen guidance l' to affirm what it characterized as a domestic
constitutional decision. °9
As discussed in Section II.C below, this is typical of those
domestic courts that have overturned laws prohibiting homosexual
intercourse. In some cases, the courts have struck down the
prohibitions on purportedly constitutional grounds, referencing
"human rights" but defining these as domestic rather than interna-
tional concepts. In other cases, state courts have referenced the
practices of other states and international or regional legal
authorities, but always to supplement rather than supplant
domestic constitutional analysis. Some courts display an interest in
and belief in the relevance of international practice for interpreting
domestic law, but none relies on international human rights law as
a central, much less the primary, basis for recognizing the right of
all persons to express and define themselves sexually with other
consenting adults.
104. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Id. at 573, 576-77.
106. E.g., id. at 565.
107. See id. at 578-79.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
109. See Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
(cc) 1 46-47 (S. Afr.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36.
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B. Nondiscrimination
1. Comprehensive Prohibitions
The decriminalization of unconventional sex removes a funda-
mental barrier to the enjoyment of the human rights to privacy and
association, but it does not ipso facto lead to the full equal treat-
ment of sexual minorities. Even in many states that do not prohibit
unconventional sex, discrimination against sexual minorities is
abundant and takes diverse forms. The next major trend in state
practice following decriminalization has been, first, the abolition
of laws explicitly discriminating against sexual minorities, and,
second, the promulgation of laws forbidding state and private
discrimination. Often these liberalizations have proceeded incre-
mentally, beginning with the elimination of discrimination in the
age of consensual sex, or with the enactment of laws prohibiting
employment discrimination or extending housing benefits to the
same-sex partner of a renter, and later expanding to encompass
other kinds of discrimination. In other cases, more general anti-
discrimination legislation has been adopted.
As of 2008, twenty-two states, as well as numerous municipali-
ties and other sub-state regions, have adopted legislation compre-
hensively prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.110
As with the decriminalization of same-sex intercourse, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European
Union have led the charge. In 1981, the Assembly urged its member
states to assure equal treatment between heterosexuals and
homosexuals in employment matters and child custody and
visitation rights"'-a call it has repeated more recently labeling
discrimination based on sexual orientation as "one of the most
odious forms of discrimination."" 2 Many members of the Council of
Europe continued nonetheless to discriminate against sexual
110. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
111. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation on Discrimination Against Homosexuals,
Recommendation 924 (1981), 7(iii)(b),(d).
112. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Situation of Lesbians and Gays in Council of European
Member States, Recommendation 1474 (2000), 7, 11(i),(iii)(a).
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minorities and same-sex couples in employment, housing, immigra-
tion, and other areas throughout the 1990s." 3
This uneven response provoked further pressure from the
Council. In 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly sought to have
Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR 114 amended to forbid discrimination
"by any public authority" on grounds of sexual orientation,1 5 but
the recommendation was not accepted by the Committee of
Ministers. The Explanatory Report suggests, however, that the
reason for the omission of any direct reference to sexual orientation
was not disagreement with the Assembly but rather a sense that
such a reference would be gratuitous and might cause misinterpre-
tation:
The list of non-discrimination grounds in Article 1 is identical to
that in Article 14 of the Convention. This solution was consid-
ered preferable over others, such as expressly including certain
additional non-discrimination grounds (for example, physical or
mental disability, sexual orientation or age), not because of a
lack of awareness that such grounds have become particularly
important in today's societies as compared with the time of
drafting of Article 14 of the Convention, but because such an
inclusion was considered unnecessary from a legal point of view
since the list of non-discrimination grounds is not exhaustive,
and because inclusion of any particular additional ground might
give rise to unwarranted a contrario interpretations as regards
discrimination based on grounds not so included. It is recalled
that the European Court of Human Rights has already applied
Article 14 in relation to discrimination grounds not explicitly
mentioned in that provision (see, for example, as concerns the
ground of sexual orientation, the judgment of 21 December 1999
in the case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal).116
113. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 49, 4-5 (1989) (upholding
the United Kingdom's refusal to grant immigration benefits to a same-sex partner of a U.K.
citizen).
114. Protocol (No. 12) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,2000, C.E.T.S. No. 177 [hereinafter ECHR Protocol No. 12].
115. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass'n, Opinion No. 216 on Draft Protocol No. 12 to the European
Convention on Human Rights (2000).
116. ECHR Protocol No. 12, supra note 114, Explanatory Report 20 (June 26, 2000),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ReportsIHtml/177.htm.
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Similar calls for comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation
have originated in the EU. In 1984, the European Parliament first
expressly condemned workplace discrimination based on sexual
orientation.'17 Recurrently since that time, the EU Parliament has
called for nondiscrimination legislation in member states encom-
passing equal ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual
intercourse; equal social benefits, inheritance rights, and housing
rights; and antidiscrimination legislation generally, including
access to marriage or an "equivalent" for same-sex couples.11 By the
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam," 9 the (then fifteen) member states of
the European Community inserted a new Article 13 into the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. Article 13(1) now autho-
rizes the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and in
consultation with the European Parliament, to "take appropriate
action to combat discrimination based on sex, ... or sexual orienta-
tion." 2 In January 2006, the EU Parliament made clear that it
"[s]trongly condemns any discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation" and urged member states to end discrimination of
all kinds based on sexual orientation. 121 Later that year, the
Parliament called again on the member states to implement its
antidiscrimination directives with an emphasis on eliminating
discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual orientation by
criminal prohibitions if necessary.'22
117. EUR. PARL. RES. 1-1356/83 (Sexual Discrimination in the Workplace), 1984 O.J. (C
104) 46, 5.
118. EuR. PARL. RES. A3- 0028/94 (Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the EC),
1994 O.J. (C 61) 40, 7 5-10; see EUR. PARL. RES. A4-0223/1996 (Respect for Human Rights
in the European Union in 1994), 1996 O.J. (C 320) 36, 77 78, 83-84. In 2001, the European
Parliament called on the Commission to study ways to decrease discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the EU and called on member states both to combat such
discrimination. Resolution on the Situation Concerning Basic Rights in the European Union,
2001/2014(INI), EUR. PARL. Doc. P5_TA (2003)0012, 77 99-100.
119. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340)01, art. 2, 7.
120. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 43.
121. See Resolution on Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA(2006)0018, It 1,
11.
122. Press Release, Eur. Parl., MEPs Adopt Resolution on the Increase of Racist and
Homophobic Violence in Europe, June 15, 2006; MEPs Urge Member States, supra note 43.
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Despite these tentative moves toward legislated equality, the
European Court of Justice was slow to recognize a comprehensive
human right against discrimination based on sexual orientation. In
the controversial 1998 case Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd.,' 2' the
ECJ found that Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and the Council's
Equal Pay Directive,124 both of which prohibit employment discrimi-
nation with regard to access to employment, training, promotion,
and working terms and conditions "on grounds of sex," do not
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 125 In the case,
Ms. Grant's employer granted travel privileges to the spouse or
"common law opposite sex spouse" of staff members while pre-
cluding Grant's female partner from benefitting from travel
privileges. 126 Citing the ECtHR's conclusion that homosexuals have
no right to a family life with unrelated members of the same sex
under Article 8 of the ECHR, the ECJ decided that "in the present
state of the law within the Community, stable relationships
between two persons of the same sex are not regarded as equivalent
to marriage or stable relationships outside marriage between
persons of opposite sex.' 12' Dismissing the relevance of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee's guidance in Toonen, the court con-
cluded that "Community law as it stands at present does not cover
discrimination based on sexual orientation, such as that in issue in
the main proceedings. 128
Partly in reaction to this decision, in 2000, the EU authorized the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which
prohibits in Article 21(1) discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation.129 Although the Charter is not legally binding, Council
Directive 2000/78/EC, also adopted that year, established a "general
framework" for preventing discrimination on the grounds of sex or
sexual orientation in employment.3 0
123. Case C-249/96, 1998 E.C.R. 621.
124. Council Directive 75/117/EEC, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19, art. 1.
125. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 652, 1 50.
126. Id. at 639-40, 11 4-8.
127. Id. at 648, 35.
128. Id. at 651, 47.
129. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 13.
130. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16. The directive was required to be
implemented by national laws of Member States by the end of 2003. Id. art. 18.
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Also noteworthy among regional precatory declarations, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) called on member states in 1995 to
"ensure that all persons belonging to different segments of their
population be accorded equal respect and consideration in their
constitutions, legislation, and administration and that there be
no subordination, explicit or implied, on the basis of ... sex, sexual
orientation, [etc.]."'' Although the OSCE Assembly has not
repeated the call in any of its declarations since that time, neither
has repudiated it.
Universal, as opposed to regional, efforts to advance the cause of
the human right to nondiscrimination for sexual minorities have
been made by several U.N. committees. Most prominent among
these is the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC). The HRC has
not always supported nondiscrimination for sexual minorities. In
1982, the HRC considered whether the Finnish ban on favorable
portrayals of homosexuality in broadcast media constituted pro-
hibited discrimination. 3 2 The HRC, finding no violation of nondis-
crimination, accepted Finland's invocation of the Article 19(3)
exception for measures necessary to preserve public morality. 13 3 The
opinion seems to imply that the mere portrayal of homosexuality
could somehow present a threat to public morals, as if homosexual-
ity were such an irresistible concept that the mere positive public
portrayal might cause men and women to leave their families
and abandon themselves to lives of debauchery. 3 1 On the other
hand, the HRC's more recent observations stating or implying
that legislation discriminating against homosexuals is inconsistent
with the ICCPR indicates a maturation in its thinking on the
subject.' 35
131. Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., Ottawa Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly, July 8, 1995, 29, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/pa/1995/07/
171_en.pdf.
132. Hertzberg v. Finland, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm. No. 14/61, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 161, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
133. Id. 11.
134. While doctrinally this decision may be reconciled with the much later decision in
Toonen based on invocation in the former of the public morality exception, Laurence Helfer
and Alice Miller are undoubtedly correct in asserting that the Committee's maturing view
of unconventional sexuality between 1982 and 1994 better explains the divergent flavors of
the two decisions. See Helfer & Miller, supra note 82, at 73-74.
135. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
82920081
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Indeed, in Young v. Australia, the Committee extended its
holding in Toonen to find that Australia's refusal to provide the
homosexual partner of a veteran the same pension that it would
have provided to a heterosexual spouse violated Article 26 of the
Convention.'36 Australia chose not to argue that the distinction
between homosexual partners (who cannot marry under Australian
law) and heterosexual spouses could be justified on a reasonable
and legitimate policy basis.'37 In an individual concurring opinion,
two Committee members emphasized this fact to imply that in
future, similar cases the Committee might come to a different
conclusion if confronted with "reasonable and objective" arguments
to justify discrimination based on sexual orientation. 138 That the
other ten members of the Committee declined to join in this opinion
indicates either that they disagreed and concluded that such
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation could never be
reasonable and objective, or that they considered the emphasis on
Australia's failure to justify its policy to be gratuitous. Given the
trend of the Commission's interpretation of the Convention,
however, the former conclusion seems more likely than the latter.'39
Finally, four U.N. Committees-the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; the Committee on Torture; the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child-as well as the U.N. Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention have so far taken the official position
that various forms of discrimination against sexual minorities
violate human rights obligations under the treaties respectively
Committee, Zimbabwe, 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.89 (1998) (expressing "concern that
homosexuals are subjected to discrimination').
136. Youngv. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc'n No. 941/2000, 10.4-11 (Sept.
18, 2003), U.N. Doc. No. CCPRIC/78/D/941/2000 [hereinafter Young].
137. Id. app. (Wedgwood & DePasquale, concurring).
138. Id. app.
139. Compare, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong (China), 15, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.117 (Nov. 4, 1999) (determining that the lack of individual remedies
available to redress discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation violated Article 26 of the
Convention), with U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee, Hong Kong, 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HKG/CO/2 (Mar. 31, 2006) (expressing
appreciation for initiatives undertaken to counter discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation).
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administered by them.14 ° The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the
Child specifically opined that discriminatory age of consensual sex
laws violate international human rights law, although it left the
basis for this conclusion unstated.
1 4
'
The trend toward individual state recognition of a general human
right to protection against discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion is, as a factor in the development of customary international
law, potentially as influential as the opinions of the Council of
Europe, OECD, Human Rights Committee, and other supranational
agencies. As noted, a growing number now unilaterally prohibit
discrimination against sexual minorities comprehensively, includ-
ing in government action and services, housing and real estate,
employment, education, and public accommodations such as the
provision of goods and services.142 A few states-Ecuador, Fiji,
Portugal, South Africa, and Switzerland-have expressly incorpo-
140. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 7/2002
(Sept. 3, 2001) 27-28 (Egypt); see Holning Lau, Note, Sexual Orientation: Testing the
Universality of International Human Rights Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689, 1701-02 & n.84
(2004).
141. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (Isle of Man): United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-Isle
of Man, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.134, 22 (Oct. 16, 2000).
142. These include federal and provincial legislation in Buenos Aires, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark (as early as 1987), Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and some states and municipalities of the United States. See
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS app.II at 782-87 (Robert Wintemute &
Mads Andenaes eds., 2001); see also, e.g., Anti-Discrimination Act 48 of 1977, Part 4C
(Australia); Sdo Paulo Lei No. 10.948, de 5 nov. 2001, art. 1 (Brazil); Loi de 6 nov. 2001
(France); Loi de 1 aofit 2000 (France); Human Rights Act 1993, § 21(1)(m) (New Zealand); El
Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749 (Isr. Sup. Ct.), available at
http://www.tau.ac.il/law/aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm; OTTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal
Survey, supra note 42; Brown, supra note 42, at 119; Maria Berenice Dias, Brazil: Same-Sex
Couples, in INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW, 2003 EDITION 69, 71 (Andrew Bainham
ed., 2003) [hereinafter 2003 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY] (Brazil); Hubbard & Cassidy, supra
note 46, at 264, 274 (Namibia); Ranata Uitz, Hungary: Mixed Prospects for the
Constitutionalization of Gay Rights, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 705, 712-13 (2004) (Hungary);
Wilets, supra note 52, at 56-57 (Australia, Denmark, France, & the Netherlands);
Wintemute, supra note 61, at 1152 & n.39; Paul Gerber, Case Comment, South Africa:
Constitutional Protection for Homosexuals-A Brave Initiative, But Is It Working?, 2000
AUSTL. GAY & LESBIANL.J. 37, 50-51 (South Africa); Szakacs, supra note 57, at *2 (Hungary).
A proposal to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation was adopted by the
Justice Commission of Turkey in 2004, but was eliminated from the law by the Justice
Minister, Cemil Cicek. See Sebnem Arsu, For Gays in Turkey, A Slow Road to Equality, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 6, 2006, at 3.
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rated a right to protection from discrimination based on sexual
orientation into their new constitutions.'43
Where a state has adopted no national prohibition on discrimi-
nation, governmental subdivisions such as provinces or territories
may adopt such protections. For example, while the United States
has no federal legislation prohibiting some kinds of discrimination
based on sexual orientation, twenty states (including the two most
populous) plus the District of Columbia,'44 as well as numerous
municipalities, 4 ' covering in toto more than a quarter of the U.S.
population,'46 have adopted legislation to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation (and in some states based on
appearance, "gender identity and expression," or domestic part-
nership status). Such legislation may cover varied fields of legal
regulation, including employment and professions, housing and
real estate transactions, licensing, financial credit, business and
commercial transactions generally, and public accommodations
and services.'47 Similarly, although Germany lacks general
143. E.g., Constituci6n Politics de 1998, art. 23, § 3 (Ecuador), available at http://pdba.
georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html; Constitution of Fiji (1998) sec.
38(2)(a), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/f0O00.html; Constituiqdo da
Repdblica Portuguesa (2005) art. 13, § 2, available at http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/
Paginas/ConstituicaoRepublicaPortuguesa.aspx (Portugal); Constitution of South Africa
(1996), ch. 2, § 9(3), available at http://www.info.gov.zaldocuments/constitution/ index.htm;
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (2002) art. 8(2), available at http://www.
admin.chlorg/polit/00083/index.html?lang=en (Switzerland).
144. As of 2008, these states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Hawai'i, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. As of 2008, only the District of Columbia has incorporated a
right to nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation into its state constitution or bill of
rights. See D.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 (equal protection and nondiscrimination).
145. See Wilets, supra note 52, at 57.
146. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 325.
147. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (public accommodations) (West 2007); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12940, 12944, 12955 (West 2005) (employment, licensing, housing and real estate); COLO.
REV. STAT.ANN. §§ 5-3-210, 8-3-102, 8-17-101, 10-3-1104, 10-4-626, 12-5-102, 12-12-114 et al.
(West 2008) (credit, employment, licensing, juror eligibility); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4a-
60a, 4a-81b to -81k (2007) (government contracts, licensing and professions, employment,
public accommodations, housing and real estate, credit transactions, training, state services);
D.C. CODE§§ 2-1402.11, -.31, -.41, -.73, 32-408 (2008) (employment, public accommodations,
education, government services); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-2, 515-3 to -5 (2007) (employment,
housing and real estate, real estate financing); 775 ILL. COMPILED STAT. pt.5 (2007)
(employment, real estate, financial credit, public accommodations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, §§ 4572, 4582, 4592, 4596, 4602 (2007) (employment, housing and real estate, financial
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antidiscrimination laws, in 1992, Brandenburg adopted a new
constitution prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation,
and a few Ldnder eventually followed the example.'48
credit, educational opportunity, public accommodations); MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, §§ 5, 8,
16, 23 (2008) (public accommodations, employment, housing and real estate); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2007) (employment, housing and real estate, real estate
finance); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.08, 363A.09, 363A.11 to .18 (West 2007) (employment,
housing and real estate, education, public accommodations and services, financial credit);
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 281.370(2), 338.125, 613.330,613.340(2) (2007) (employment); N.H. REV.
STAT.ANN. §§ 21-I:52, 354-A:7, 354-A: 10 (West 2008) (employment, housing); N.J. STAT.ANN.
§§ 10:2-1, 10:5-12, 10:5-33 (West 2008) (employment, public accommodations, housing and
real estate, business transactions, financial credit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2008)
(employment, housing and real estate); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 313 (McKinney 2008) (education);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 296, 296-a (McKinney 2008) (employment, public accommodations,
licensing, housing and real estate, commercial transactions, financial credit); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 10.030,93.270, 179.750,659.850, 659.870, 659A.006, 659A.009, 659A.030 et al. (West 2008)
(juror eligibility, public accommodations, employment, education, municipal laws generally,
housing and real estate); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-7, 28-5.1-4, 28-5.1-7 to -9, 28-5.1-14, 34-37-2,
34-37-4,34-37-5.4 (2007) (employment, public services, education, licensing, housing and real
estate); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961(b), 963 (2007) (employment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
10403 (2007) (financial credit); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4502-03 (2007) (housing and real
estate, real estate financing, public accommodations); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495,
1621(a)(7) (2007) (employment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.30.300, 48.150.020 & ch. 49.6
(West 2008) (financial credit, housing, employment); WIS. STAT.§§ 16.765, 106.52(3)(a),
111.36(1)(d) (2005-06) (employment, public accommodations). As with national nondis-
crimination legislation in some countries, see, e.g., Szakacs, supra note 57, at *4 (Hungary),
and in some cases judicial decisions, see, e.g., Trinity W. Univ. v. British Colum. Coll. of
Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (Can.) (holding that a private religious college that required
students to refrain from homosexual behavior and other "Biblically condemned" sins did not
discriminate against homosexuals), some of these statutes make exceptions for religious
organizations and small scale lessors of real estate and employers. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(G) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.20 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-
7(A), 28-1-9 (2008); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKinney 2008). Minnesota explicitly
exempts any "nonpublic service organization" that provides "occasional services to minors"
from the nondiscrimination duty, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.20, 363A.24 (2007),
apparently on the theory that the attractions of homosexuality are so compelling that
otherwise-heterosexual minors will prove unable to resist its charms once exposed to a
practicing homosexual. Alternatively, the Minnesota legislature may assume that sexual
minorities are pedophiles.
148. Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE 71, 78 & n.15 (Kees Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993)
[hereinafter HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE ]; Wilifried Schliiter, Jasmin
Heckes & Sonja Stommel, Die Gesetzliche Regelung von Auflerehelichen Partnerschaften
Gleichen und Verschiedenen Geschlechts im Ausland und Die Deutschen Reformvorhaben,
2000 DEUTSCHES uND EUROPAISCHES FAMIuENRECHT 1, 6. The German Grundgesetz does
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as such. See Greg Taylor, The
New Gay and Lesbian Partnerships Law in Germany, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 573, 585 (2003).
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This is not to say that substate legislation creates a general
atmosphere of equality for sexual minorities. It is true that, in a few
states lacking national antidiscrimination legislation based on
sexual orientation, local antidiscrimination laws may be promoted
pursuant to a national policy. Brazil, for example, lacks comprehen-
sive federal legislation of this kind, but it has recently begun a
national program entitled "Brazil without Homophobia" designed
to counter persecution of homosexuals and foster equality on the
federal, state, and municipal levels. 4 9 Nonetheless, regional laws
often have been enacted based on local sensibilities that run
counter to homophobic tendencies in other regions of the same
country, as in the United States, where discrimination based on
sexual orientation is prohibited in some states and counties and
quite common in others. 
150
At the antipodes of the discrimination spectrum is the majority
of the world's states-including almost all of Africa, Asia, the
Middle East, and much of Latin America-which continues to lack
any legislation to protect sexual minorities from public or private
149. See Maria Berenice Dias, Judge, Tribunal of Justice of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil,
Speech at the First World Games, Montrial, Canada: Brazil without Homophobia? (July 25,
2006), available at http://www.mariaberenicedias.com.br [hereinafter Dias, Brazil Without
Homophobia?].
150. This point refers to national policy rather than toleration of private acts of
discrimination. There is an important difference between permitting private individuals and
organizations to discriminate and adopting a governmental policy of discrimination.
Nonetheless, in recognition of the role of the state in countering atavistic social tendencies
toward racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination, many states prohibit private
discrimination on various grounds. In some states, this extends to at least some forms of
private discrimination based on sexual orientation. In the United States, this is accomplished
through various national laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and similar laws. See, e.g., Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-1 to -3) (prohibiting private employment discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
color, or national origin). This has been unevenly extended, however, to private discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(finding unconstitutional a law prohibiting a private association of Boy Scouts from excluding
homosexual scout masters); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (finding unconstitutional the application of a Massachusetts statute
forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation to require St. Patrick's Day parade
organizers to allow GLIB to march in the parade). There is sufficient variation in state
approaches to private discrimination that a trend toward prohibiting such discrimination
cannot be called a recognized state duty imposed by international human rights law. See
Robert Wintemute, Religion vs. Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human Rights?, 1 J.L. &
EQUAIUTY 125, 142-47 (2002)
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discrimination.' 5 ' In some of these countries, general antidis-
crimination legislation proposed on behalf of sexual minorities has
met with rebuffs.152 It remains clear that there is no consensus that
sexual minorities are entitled under international human rights law
to freedom from arbitrary discrimination. More generally, no major
international human rights instrument other than the European
Charter expressly forbids discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, and the U.N. General Assembly has never expressed a definite
position on the issue, leaving a telling lack of explicit recognition of
a human right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based on
sexual orientation. There is, nonetheless, a clear trend toward the
expansion of the right against discrimination to encompass sexual
orientation, sexual identity, and other aspects of sexuality.
2. Limited Prohibitions
The most rapidly disappearing discrimination relates to unequal
ages of consent to sexual intercourse. In many states, even those
that do not prohibit same-sex intercourse, persons can legally
consent to heterosexual (or vaginal) intercourse at a younger age
than that at which they can legally consent to homosexual (or, in
some cases, oral or anal) intercourse. Violations of these provisions
are typically considered statutory rape and carry criminal penal-
ties, including fines and imprisonment. They are usually designed,
as in a recently repealed Austrian law, "in order to protect ... a
young, maturing person from developing sexually in the wrong
way," on the theory that "homosexual influence endangers maturing
males to a significantly greater extent than girls of the same age."'53
151. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 42, at 123-24 (Argentina). Hong Kong SAR prohibits
discrimination by the government but not private entities or individuals. See Chan, supra
note 74, at 70, 74.
152. See generally OrTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; see also,
e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, South Korea: Anti-Discrimination Bill Excludes
Many (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://hrw.org/.
153. See Wolfmeyer v. Austria, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 21(2006); L. & V. v. Austria, 36 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 55, 24 (2003). Other states may phrase their homophobia in more neutral terms,
as in Hong Kong: "rhe reasons [for the age discrimination] are that men between 16 and 21
often have only a limited and possibly distorted knowledge of homosexual activity; they
might be curious about and inclined to experiment with new activities and consequently be
easily led into committing homosexual acts ...." Chan, supra note 74, at 72.
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The equalization of the ages of consent for heterosexual inter-
course and homosexual intercourse is an important first step
toward eliminating discrimination more generally, because dif-
ferential ages of consent are based on two homophobic assumptions
illustrated in the Austrian law quoted above. The first is that a
homosexual experience during the teen years can "convert" someone
who would have been heterosexual into a homosexual or bisexual.
That there is no scientific evidence for this belief exemplifies the
kind of alarmism that often surrounds state treatment of the issue.
The second assumption is that the state has legitimate reasons for
using its most extreme tool of social control-the criminal law-to
prevent such a conversion.
With the waning of homophobia among both the public and
political elites in Europe came pressure on European states to
abandon discriminatory ages of consent for sexual intercourse. The
European Parliament persistently called on EU member states to
equalize their age of consent laws beginning in 1994' and again
in 1996,'55 1997,156 and 1998.157 The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe similarly urged in 1981158 and again in 2000159
that all member states abolish discriminatory ages of consent.
They encountered resistance from member states and even the
European Human Rights Commission,"' which consistently re-
fused to recognize privacy and nondiscrimination rights for sexual
minorities against discriminatory ages of consent until the 1996
case Sutherland v. United Kingdom.'6' In that case, the Commission
154. EUR. PARL. RES. A3-0028/94, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 40, 41, 6.
155. EUR. PARL. RES. A4-0223/96, 1996 O.J. (C 320) 36, 45, 84.
156. EUR. PARL. RES. A4-0112/97, 1997 O.J. (C 132) 31, 41, 136.
157. EuR. PARL. RES. A4-0034198, 1998 O.J. (C 80) 43, 50, 136.
158. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 924, 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 78,
7(ii).
159. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1474,2000 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 429,
11(iii)(d).
160. See, e.g., Zukrigl v. Austria, App. No. 17279/90, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
(1992); X. v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 63, 158 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1978);
X. v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., App. No. 5935/72, 3 D.R. 46 (1975); X. v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., App. No.
530/59, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 184; H. F. v. Austria, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 68 (1995);
Johnson v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 386 (1987); A. v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 9721/82, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 145 (1985); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep.
40, 120 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1980).
161. 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 182 (1996).
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ultimately found a lower heterosexual age of consent (sixteen for
heterosexual sex versus eighteen for homosexual sex) violated
Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 8.162
Soon after the Commission's change of posture, the ECtHR
agreed that states holding homosexuals to a different age of consent
violate Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR in the parallel cases L. & V.
v. Austria and S.L. v. Austria."3 The court required Austria to
provide "weighty reasons" to justify the discrimination -a burden
Austria could not sustain given the absence of empirical support for
assumptions underlying such laws. In a more recent case, the
ECtHR emphasized the private nature of the conduct, and required
Austria to compensate an applicant who had been prosecuted and
acquitted of sex with adolescents due to the recent repeal of the
discriminatory criminal law under which the applicant had been
prosecuted.165 The applicant's subsequent acquittal, observed the
court, could not "make undone the suffering associated with the
public exposure of most intimate aspects of the applicant's private
life or the loss of his employment.""1 6 It is now firmly established in
the ECtHR's jurisprudence that discriminatory age of consent
laws violate Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the
ECHR. 16
7
It is interesting that many states lacking comprehensive antidis-
crimination legislation nonetheless have abolished discriminatory
age of consent laws or declined to adopt them in the first place. At
present, all Council of Europe member states and twenty additional
162. Id.
163. L. & V. v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55, 50-54 (2003); S.L. v. Austria, 37 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 39, 41-46 (2003). The ECtHR reaffirmed this decision in B.B. v. United Kingdom, 39
Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 23-25 (2004), and further found that persons with past convictions
under the Austrian law suffered a remediable injury in spite of the fact that Austria had
repealed the law in 2003. See Woditschka & Wiling v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 1 26-
27 (2005).
164. Woditschka & Wifling, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 28.
165. Wolfmeyer v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 31-34 (2006).
166. Id. 45.
167. See S.L., 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 17; L. & V., 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 52-54; B.B. v.
United Kingdom, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 25 (2004). Several Council members equalized ages
of consent long before the ECtHR required it, however. The Dutch parliament, for example,
did so in 1971. See Maarten Salden, The Dutch Penal Law and Homosexual Conduct, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 155, 161 (A.X. van
Naerssen ed., 1987).
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states outside of Europe (plus, most recently, Hong Kong SAR) 68
are known not to discriminate in the age of consent. 169 Nonetheless,
the count of states having discriminatory age of consent laws
greatly outnumbers those that do not discriminate. At present, only
eleven states and some parts of Australia and the United States
have decriminalized homosexual intercourse but kept in place
discriminatory age of consent laws.
170
When states undertake to reduce or eliminate arbitrary discrimi-
nation against sexual minorities and unconventional sexuality,
equal age of consent laws are typically the first of several increas-
ingly liberal steps. Sometimes comprehensive antidiscrimination
legislation has followed immediately, but more often other forms
of discrimination based on sexual orientation have been prohibited
in a fragmented fashion as cultural or political pressure slowly
overcomes entrenched homophobia. Until its abolition in 1998, the
Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission persistently de-
clined to recognize a nondiscrimination right to family life for
homosexual couples deprived of immigration, housing, public em-
ployment, and other benefits available to heterosexuals. 171 The
Parliamentary Assembly, as noted above, has taken precisely the
opposite view of discrimination in several areas of state re-
gulation, 172 having urged the member states to grant sexual
168. Court in Hong Kong lnvalidates Anti-Sodomy Law from British Era, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2005, at A9 [hereinafter Court in Hong Kong].
169. The non-European states are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cambodia, the
Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Israel, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Vietnam. See OTrOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; Wintemute,
supra note 61, at 1149.
170. These states are Albania, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Chile, Gabon, Rwanda, Suriname, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. See Smith &
Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United
Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999); OTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra
note 42; Chan, supra note 74, at 71-72; Court in Hong Kong, supra note 168, at A9; Szakacs,
supra note 57, at *3. But see State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 38 (Kan. 2005) (finding that a state
statute imposing heavier penalties for underage homosexual intercourse than for
heterosexual intercourse violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
171. See, e.g., X. & Y. v. United Kingdom, App. 9369/91, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
220, 222 (1983) (immigration); Simpson v. United Kingdom, App. 11716/85, 47 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 274, 277-80 (1986) (housing); Marangos v. Cyprus, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D.
192, 197 (1997) (public employment).
172. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1474,2000 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 429,
11.
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minorities nondiscrimination rights in public employment and
asylum, and a status comparable to heterosexual couples with
respect to immigration generally.173 Ultimately following the
Assembly's view rather than the Commission's, the ECtHR has
reversed the trend established by the Commission in a very short
period. In its 2004 decision in Karner v. Austria, the court recog-
nized a violation of Article 14 taken in combination with Article 8
where tenancy rights typically granted to the survivor of a hetero-
sexual couple were denied to the survivor in a same-sex relation-
ship. 17 4 In the case, the court concluded that Austria was unable to
meet the proportionality test because it could not show how denying
such benefits to same-sex couples was necessary to promote "the
family in the traditional sense."'75 The ECtHR has, nonetheless,
never interpreted Article 14 to grant sexual minorities a compre-
hensive right against arbitrary discrimination by Council of Europe
member states.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is another
regional authority to have held that rights against arbitrary
discrimination extend to sexual minorities. In the 1998 case Giraldo
v. Colombia, it heard and declared admissible a complaint by a
lesbian prisoner in Colombia who was denied the right to "intimate
visits" from her partner based solely on her sexual orientation.
76
The Commission was unpersuaded by Colombia's defense based on
"security, discipline, and morality in penitentiary institutions" and
"a deeply rooted intolerance in Latin American culture of homosex-
ual practices." '177 In a laconic opinion, the Commission concluded
that the claim was admissible because Colombia's policy "could
constitute an arbitrary or abusive interference" with the peti-
tioner's "private life" under Article 11(2) of the ACHR.178 Although
the Commission decided to continue analyzing the merits of the
173. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1470,2000 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ONH.R. 426,
77.
174. 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528, 7 34-43 (2004). The case is procedurally remarkable because
the court declined to strike the case as moot when the applicant died prior to judgment. See
id. 28.
175. See id. 39-43.
176. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case No. 11.656, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 71/99,
OEA/Ser.LIV/II.106, doc. 6 rev., TT 2, 14-23.
177. Id. IT 11-12.
178. Id. TT 21, 23.
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case, the Colombian government has refused to change policies and
no resolution is recorded almost a decade later."l 9 Giraldo is in any
case an isolated instance and not part of a pattern of ACHR juris-
prudence on this issue.
Many states have introduced legislation prohibiting specific
kinds of discrimination beyond equalizing ages of consent. In most
countries, this is typically accomplished through legislation or
judicial decisions prohibiting discrimination on a case-by-case
basis. The United Kingdom, for example, prohibits discriminatory
eviction of the same-sex partner of a homosexual tenant in compli-
ance with the ECtHR's Karner decision, 80 and several countries
outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing leases
generally." 1 Others prohibit discrimination in public education or
public employee benefits" 2 or inheritance.'83 Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United States, and most of Europe allow citizens
to sponsor their same-sex partners for immigration purposes." 4 In
Brazil, some courts have recognized same-sex couples as de facto
partners and granted divisions of assets following breakup accord-
ingly; similarly, the federal National Institute for Social Security
determined in 2000 that bereaved same-sex partners could collect
179. See IGLHRC, In Colombia: Lesbian Inmate Subjected to Punitive Sanctions and
Inhuman Treatment, In Response to Petition Claiming Her Rights, Dec. 18, 1999, available
at http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id=5&detal=349.
180. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass'n, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1113 (H.L.) (U.K.); accord
Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989).
181. See, e.g., Lilla Farkas, Nice on Paper: The Aborted Liberalisation of Gay Rights in
Hungary, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 142, at 563, 570
(Hungary); Angelo Pantazis, Home and the World: Lesbian and Gay Places in the Law, 119
S. AFRICAN L.J. 305, 310 (2002) (South Africa).
182. See, e.g., Farkas, supra note 181, at 563-64 (Hungary). In addition, in some
Australian states, employment tribunals are empowered to hear complaints of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Michael Kirby, Same-Sex Relationships: An Australian
Perspective on a Global Issue, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note
142, at 7, 12, 20.
183. See Yuaval Yoaz, Justice Min. Retreats on Move To Bar Gays from Inheritance Law,
HAARETZ.COM, May 9, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/901141.html (Israel).
184. See Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct, S.C.1, ch. 27 (2001) (Can.); Immigration
& Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Can.); JOHN HART, STORIES OF GAY AND
LESBIAN IMMIGRATION 26, 29, 32-33 (2002); Wilets, supra note 52, at 104. For a history and
analysis of the history of Canadian same-sex immigration laws, see generally OTOSSON,
supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; Nicole LaViolette, Coming Out in Canada
The Immigration of Same-Sex Couples Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
49 McGILL L.J. 969 (2004).
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social security benefits on similar terms to different-sex couples in
long-term extramarital relationships.
185
These examples cannot be said to illustrate a powerful trend
toward the adoption of even a limited right to be free from all
discrimination based on sexual orientation. They do evidence a
growing recognition, however, that some forms of discrimination
based on sexual orientation are arbitrary and unjustified. Taken
together with the increasing number of states that have enacted
comprehensive prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual
orientation and the pronouncements of human rights authorities,
there does appear to be a definite if still incipient movement toward
the recognition that arbitrary discrimination based on sexual
orientation in its most conservative interpretation contravenes
some state or regional policy protecting national constitutional
rights. In Europe, it is clear that the view that such discrimination
violates internationally recognized human rights has achieved a
critical mass of consensus and will continue to develop.
3. Military Service
The armed forces of most of the world's states have long dis-
criminated against sexual minorities. Even those states relatively
sympathetic to claims of equal rights by sexual minorities have
refused to admit they are as qualified as heterosexuals to work in
defense of their country. Several states have recently come to
admit sexual minorities into the armed services. Europe, as
elsewhere in the human rights law relating to sexual orientation,
has stood at the forefront of this trend. Yet, what few steps have
been taken did not come easily. The European Commission of
Human Rights'86 was slow to recognize a right against discrimina-
tion in admission to participate in the armed forces. 87 The
Commission found as recently as 1984 that military regulations in
185. See Dias, supra note 142, at 73-74.
186. The Commission was established as an advisory body to the Court of Human Rights
in Section II of the ECHR. It was, however, abolished with the adoption of a permanent
European Court of Human Rights in 1998. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Protocol (No. 11) to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring
the control machinery established thereby, E.T.S. No. 155 (1994), available at http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Htmll155.htm.
187. See, e.g., Marangos v. Cyprus, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 192, 195-97 (1997).
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a member state criminalizing homosexual but not heterosexual
intercourse were "objectively and reasonably justified" for the
"prevention of disorder" and the "protection of morals.' 18' The
ECtHR has reversed this position since 1999, however, and con-
demned discrimination against homosexuals seeking to enlist or
remain in the armed services of the United Kingdom.' 89 Although
in each case the state proposed a legitimate aim to justify the
discrimination (again, "national security" and "the prevention of
disorder" being typical), 9 ° the court found the United Kingdom had
failed to justify the measures as proportional, because the U.K. had
produced no sound evidence that sexual minorities constituted a
threat to military discipline, morale, or operational effectiveness.' 9'
At most, the court found, the evidence that the government pro-
duced represented a "predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual
majority against a homosexual minority," which could not, in itself,
justify discrimination. 192 The ECtHR accordingly found a violation
of Article 8 (though not, interestingly, taken in combination with
Article 14). 93
Homosexuals are currently required to be admitted to serve in
the armed forces in Australia, the Bahamas, Canada, Israel, Japan,
New Zealand, South Africa, and the Council of Europe states. 94
Thus, nondiscrimination in the armed services is the norm in fifty-
four of the world's most influential states. The trend continues, as
other states are also considering revising enlistment rules to allow
sexual minorities to serve. 195
188. A. v. United Kingdom, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 354, 357 (1984).
189. See, e.g., Beck v. United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R. 48535/99, I 51-53; Perkins
v. United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43208/98, 38-41; Smith & Grady v. United
Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493,493-98 (2000); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom,
29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 548-50, 552-53 (1999).
190. See Lustig-Prean, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 67; Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
74.
191. Lustig-Prean, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 78; Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 7 99,
105.
192. Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 7 99, 105.
193. Id. 97.
194. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD'S POLICY ON
HOMOSEXUALITY, GAO/NSIAD-92-98, June 1992, App. II, at 54; OTTOSSON, supra note 42;
World Legal Survey, supra note 42. For a discussion of the Canadian decision in 1992, see
generally Aaron Belkin & Jason McNichol, Homosexual Personnel Policy in the Canadian
Forces, 56 INT'L J. 73, 73-77 (2000-01).
195. See, e.g., Jung Sung-Ki, Military to Revise Rules on Homosexuals, KOREA TIMES, Apr.
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Those states that continue to prohibit homosexual intercourse
obviously make no exception for members of their armed forces.
Wherever homosexuality is a crime, states uniformly do not admit
homosexuals to their armed forces. Even those states that do not
prohibit homosexual intercourse, however, may continue to dis-
criminate against homosexuals who seek to enlist. These states
include Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Croatia, North Korea, Peru, the
United States, and Venezuela.19 Thus, homosexuals are denied the
equal right to enlist in the armed forces of at least 90 of the U.N.'s
192 member states. This represents a significant but limited recent
movement toward recognition of equal rights.
4. Protection Against Persecution
Systematic private and public persecution of sexual minorities
remains common worldwide.'97 Even in states in which homosex-
uality has been decriminalized, harassment of and attacks on
5, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 6034512.
196. See OTTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; Park Yoon-Bae,
Legal Framework for Transsexuals, KOREA TIMES, June 29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
11294607 (Korea).
In the United States, homosexuals and bisexuals have long been denied the right to
participate in military combat positions. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006); see Remarks
Announcing New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military (July 19, 1993), 1 PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WILLIAMJ. CLINTON, 1993, at 1111 (1994); News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Off. of the Assist. Sec'y of Def. (Pub. Affairs), No. 605-93:
Secretary Aspin Releases New Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces
(Dec. 22, 1993). U.S. federal courts have upheld the DoD policy as consistent with human
rights as conceived in the U.S. Constitution. See Turner v. Dep't of the Navy, 325 F.3d 310
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997);
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808-09 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980). As a result, several hundred
U.S. military personnel are discharged every year in the United States because of
homosexuality. See DAviD F. BURRELLI & CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. RES. SERv., HOMOSEXUALS
AND U.S. MILITARY: CURRENT ISSUES 11 (2006), available at http://digital.library.unt.edul
govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8572: 1.
197. Although the examples could be multiplied indefinitely, for a few illustrations see,
for example, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L GAY & LESBIAN H.R. COMM'N, MORE THAN A
NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
passim (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/safriglhrc0303.pdf
(chronicling official persecution of homosexuals in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and
Botswana); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, passim (Egypt); Brown, supra note 42, at
121, 123 (Argentina); Younge, supra note 4, at 6 (Jamaica); News Release, Human Rights
Watch, Jamaica: Shield Gays from Mob Attacks (Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/31/jamaica-shield-gays-mob-attacks.
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sexual minorities by private individuals or gangs, often in a manner
abetted or tolerated by police, is far from rare.198 Occasionally, it is
the state government itself that foments homophobic persecution,
most commonly in Africa, where governments have the most reason
to wish to distract the public from the serious issues of corruption
and poverty. Open and explicit calls by public officials, even heads
of government, for the arrest, harassment, deportation, or murder
of sexual minorities still occasionally occur without eliciting
sanctions or even strong condemnation from the international
community.19 Yet, there has been a countervailing trend of state
recognition of a duty to prevent and punish persecution of sexual
minorities. The general positive obligation on the state to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect peaceful assembly
from foreseeable private violence is well established, 00 as is the
obligation to protect individuals from private discriminatory
198. See Ungar, supra note 75, at 66-67, 70-72; see also, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary
Executions 1 66, U.N. Doc ECN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003) (prepared by Asthma Jahangir)
(noting the failure of the Venezuelan government to investigate the murders of transsexuals);
Homosexuals Tricked into Sterilization in Peru-Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE WIRE, July
6, 1998 (alleging a government program of deceiving homosexuals into sterilization in Peru);
Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 13 (describing police indifference to mob attacks on homosexuals
in Russia); Schwartz, supra note 75 (chronicling police verbal and physical abuse of
homosexuals in Latvia); News Release, Human Rights Watch, Poland: Official Homophobia
Threatens Basic Freedoms (June 4, 2006), available at http:/www./hrw.org/en/news/2006/06/
04/poland-official-homophobia-threatens-basic-freedoms; News Release, Human Rights
Watch, South Africa: Lesbians Targeted for Murder, Aug. 9, 2007, available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2007/08/07/south-africa-lesbians-targeted-murder; Ian Martin, Rep. of the
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights in Nepal, Address to the Blue Diamond Society on
Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity, Nepal (May 17,2006), available at http://nepal.ohchr.org
(noting police persecution of sexual minorities in Nepal).
Strangely, the Prime Minister of Singapore, which continues to criminalize homosexual
intercourse, has welcomed homosexuals into government service so long as they disclose
their sexual orientation. Weiss, supra note 4, at 267.
199. See, e.g., Goddard, supra note 42, at 89, 95 (quoting the Minister of Home Affairs of
Zimbabwe and the President of Zimbabwe); Hubbard & Cassidy, supra note 46, at 273
(quoting the Minister of Home Affairs of Namibia and the Namibian President); Letter from
Human Rights Watch to Congressional Caucus About U.S. Support for Ugandan Homophobia
(Oct. 11, 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/10/10/letter-congressional-
caucus-about-us-support-ugandan-homophobia; News Release, Human Rights Watch,
Uganda: State Homophobia Threatens Health and Human Rights (Aug. 21, 2007), available
at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/08/2 1/uganda-state-homophobia-threatens-health-and-
human-rights [hereinafter Uganda: State Homophobia].
200. See, e.g., United Macedonian Org. Ilinden v. Bulgaria, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4, 115
(2007).
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violence and to investigate and punish those responsible for such
violence, at least when the discrimination is based on forbidden
grounds. 20 ' The development of positive obligations of the latter
category has been buttressed by the position recently taken by the
U.N. Human Rights Commission, which condemned the failure to
investigate and punish attacks on and murders of sexual minori-
ties as a violation of the right to life.20 2 Some intergovernmental
organizations, such as the World Health Organization, have rein-
forced this position by defining harassment to include persecution
based on sex or sexual orientation.203
Regional and state efforts to combat such persecution have
increasingly assumed the form of official policy. More recently, in
its Recommendation 1474, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly pro-
posed that the European Commission Against Racism and Intoler-
ance incorporate homophobia into its portfolio.20 4 In 2006, the
European Parliament similarly called on EU member states to
combat homophobia in their relations with each other as well as in
their bilateral relations with other countries.20 5 In addition, several
states-almost all in Europe, North America, and Oceania-forbid,
sometimes under threat of criminal penalty, harassment or hate
speech based on sexual orientation. Many, including Australia,
201. See, e.g., Nachova v. Bulgaria, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 165, 169 (2004) (ethnic
grounds); Velisquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4 (July 29), at
166.
202. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Decision 2005/34, 5, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess.,
Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/2005/23 (Apr. 19, 2005); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 198, 9 66-67.
203. World Health Organization, Office ofthe Exec. Director, WHO Policy on Harassment,
Cluster Note 2001/9, Mar. 23, 2001, 4, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
osagilpdf/who.pdf.
204. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1474, 1(ii) (2000).
205. See Resolution on Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA(2006)0018, 7 2-3;
MEPs Urge Member States, supra note 43.
206. These include state or federal legislation in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and
the United States. See CRIM. CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 318(4)-19 (1985) (Can.); OTTOSSON,
supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; Hubbard & Cassidy, supra note 46, at 264
(Namibia); Pantazis, supra note 181, at 312 (South Africa).
Several U.S. states have adopted legislation criminalizing harassment or persecution
based on sexual orientation. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 37 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 151B, § 4, 4A (2007); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (Consol. Supp. 2008). Although the
U.S. federal government has not adopted hate crime legislation, it has directed the
consideration of hatred based on sexual orientation as an aggravating factor in the federal
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Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, and most
of Europe," 7 have followed the lead of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees in defining persecution based on sexual orientation or
transsexualism as a legitimate basis for granting asylum."' In some
cases, state courts have taken the position that, where homosexuals
could live a life of secrecy and intrigue, hiding their sexuality from
the world to avoid abuse and possibly imprisonment or execution,
they are not persecuted," 9 but these appear to be the exception
rather than the rule in these countries.21 ° On the other hand, the
large number of states from which asylum based on homophobic
persecution has been granted demonstrates the schism in state
perceptions of their duties under international law toward sexual
minorities. Host states have granted asylum based on persecution
of sexual minorities in dozens of countries, including seven
countries in each of Africa, Asia, and Europe, three in the Middle
East, and thirteen in the Americas.211
On one hand, protection against persecution based on sexual
orientation represents a significant step toward a general recogni-
tion among the most influential states that at least the most
virulent forms of discrimination violate human rights. On the other,
state toleration of persecution in many countries indicates that the
sentencing guidelines. See Pub. L. 103-322, tit. 28, § 280003 (Sept. 13, 1994), 108 Stat. 1997
(U.S.). Nonetheless, hate crime based on sexual orientation is far from rare in the United
States, accounting for nearly 1200 reported (and undoubtedly many more unreported)
incidents and more than 1400 reported offenses in 2004. See FED. BUREAU OFINVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 65-66 (2004).
207. See, e.g., In re Toboso-Alfonso, Att'y Gen. Order No. 1895-94, June 19, 1994, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (U.S.); Council of Europe Doc. 8755, supra note 43,
Explanatory Mem. 37-38 (Belgium, the Czech Rep., Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden); OTrOSSON, supra note 42 (most of Europe, New Zealand, Canada); Pantazis, supra
note 181, at 309 (South Africa); Kristen L. Walker, Sexuality and Refugee Status in
Australia, 12 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 175, 180-84 (2000) (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K.,
U.S.); Wilets, supra note 52, at 109-10 (Australia, Austria, Netherlands, Germany, Finland,
Sweden).
208. U.N. High Refugee Agency, Guidelines on International Protection, Gender-Related
Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 16-17,U.N. Doc. HCRJGIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002);
EUR. PARL. RES. A 3-16/89, 10, 1989 O.J. (C 256) 33.
209. See Dauvergne & Millbank, supra note 4, at 105-07.
210. See id. at 115 (noting that Canada, New Zealand, and the United States have come
to contrary conclusions).
211. OITTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42.
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global recognition of these rights has not advanced to the point of
widespread practice.
C. Moves Toward Family Law Rights
The most contentious sphere of state regulation relating to sexual
minorities from a human rights perspective has been in the field of
family law. Despite the treaty-based guarantees of protection from
arbitrary state interference in the right to privacy, association, and
family life, the overwhelming majority of states deny any right to
same-sex marriage and systematically discriminate against sexual
minorities where parental rights are concerned. This subject
remains the one in which state justifications for such measures are
most staunchly defended as necessary for the preservation of ordre
public or public morality. Yet, here too the writing is on the wall. A
handful of influential states have now granted full rights to same-
sex marriage and parental rights, and many others have taken
decisive steps in this direction by granting partnership rights in
most ways akin to marriage.
1. Same-Sex Marriage
Sexual minorities may be motivated to claim a human right to
same-sex marriage for several reasons. Most pragmatically, mar-
riage is a highly subsidized institution in most countries. 12 Beyond
the support that the law requires spouses to bestow on each other
(e.g., mutual aid, maintenance or alimony, contributions to child
care), the state typically grants many benefits to the married couple
in .the form of rights to community property, pensions, tenancy
rights, inheritance, immigration rights, tax benefits, prison and
hospital visitation rights, and the right to refuse to testify against
one's spouse in a criminal prosecution. In the United States, for
example, the federal government grants over a thousand benefits
to married couples that are denied to unmarried couples (which
212. See generally, e.g., Marlene Schmidt, Employment, The Family, and The Law:
Current Problems in Germany, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 451,485 n.128 (2006) (discussing
subsidization of marriage in German law); Leslie Whittington, Manipulating Marriage?
Federal Income Taxes and the Household Structure Decision, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129
(1999) (discussing tax benefits given to married couples under U.S. federal law).
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includes all same-sex couples).213 In federal states, these benefits
may be exclusive of provincial, state, or municipal benefits for
married couples, which may be substantial (as they are in the
United States). Denials of these benefits to same-sex couples create
a systematic transfer of wealth and privileges from same-sex
couples wishing to marry to heterosexual couples wishing to marry
based primarily if not entirely on their choice of intimate partners.
Second, marriage creates legal rights and obligations that
balance the needs of the couple regardless of the economic con-
tribution (if any) they make to the relationship. This may be
desirable as a means of reaffirming each spouse's love for and
support of the other, thereby creating or strengthening socially
supportive relationships.214 Marriage may also appeal to the state
itself as a means for reducing the burdens of the welfare system. 5
Marriage in most states constitutes a legally binding commitment
by each to care for the other as well as any of their children
financially, and so creates a formal duty of mutual aid and protec-
tion.216 If one spouse becomes unable to support himself or his
children, due to job loss or a health problem, marriage requires the
other spouse rather than the state to assume the obligation to
provide for the couple.2"7
Third, marriage is a form of self-definition. Changing status from
single or married alters one's identity fundamentally. In a purely
personal sense, through marriage, one's self-perception may change
due to the recognition that one has made a binding, intimate,
213. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to U.S.
Sen. Bill Frist (Jan. 23, 2004) (Doc No. GAO-04-353R).
214. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 33. The German registered partnership law, for
example, obligates partners to form a relationship "of mutual support and consideration for
each other's needs." See Taylor, supra note 148, at 590, 598.
215. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423-24 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the ways in
which marriage promotes mutual support among family members and child rearing to reduce
the burden on the state's welfare system); Kerri Harper, Stereotypes, Childcare, and Social
Change: How the Failure to Provide Childcare Perpetuates Public Perception of Welfare
Mothers, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 387, 400 (2000-01) (discussing the burden that
children born out of marriage place on the social welfare system).
216. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-70 (1996); MERIN,
supra note 42, at 34-35.
217. In enacting its civil union law, the Vermont General Assembly expressly invoked its
"strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families, including families based upon a
same-sex couple." Act 91, An Act Relating to Civil Unions, § 1(8), 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1201(8)
(Supp. 2000).
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purportedly lifelong promise to love and support the other person
and any preexisting or future children. This is a commitment not
everyone can make, and the realization that one is capable (or, for
that matter, incapable) of making it may profoundly affect one's
self-perceptions and can be critical to one's feelings of fulfillment of
his or her human potential, place in society, and relationship to
others generally. The ubiquity of references in most societies to
marital status (e.g., on job applications, driver's license, financial
accounts and mortgages, automobile insurance forms, hospital
admission forms, etc.) reinforces the importance of this aspect of
identity by constant reminders of its relevance to society and, by
extension, to one's place in that society.
Finally and perhaps relatedly, marriage constitutes a major, if
not the ultimate, societal endorsement of lifestyles sought by the
married couple.21 Certainly, not all sexual minorities consider
same-sex marriage to be the holy grail of public recognition of their
freedom to define their own familial associations and sexual
identity.219 But for those who do, same-sex marriage, once formally
recognized by the state, may be construed as a public recognition of
their equal rights and equal autonomy to that of heterosexuals.
Until very recently, even the most progressive human rights
authorities were unreceptive to claims to equal rights to marriage
for sexual minorities. As with other kinds of discrimination, the
judicial organs of the European Union and Council of Europe have
lagged behind the legislative organs in the application of traditional
human rights principles to sexual minorities. Throughout the
1980s, the ECtHR and the European Commission on Human Rights
denied that homosexuals had any right to family life at all by virtue
of the sex of their chosen partners.220 As late as 2001, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) decided a case brought by an official of the
218. See Douglas Louw, Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the Redefining of
Family, 16 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 313, 320 (2000).
219. See, e.g., Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and
Inequality, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 363, 365-74 (1998); Judith Rauhofer, The
Possibility of a Registered Partnership Under German Law, in LEGAL QUEERIES 68, 73-78
(Leslie J. Moran et al. eds., 1998).
220. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. C.D. 49, 4 (1989) ('The Court and
the Commission have previously held that homosexual relationships do not fall within the
ambit of family life, but rather fall within the notion of private life under Art. 8 of the
Convention.").
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European Community whose Swedish registered partnership-a
partnership explicitly made equivalent to marriage under Swedish
law, with specific listed exceptions-the EU Council refused to treat
as equivalent to marriage for purposes of EU employee household
allowance.22' The court held that these regulations could not be
construed as discriminatory on the basis of sex, because the sex of
the employee was irrelevant to the Staff Regulations policy22 -- a
course of reasoning sometimes called the "equal application theory"
because it treats all laws having equal application to both sexes as
nondiscriminatory regardless of the context or consequences. The
ECJ further noted that "according to the definition generally
accepted by the Member States, the term marriage means a union
between two persons of the opposite sex" and found it "clear" that
registered partnerships are regarded by EU member states as
being distinct from marriage.223 From this, the court concluded that
the EU Staff Regulations must be interpreted literally to exclude
from the household allowance any legal arrangement other than
"marriage. '224 Finally, the court rejected the plea that the discrimi-
natory policy infringed the employee's right to respect for private
and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, interpreting "private
life" narrowly to mean the transmission of personal information
(inapplicable to the case at hand), and interpreting "family life"
even more narrowly as relating to the employee's "civil status" only,
rendering Article 8 irrelevant to the situation of an employee dis-
criminated against based on the sex of his or her legally recognized
life partner.225
As with most judicial decisions, the result in this one was not
preordained. The ECJ could have taken a different approach, con-
sidering the sex of the employee's partner as well. It could have
defined sex discrimination more broadly to include discrimination
against the couple based on their relative sexes instead of focusing
atomistically on the employee alone.226 Similarly, it could have
221. D. & Sweden v. Council of the Eur. Union, [2001] E.C.R. 1-4319, 9 2-5.
222. Id. T 46, 52.
223. Id. 99 34, 36, 48-51.
224. Id. 9 37-38.
225. Id. 9 58-59.
226. In an interesting contrast, the Circuit Court of Maryland County held in 2006 that
the refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry violated Maryland's constitutional prohibition
on sex discrimination (as opposed to discrimination based specifically on sexual orientation)
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analogized registered partnerships to marriage. The ECtHR has
long interpreted Article 8 to encompass not merely the right to
withhold personal information from the public but a more general
liberty of choice in one's intimate actions and associations. The
ECJ could have cited this policy to find discrimination based on
his intimate choice of association. In any case, the EU Council
apparently disagreed, on policy grounds, as it decided in 2002 to
adopt regulations treating same-sex marriages on equal terms as
different-sex marriages for purposes of EU employment benefits
and other staff regulations.227
Although the ECtHR has never recognized a right to same-sex
marriage under Articles 8, 12, or 14 of the ECHR, it has begun to
shift its jurisprudence toward recognition of a right to family life for
sexual minorities. In 1998 the court found no violation of Article 12
in member state refusals to permit transsexuals to marry persons
of their birth sex,228 but only four years later, the court reversed
itself decisively. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the court held
that states that permit sex reassignment surgery must treat post-
operative transsexuals as if they had changed sex for all legal
purposes, including marriage.229 Overcoming the technical objec-
tions of the respondent state, the court noted:
with reference to the sex of the spouses: "The relative genders of the two individuals are facts
that lie at the very center of the matter." There is sex discrimination in the refusal to permit
same-sex marriages, the court reasoned, because a man is barred from marrying a male
partner "when a woman would enjoy the right to marry that same male partner. As
compared to the woman, the man is disadvantaged solely because of his sex.... [I]n any given
instance the [prohibition] 'will always be applied to a particular sex."' Deane v. Conaway, No.
24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at **3, 5 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (quoting Burning
Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817 (Md. 1985) (Rodowsky, J., concurring)).
227. See Aude Fiorini, New Belgian Law on Same-Sex Marriage and Its PIL Implications,
52 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 1039, 1047-48 (2003).
228. Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163, 195, 66 (1998). The
court had earlier stated regarding Article 12 that "whether a person has the right to marry
depends not on the existence in the individual case of such a partner or a wish to marry, but
on whether or not he or she meets the general criteria laid down by law." Cossey v. United
Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 638, 32 (1990). This reading of Article 12 is tantamount
to reducing the "human right" guaranteed by that Article 12 to a right not to be denied a
marriage license arbitrarily and absent applicable law (i.e., it becomes a narrow right to due
process of law where marriage is concerned).
229. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, [2002] E.C.H.R. 28957/95.
20081
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The applicant in this case lives as a woman, is in a relationship
with a man and would only wish to marry a man. She has no
possibility of doing so. In the Court's view, she may therefore
claim that the very essence of her right to marry has been
infringed.23 °
The respondent state replied by arguing that the decision to
permit or deny such marriages should be left to its own discretion
because many Council of Europe member states deny transsexuals
the right to marry persons of their birth sex.231 To this, the court
rejoined: "This would be tantamount to finding that the range of
options open to a [member state] included an effective bar on any
exercise of the right to marry. The margin of appreciation cannot
extend so far." '232 While it is clear that the court intended to limit its
holding to the facts before it, its reasoning applies by analogy to
other same-sex marriages. Homosexuals, by the nature of their
sexual orientation, are also typically in a relationship with someone
of their own sex and would only wish to marry someone of their
own sex. To deny homosexuals the right to same-sex marriage is
equally an "effective bar on any exercise" of their right to marry.233
Nonetheless, the ECtHR has not yet gone so far, partly because it
considers that there is no human right to marry in abstracto. Until
the court takes this additional step, Article 12 confers only a right
to marry persons of the "opposite" sex.
The legislative organs of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU
have been still more proactive. The CoE Parliamentary Assembly
in 2000 urged member states to adopt legislation providing for
"registered partnerships" for same-sex couples. 4 Similarly, in
2001, the EU Parliament called on member states "to recognise
unmarried partnerships-between both couples of different sexes
and same-sex couples-and to link them to the same rights as apply
to marriage" and urged the EU to put same-sex marriage on the
230. Id. 101 (emphasis added).
231. Id. 102.
232. Id. 103 (emphasis added).
233. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) ("[T]his state's bar
against same sex marriage effectively precludes gay persons from marrying; to conclude
otherwise would be to blink at reality.").
234. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1474, 11(iii)(i) (Sept. 2000).
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agenda.235 It repeated the call in January 2006, noting that some
EU member states give unequal benefits to different-sex couples
(notably by denying same-sex couples full marriage rights) and
urging the Commission to propose a prohibition on discrimination
against same-sex couples, either married or in a registered
partnership.236 It further urged the Commission to guarantee the
free movement of EU citizens and their family members regardless
of sexual orientation.237
This call has been partly answered, although not by the universal
adoption of same-sex marriage. As of this writing, only five
states-Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and South
Africa-now permit full same-sex civil marriages on terms substan-
tially identical to those of different-sex marriages. The Netherlands
adopted full same-sex marriage in 2001, only three years after
approving registered partnerships for same-sex couples. 238 The
Belgian parliament opened marriage to such couples in 2003.239
Canada legalized same-sex marriage through the 2005 Civil
Marriage Act 240 after court decisions had already validated same-
sex marriage in eight provinces and one territory.241 The Spanish
parliament approved full same-sex marriage in June 2005 as
well.242 Finally, in December 2005, the South African Constitutional
Court ruled the common law prohibition on same-sex marriage
235. Resolution on the Situation Concerning Basic Rights in the European Union,
2001/2014(INI), EUR. PARL. DOC. P5_TA(2003)(0012), 102-03.
236. See Resolution on Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA(2006)0018, E,
11; Resolution on Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All-A Framework
Strategy, 2005/2191(INI), EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2006)0261, 30.
237. MEPs Urge Member States, supra note 43.
238. See Act of 21 December 2000 Amending Book 1 of the Civil Code, Concerning the
Opening Up of Marriage for Persons of the Same Sex (Act on the Opening up of Marriage),
2001 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Official Gazette) nr.9 (Jan. 11, 2001)
(Nether.).
239. See Loi ouvrant le mariage A des personnes de m6me sexe et modifiant certaines
dispositions du Code civil de 13 f~v. 2003, Moniteur Belge (Official Gazette), Feb. 28, 2003
ed 3, at 9880, available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be ("Deux personnes de sexe diff6rent
ou de m~me sexe peuvent contracter mariage.").
240. See C-38, 38th Parliament, 1st Sess. (2005) (codified at 33 STAT.) (Can.).
241. Re Same Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.); M. v. H., [1999] 2
S.C.R. 3 (Can.); see MARY C. HURLEY, BILL C38: THE CIVIL MARRIAGE ACT (Can. Parl. Doc. LS-
502E, Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca.
242. Spanish Ms Approve Gay Marriages, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/europe/4636133.stm.
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unconstitutional, prompting the South African parliament to
consider marriage for same-sex couples, which it adopted by law in
November 2006.44 A sixth, Hungary, has allowed common law
same-sex marriages since 1995 without extending a right to civil
marriage to same-sex couples.2 45 At present, several other states,
including Australia, 46 Germany, 24' and Taiwan,248 are currently
considering adopting same-sex marriage as well.
As with nondiscrimination laws, where federal states have
been slow in recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, provincial or
local governments have sometimes steamed ahead. In Brazil, for
example, Rio Grande do Sul became the first state in that country
to recognize same-sex civil unions in April 2004.249 The province of
Victoria did the same in Australia.2 0 Similarly, although same-sex
marriage is not recognized by the U.S. federal government or
most states, it has been allowed in the state of Massachusetts
since 2003251 and has recently been declared a constitutional right
243. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT60-04.
244. Phumza Macanda, Africans Cheer, Condemn S. Africa Gay Marriage Bill, REUTERS
NEWS., Nov. 15, 2006; John Reed, S. Africa to Legalise Gay Partnerships, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2006; South Africa OKs Same-Sex Marriage, CBS NEWS, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/14/world/main2l79939.shtml.
245. This was the result of a decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court rather than
the parliament. Uitz, supra note 142, at 712 (citing Decision 14/1995 (III. 13.) AB). The
Hungarian parliament did, however, expressly recognize same-sex common-law marriages
the following year. MERIN, supra note 42, at 131 (citing Act of 1996: XLII Law 1-3 (May 21,
1996) (Hung.)); see also Farkas, supra note 181, at 569; Szakacs, supra note 57, at *4.
Common law marriages confer most of the economic and other rights and duties of formal
marriage as well as the privilege against spousal testimony and hospital visitation rights.
It does not, however, confer an obligation of mutual support or any parental rights. See
MERIN, supra note 42, at 131-32; Farkas, supra note 181, at 570.
246. See Marriage (Relationships Equality) Amendment Bill 2007, Bill No. 07034, Feb. 28,
2007, available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au.
247. See Eric Fongaro, Le mariage homosexuel a l 'preuve du droit international privg, 133
J. Du DROIT INT'L 477, 480 (2006).
248. See Advocates Seek Talks with Lawmakers over Issues on Gay Rights, TAIWAN NEWS,
Nov. 2,2006, available at http://english.www.gov.tw; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Recognition of Gay
Marriage: A Global Phenomenon, SAN JOSE MERcURY NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006, at Al; Paul
Wiseman, Same-Sex Marriage Spurs Few Political Ripples in Taiwan, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb.
27, 2004, at A10.
249. Danya Levy, Civil Union Bill: Gay Unions a Global Issue, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 7, 2004,
at A18.
250. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 171.
251. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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in Iowa by a state district court,252 and in Connecticut by the
Connecticut supreme court.253
The U.S. experience is particularly instructive. Although the
federal Supreme Court has repeatedly found marriage to be a
"fundamental freedom" and "one of the basic civil rights of man, 254
it has, in holding statutes criminalizing adult consensual homosex-
ual conduct unconstitutional, disclaimed any intent to preclude
laws discriminating against same-sex marriage2--a decision that
lower state and federal courts have typically understood to pre-
clude equal protection claims to a right to marry.256 Like several
other countries have done,257 the United States enacted a law in
1996-the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)-to define marriage for
federal purposes specifically as the union of a man and a woman to
the exclusion of all other definitions with the intent to deprive the
U.S. states of their right to define marriage to include same-sex
couples with federal effect. 25' The Internal Revenue Service and
252. See Varnum v. Brien, Case No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007) (unpub.),
available at http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/legal/varnum/varnum-d-08302007-ia-district.pdf.
At the time of this writing, the Iowa Supreme Court is currently considering the appeal in
the case. Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, Ia. Sup. Ct.; see Supreme Court Schedules Gay
Marriage Hearing: Oral Arguments Begin Dec. 9, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.washblade.com/thelatest/thelatest.cfm?blog-id=21440.
Appellate courts of several states have recently considered and struck down lower court
rulings finding discrimination against same-sex marriages unconstitutional. See, e.g., Deane
v. Conaway, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. App. 2007), rev'd 2006 WL 148145 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20,
2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
253. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
254. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
255. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This despite Justice Scalia's opinion
that the Court's opinion undermined the legal foundation for such discrimination. Id. at 604
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R.
123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); Standhardt v. Superior Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d
451 (Ariz. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Samuels v. New
York State Dep't of Health, 29 A.D.3d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). But see, e.g., In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407; Varnum, Case No. CV5965.
257. Australia, for example, amended its federal Marriage Act in 2004 to define marriage
explicitly as a union between men and women "to the exclusion of all others," and the
conservative Prime Minister caused the Governor-General to veto the Australian Capital
Territory's attempt to establish gay civil unions in May 2006. See Australia: No Wedding
Bells, ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006, at 50; Outrage as Same-Sex Union Bill Vetoed, CANBERRA
TIMES, June 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10117183.
258. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
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other federal agencies have accordingly declared that they will not
recognize same-sex marriages for federal tax and other regulatory
purposes.259 Congress hoped the DOMA would prevent U.S. states
not permitting same-sex marriages from being compelled to rec-
ognize another U.S. state's same-sex marriage under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution. 0 In addition, constitutional
amendments have repeatedly been introduced into Congress to
prevent any state from allowing same-sex marriages.2"' These
amendments have so far been rejected by a small margin, but
twenty-nine U.S. states have amended their constitutions to ban
same-sex marriages and in some cases partnerships,262 and the rest
(excepting Connecticut and Massachusetts) have done so by
legislation.263 Although civil unions are available in some states,
and several counties and municipalities offer domestic partner-
ships,264 few states can offer substitutes similar to those common in
Europe due to the importance of federally granted marriage
benefits.265
Of course, this may seem like a classic case of the exception
proving the rule that sexual minorities lack a human right to marry
under customary international law. While recognition of such a
right is still nascent, there has been a definite international trend,
beginning in 1989, of legally creating various kinds of domestic
partnership and civil union arrangements that, while not fully
equivalent to marriage, are designed to put same-sex couples on a
more equal footing with heterosexual couples respecting most of
§ 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004)).
259. See Anthony C. Infanti, Prying Open the Closet Door: The Defense of Marriage Act
and Tax Treaties, 105 TAX NOTES 563, 563 (Oct. 25, 2004).
260. LYNN 0. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW
216 (2d ed. 2006). The normal conflict of laws rule is that the validity of marriage is governed
by the lex loci celebrationis, unless some important public policy would be threatened by
recognition of the marriage. Id. at 219.
261. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 91, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006); S.J. Res.
13, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005);
H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 26, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R.J .Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002).
262. See Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Relationship Recognition Map for Same-Sex
Couples in the United States (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org.
263. Id.; see also MERIN, supra note 42, at 229.
264. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 246-48 tbl.2.
265. Id. at 251.
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the duties and benefits of marriage. The earliest, and among the
most egalitarian, is Denmark's Registered Partnership Act of
1989.266 Since that watershed, over a dozen states in Western
Europe have adopted various forms of civil unions or domestic
partnerships for same-sex couples.267 Most recently, in December
2007, the Hungarian Parliament created a registered partnership
for either same-sex or different-sex couples.26 This partnership
grants all of the rights of married couples except parental rights
and the right to take the same surname.269 Other countries are
considering adopting civil unions or registered partnerships as
well.27°
As with same-sex marriage, sub-state political entities like
provinces, counties, and cities have also adopted civil union or
registered partnership laws when the national government failed
266. The Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 372 of June 7, 1989 (Den.). See generally
Marianne H. Pedersen, Denmark. Homosexual Marriages and New Rules Regarding
Separation and Divorce, 30 J. FAM. L. 289 (1991-92). The Danish Act was adopted in 1996 by
Greenland as well. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 67.
267. Act on Registered Partnerships 950/2001 (Fin.); C. CIVIL art. 515 (2000) (Fr.); Gesetz
zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: Lebenspart-
nerschaften (Feb. 16, 2001), BUNDESGESETZBLATT (Official Gazette) I, at 266, available at
http://www. bgblportal.de/BGBL/bgbllfb101009f.pdf (F.R.G.); Act on Registered Partnership,
No. 87 (1996) (Ice.); Registered Partnership Act (Apr. 30, 1993) (Norway); Law No. 6/2001
(Port.); Law No. 7/2001 (Port.); Registration for Homosexual Couples of Partnership Act
(June 23, 1994) (Swed.); Act on Registered Partnerships Between Persons of the Same Sex
(June 5, 2005) (Switz.); see Eingetragene Partnerschaft in der Berufsvorsorge der Ehe gleich,
NZZ ONLINE, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.nzz.ch/2006/09/29/il/newzzESOAZA20-12.html
(Switz.); Civil Partnership Act 2004, ch. 33, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2004/ 20040033.htm (U.K.); MERIN, supra note 42, at 56, 80, 94, 108, 134-35; Caroline
Forder, European Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM.
L. 371, 390 (2000); Sofia Oliveira Pais, Portugal: De Facto Relationships and Same-Sex
Relationships in Portugal, in 2002 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 46, at 340, 344;
Taylor, supra note 148, at 584.
The parliament of the Czech Republic approved a registered partnership law for same-sex
couples over the President's veto in March 2006 (taking effect in July 2006). Czech MPs
Approve Gay Rights Law, BBC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4811030.stm.
268. See Orsolya Szeibert-Erdos, Same-Sex Partners in Hungary: Cohabitation and
Registered Partnership, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 212 (2008).
269. Id.
270. For example, bills have been introduced into the Argentinian parliament, but none
has so far passed. See Argentina Moving Toward Gay Marriage Rights, 365GAY.COM, Mar.
1, 2007 (on file with William and Mary Law Review).
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to do so. In the United States, Vermont,27' Connecticut,272 New
Hampshire,2 7 New Jersey,274 and Oregon 275 permit civil unions that
are in almost all ways equivalent to marriage with respect to state-
granted (but not federal) rights. Domestic partnerships granting
somewhat lesser rights than civil unions are now available in
many U.S. states, most comprehensively in California 276 and
Maine.2 77 Similarly, the city of Buenos Aires and province of Rio
Negro in Argentina, the Australian states of New South Wales and
Queensland, the Distrito Federal of Mexico, and several Italian
provinces have also adopted civil unions or domestic partnerships
when the national government would not.2 71
This is not to equate civil union, much less registered partner-
ship, to the recognition of equal family rights for sexual minorities.
The partnership and civil union often differ substantially in the
scope and terms of benefits and obligations imposed on the part-
ners, and some of them afford quite limited rights. The French
Pacte civil de solidaritg (PaCS), for example, is similar to marriage
in requiring the partners to furnish "mutual and material aid,"
holding them jointly liable for debts, permitting joint income
271. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2000).
272. An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 05-10.
273. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2007).
274. N.J. Assembly Bill A3787 (2007) (codified at N.J STAT., tit. 37 (2007)).
275. Ashbel S. Green, Civil Unions Get the Nod in Oregon, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb.
2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 2110669.
276. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2008). The California Supreme Court found that
homosexuals had the same constitutional right to marriage as heterosexuals in early 2008,
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 34 (Cal. 2008), but California voters quickly passed a
referendum to amend the California constitution to deprive homosexuals of the right to
marry. See Peter Henderson, Gays See Rights Growing Despite Election Losses, REUTERS,
Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com.
277. See generally Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257 (2006).
278. See Nerina Boschiero, Les unions homosexuelles e l'4preuve du droit international
privg italien, 40 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 50, 56 (2007) (Italy); Kirby, supra note
182, at 14-15; Gay Couple Unites in Argentina, A First for Latin America, GMAX, July 21,
2003, http://www.gmax.co.za/look/07/21-argentina.html; Mexican Capital Legalizes Same-Sex
Civil Unions, AFP NEWSWIRE, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://www.breitbart.com/
article.php?id=061110062654.7aOl6ypb&show-article=l. See generally Jenni Millbank &
Kathy Sant, A Bride in Her Every-Day Clothes: Same Sex Relationship Recognition in NSW,
22 SYDNEY L. REv. 181 (2000). The Australian capital territory tried to do the same thing,
but was blocked by the Prime Minister. See Outrage as Same-Sex Union Bill Vetoed, supra
note 257.
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taxation, giving them an undivided half interest in each others'
property (community property), conferring a survivorship right to
housing, and granting death benefits in employment.279 But it
differs from marriage in not requiring sexual fidelity, not granting
an employment holiday to celebrate the marriage, not conferring an
automatic inheritance right, creating no parental rights, and not
conferring an automatic right of French nationality on the partner
(instead, the PaCS is an "element of appreciation" for consideration
by the French government).280 It is common for domestic partner-
ships to deny sexual minorities important rights, including joint
taxation, inheritance, social security rights, and equal rights to
child custody.2"' In contrast, Nordic registered partnerships mirror
the characteristics of marriage-including tax and social security
benefits, inheritance rights, community property, and a duty of
mutual support-with only a few specified exceptions relating to
pension rights and the status of children, some of which have been
abandoned.282 Moreover, the very creation of a separate system of
family rights for homosexuals may be taken as a denial of the equal
dignity and value of homosexual relationships to heterosexual
ones.
283
279. MERIN, supra note 42, at 139-40; Claudina Richards, The Legal Recognition of Same-
Sex Couples-The French Perspective, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 305, 317-18 (2002).
280. Fongaro, supra note 247, at 483, 507; Richards, supra note 279, at 317-19.
281. See Resolution on Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6TA(2006)0018, E.
The German law, for example, is limited in the sense that, for example, although registered
partners benefit from inheritance rights like spouses, they do not obtain the same inher-
itance tax benefits. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 146-47.
282. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 89-90, 92, 99, 102, 105. Initially, Danish and Swedish
registered partners could not jointly adopt, have joint custody over the other's children, or
obtain artificial insemination. The first two limitations were abandoned in Denmark,
however, in 1999. See id. at 73-74, 77. Sweden switched to allowing same-sex adoption in
2002. See Marion MacGregor, Sweden Opts for Gay Adoption, DEUTSCHE-WELLE, June 7,
2002, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,571702,00.html.
283. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444-46 (Cal. 2008) ("[P]articularly in light of
the historic disparagement of and discrimination against gay persons, there is a very
significant risk that retaining a distinction in nomenclature with regard to this most
fundamental of relationships whereby the term 'marriage' is denied only to same-sex couples
inevitably will cause the new parallel institution that has been made available to those
couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage and, in effect, as a mark of
second-class citizenship."); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn.
2008) ("[W]e cannot discount the plaintiffs' assertion that the legislature, in establishing a
statutory scheme consigning same sex couples to civil unions, has relegated them to an
inferior status, in essence, declaring them to be unworthy of the institution of marriage.");
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The proliferation of legal forms of partnership conferring rights
and obligations short of full marriage itself poses certain practical
problems for same-sex couples. Partnerships may not be recognized
in other states lacking such forms of partnership or having different
forms of same-sex partnership. Before 2004, this might have posed
a problem for same-sex partners in the European Union, where a
Swedish registered partnership was not recognized in Germany,
and a German life-partner need not be recognized in Sweden.8 4
Now, the ramifications are less severe in some parts of Europe than
elsewhere. Since 1995, the Nordic states have agreed to recognize
each other's registered partnerships,285 and recently the EU Council
and Parliament have issued a directive on the free movement of EU
citizens and their family members that extends nondiscrimination
rights to registered partners where a host member state recognizes
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage. 286 Nonetheless,
most European states that continue to deny a right to same-sex
marriage within their own borders equally apply conflicts of law
principles to decline to recognize same-sex marriages that have
taken place even in Belgium, Holland, or Spain.287 Moreover,
outside of the EU the problem remains in most places (e.g., a
Vermont civil union need not be recognized in Denmark, and vice
versa).2"'
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) ('The dissimilitude
between the terms 'civil marriage' and 'civil union' is not innocuous; it is a considered choice
of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples
to second-class status.").
284. See Fiorini, supra note 227, at 1048.
285. MERIN, supra note 42, at 78.
286. Directive 2004/581EC, 2004 O.J. (L 229) 35.
287. For example, the French Ministry ofJustice recently informed the French Parlement,
in response to a direct question on the subject, that because family law matters generally
remain within the jurisdiction of EU member states, "a homosexual union could have no
legal effect in France except if national law admitted this form of union for the couple....
mhe marriage of two women or of two men of French nationality in the Netherlands or
Belgium would not be recognized in France, because French national law prohibits it."
Rponse ministerielle no. 41533, Ministre de Justice, JOAN Q., July 26, 2005, at 7437,
reprinted in Fongaro, supra note 247, annex at 509 (my translation); see also Fongaro, supra
note 247, at 479. Italy similarly declines to recognize foreign same-sex marriages, civil
unions, and domestic partnerships. See Boschiero, supra note 278, at 53-57.
288. A recent New York appellate court, however, has established a rule that the state
must recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into in other states. See Martinez v.
County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
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Even equating civil unions and registered partnerships to
marriage, however, would not amount to a clear pattern of recogni-
tion of equal human rights for sexual minorities. Fewer than two
dozen states approving same-sex marriage or the rough equivalent
on a national level hardly evidences an international custom. On
the whole, opposition to such recognition remains overwhelming.
National recognition of a right to same-sex marriage continues to
be denied in the entirety of Central and South America, the Middle
East, Asia, and all but one state in Africa.289 Nonetheless, even
among these states, a few have forbidden discrimination against
homosexuals in the granting of benefits that otherwise accrue only
to married persons. The Supreme Court of Israel has forbidden
discrimination against homosexuals in the granting of employment
benefits that otherwise accrue only to spouses as well as inheri-
tance rights.29 ° Employment benefits and some other property
rights are now extended to same-sex couples in Argentina,29' New
Zealand,292 parts of Australia,293 and in many European states that
do not recognize same-sex partnerships as well.294 Similarly, Brazil
and Colombia have now extended inheritance and social security
benefits to same-sex partners.295
U.N. practice on the point has been ambiguous. In 2004, the U.N.
Secretary-General extended spousal benefits to same-sex partners
289. See OTTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; see also Hubbard
& Cassidy, supra note 46, at 262 (Namibia); Tabuchi, supra note 11 (Japan); Kerry Williams,
"I Do" or 'We Won't': Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa, 20 S. AFRICAN J. HUM.
RTS. 32, 45 (2004) (South Africa). Aruba, though forced by its affiliation as a colony of the
Netherlands to recognize the marriage, has resisted through its Prime Minister's opposition
on moral grounds to recognition of same-sex marriage. Aruba.: Lesbian Couple Win Case to
File Marriage, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 24, 2005, at A8.
290. El Al sr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749, 15-17 (Isr. Sup. Ct.),
available at http://www.tau.ac.il/law/aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm (employment benefits); In
re Estate of M.R. v. Att'y Gen. for the Gen. Custodian, CA 3245/03 (Civ. App. Ct. Nazareth
Nov. 10, 2004) (Israel) (inheritance); see also David Flatto, Justice in Flux, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 21, 2006, at 12.
291. See Argentina Moving Toward Gay Marriage Rights, supra note 270.
292. MERIN, supra note 42, at 174.
293. Millbank & Sant, supra note 278, at 185-89.
294. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies
for a United Europe, 32 VIR. J. INT'L L. 157, 168 (1991) (Sweden).
295. Mike Ceaser, Gay Rights Grow in Colombia, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 26, 2007, at A12;
Human Rights Watch, Non-Discrimination in Civil Marriage: Perspectives from
International Human Rights Law and Practice, available at http://www.hrw.org/
backgrounder/lgbt/civil-marriage.htm.
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of U.N. staff where the domestic partnership was legally recognized
in the staff-person's country of citizenship. Although the Secretary-
General's directive was revised to omit the term "domestic partner-
ship" in deference to protestations from the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, the regulation took effect nonetheless.296 The
effect is limited, because same-sex couples married outside of their
country of citizenship do not benefit from spousal benefits within
the U.N. organization if their country of citizenship refuses to
recognize same-sex marriages,29 7 but it represents the U.N. taking
at least a neutral position regarding equal rights for sexual
minorities.
On the other hand, the U.N. HRC has rejected the argument that
sexual minorities have an equal human right to family life. In 2002,
the Committee responded to a challenge to New Zealand's prohibi-
tion on same-sex marriage, 298 opining that the state's decision to
deny same-sex couples the benefits of marriage that it grants to
different-sex couples did not constitute discrimination in violation
of Article 26 of the ICCPR.299 Given the undisputed fact that a law
that permits heterosexuals but not homosexuals to marry is facially
discriminatory on grounds of sexual orientation, and given further
that all forms of state arbitrary discrimination are prohibited by the
ICCPR,3 °° the Committee's conclusion is difficult to reconcile with
its earlier recognition that Article 26 prohibits discrimination
based on sexual orientation in Toonen 0 1 and Young.3"2 To justify
its decision, the Committee noted that the text of Article 23(2)
296. See Edith M. Lederer, New U.N. Direction [sic] Drops Reference to Domestic
Partnerships but Allows Same-Sex Partners of U.N. Staff To Collect Benefits, AP ONLINE,
Oct. 2, 2004; William M. Reilly, U.N. Members Criticize Same-Sex Benefits, UPI NEWS
PERSP., Mar. 15, 2004.
297. See, e.g., Int'l Labour Org., Admin. Trib. Judgment No. 2449 (May 5, 2005), A,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/fulltext/2449.htm.
298. Joslin v. New Zealand, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., Comm. No.
902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40, at 214 (July 17, 2002) [hereinafter Joslin].
299. Id. t 8.3.
300. The U.N. Human Rights Committee interprets "discrimination" for purposes of the
ICCPR as encompassing "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based
on any ground such as race, colour, sex ... or other status, and which has the purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
footing, of all rights and freedoms." U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 18: Non-
discrimination, Nov. 10, 1989, T 7.
301. Toonen, supra note 76.
302. Young, supra note 136.
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established "[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to
marry and to found a family."3 °3 The Committee could have read
this provision as undetermined on the question of same-sex
marriage, as homosexuals are either men or women who seek a
right to marry. Instead, it interpreted Article 23(2) to establish the
right of men of marriageable age to marry women of marriageable
age, and vice versa.304 The Committee contrasted the Convention's
use of the terms "every human being," "everyone," and "all persons"
elsewhere in the Convention with Article 26's use of the term "men
and women."305
The Committee could reasonably have interpreted the treaty
language otherwise. The Committee could, for example, have
decided that the use of the words "men and women" was intended
to mitigate the vagueness of the term "marriageable age" by
clarifying that adults ("men and women") rather than children had
the right to marry. Such an interpretation would promote the
human right of children not to be forced into arranged marriages.306
The Committee chose instead the more politically acceptable
reading, which no doubt accorded with the views of ICCPR's parties
at the time. After all, at the time the Convention was drafted, no
state could have considered same-sex marriage to fall within the
scope of the human rights to intimate association and family life,
because none of the signatories allowed such marriages at the time.
Whether this position is justifiable on policy grounds is, of course,
an entirely different question, but the Committee's mandate and
position do not encourage it to adopt aggressively expansionistic
interpretations of politically controversial human rights, however
consistent such an interpretation might be with legal doctrines
generally.
303. Joslin, supra note 298, 8.2; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 23.
304. Joslin, supra note 298, 1 8.2.
305. Id.
306. See UDHR, supra note 1, art. 16(1); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women art. 16(2), opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
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2. Equal Parental Rights
The most entrenched form of discrimination against sexual
minorities has long related to the custody and adoption of children.
When even the states of northern Europe were just beginning to
pass registered partnership laws for same-sex couples, equal
parental rights in general and adoption rights specifically were
expressly denied to sexual minorities. °7 Much has changed in a
very short period; many states, including several that prohibit
same-sex marriage, now allow same-sex couples or single homosex-
uals to assume custody of their own or their partners' children,
or to adopt unrelated children, on a nondiscriminatory basis. As
of 2008, these states included Belgium, 30 Brazil,30 9 Canada, 310
Denmark,31" ' Finland,1 2  Israel, 3  the Netherlands,1 4  South
Africa,' 15 Spain,31 ' Sweden,31 v the United Kingdom," 8 and some
provinces of Australia.1 9 In a few states in Europe, the custody of
a sexual minority's biological child can be shared with nonbiological
same-sex parents. In some cases, these rights are even automatic,
as in the Netherlands, where a woman upon marriage to another
307. Eric Fish, The Road to Recognition, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 32, 32 (2005).
308. Gay Couples in Belgium Get Adoption Rights, WASH. BLADE, Apr. 21, 2006, available
at http://www.washblade.com/thelatestlthelatest.cfm?blog-id=6317; Danny McCoy, Belgium
Legalizes Same-Sex Adoption, GMAX.CO.ZA, Apr. 24, 2006, available at http://www.gmax.
co.za/look06/04/24-belgium.html.
309. See Dias, supra note 142, at 77.
310. See Wintemute, supra note 61, at 1157.
311. See Fish, supra note 307, at 32.
312. See Williams, supra note 289, at 46-47.
313. See Hilary Leila Krieger, Court: Lesbian Can Adopt Partner's Kids, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 13, 2006, at 1.
314. See Q & A SAME SEX MARRIAGE: A GUIDE To DUTCH POLICY 10 (2003), available at
http://www.nlembassy.org.yu/downloads/ethical.samesexpolicy.pdf
315. See Louw, supra note 218, at 315-18 (citing Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000
(8) BCLR 837 (CC) 53-60, 86 (S. Afr.)); Wendy Isaack, Equal in Word of Law: The Rights
of Lesbian and Gay People in South Africa, 30 HUM. RTS. 19, 21 (ABA 2003) (citing Du Toit
v. Minister of Welfare & Population Dev., CCT 40/01 2002 (10) BCLR 1006 (CC)).
316. See Spanish Ms Approve Gay Marriages, supra note 242.
317. See MacGregor, supra note 282.
318. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, § 79, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts
acts2004/20040033.htm.
319. See World Legal Survey, supra note 42.
320. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 148, at 598-99 (Germany).
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woman acquires joint custody of the other's prior children without
any formalities.32'
Most of the world, however, continues to deny equal parental
rights to sexual minorities. 2 The denial of custody and visitation
rights to homosexuals following divorce remains common in most
countries. In some, custody or visitation is conditioned upon a
homosexual parent hiding his or her sexual identity from the
child.323 Courts in most U.S. states, where judges have significant
discretion to discriminate if they choose,324 have come to reject
homosexuality as a basis for denying custody of children, 325 but in
many states it has been considered a relevant factor in making
custody determinations, and there is an automatic presumption in
several of them that sexual minorities are unfit to have custody
even of their own children.326 The Supreme Court's 2003 decision
overturning antisodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas would appear to
cast doubt on the continued validity of such discrimination, 327 but
the matter has not been tested at the federal Supreme Court level.
In sum, only a few countries have openly recognized that sexual
321. MERIN, supra note 42, at 127.
322. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 249, at A18 (Russian Fed.); Council of Europe Doc. 8755,
supra note 43, Explanatory Mem. 41, 43 (Andorra, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland). Some of the countries mentioned in these
sources are excluded here because they have altered their laws since the sources were
published to allow adoption.
323. See, e.g., Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47, 1065 14 (2001); Pantazis, supra
note 181, at 311 (South Africa).
324. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Couples Raising Children: The Law in the
U.S., in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 142, at 153-54.
325. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 186 n.45 (Alaska, Iowa). But see Kate Kendell, Lesbian
and Gay Parents in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 30 HuM. RTS. 8,8,22 (ABA 2003).
326. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Fain. Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 819-20 (11th
Cir. 2004) (Florida); Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 37-38 (Ala. 2002); Downey v. Muffley, 767
N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. App.
1991); Morris v. Morris, 783 So.2d 681, 45-47 (Miss. 2001); H. v. P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869-
71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). But see
Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998) (refusing
to apply the traditional irrefutable presumption that a homosexual is an unfit parent but
allowing consideration of whether the parent's homosexuality harmed the child); Pascarella
v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717-18 (Pa. Super. 1986); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102,
107-08 (Va. 1995).
327. Cf. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 467 (Conn. 2008) (concluding
that the Lawrence reversal of Bowers undermined the legal basis for concluding that
homosexuality is not a quasi-suspect basis for discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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minorities are no less likely to be adequate parents than heterosex-
uals.328
Adoption and artificial insemination remain sensitive subjects as
well even for more liberal states. Lesbians are denied the right to
artificial insemination by law in most countries in which it is
available-most of both Australia and Europe,3 29 although it is
permitted in the United States,33 ° Canada,331 a few European
states,33 2 New Zealand,333 and South Africa.334 Similarly, those
states that have established marriage rights or domestic partner-
ship laws for same-sex couples in most cases continue to deny rights
to adopt an unrelated child. This is the case, for example, in the
Czech Republic,335 Finland,336 France,337 Germany,33 Hungary,339
Iceland,"40 and Norway.34' In the United States, most states do not
328. See Dias, supra note 142, at 77.
329. OTTOSSON, supra note 42; World Legal Survey, supra note 42; MERIN, supra note 42,
at 89, 92 (Norway), 140-41 (France), 147 (Germany); Farkas, supra note 181, at 569, 571
(Hungary). In Australia, some provinces allow artificial insemination to single women and
lesbians in a relationship, while others do not. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 172.
330. MERIN, supra note 42, at 189. However, Nancy Polikoff has pointed out that the
absence of a prohibition on lesbian artificial insemination in the United States reflects the
lack of federal government involvement in artificial insemination (sperm banks in the United
States being privately operated) rather than approval of the practice. See Polikoff, supra note
324, at 158 n.13.
331. Wintemute, supra note 61, at 1158.
332. Council of Europe Doc. 8755, supra note 43, 52, 54. Denmark legalized artificial
insemination for single women in 2006. See AFP, Denmark Legalises Lesbian Artificial
Insemination, ABC ONLINE, June 2, 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitemst
200606/s1654368.htm; see also Nigel Nelson, Lesbian Victory, PEOPLE (UK), Sept. 9, 2007,
at 20, available at 2007 WLNR 17588662. In Finland, it appears there is no legal obstacle to
insemination. MERIN, supra note 42, at 109.
It should be noted, however, that even in those states that allow lesbians artificial
insemination, some allow the sperm donor some control over the fate of the child as the
"biological father." See, e.g., J. McD. v. P.L., [2007] I.E.S.C. 28, 23 (July 19, 2007) (S.C.)
(Ir.), available at http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf (denying lesbian parents of a child born
by artificially insemination the right to take the child on extended vacation in a foreign
country where the sperm donor objects).
333. MERIN, supra note 42, at 175.
334. See Gerber, supra note 142, at 49-50.
335. See Czech MPs Approve Gay Rights Law, supra note 267.
336. See World Legal Survey, supra note 42.
337. See Richards, supra note 279, at 323.
338. See Taylor, supra note 148, at 599.
339. See Farkas, supra note 181, at 569.
340. Iceland Registered Partnership Law 1996, July 1, 1996.
341. See World Legal Survey, supra note 42.
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prohibit same-sex couples from adopting by law, and several allow
second-parent adoptions by same-sex couples. 42 While a handful
prohibit such adoptions by law, every state except Florida and
Utah permits single sexual minorities to adopt,343 rendering the
legal obstacles mostly formal.3 44 A few countries do allow such
adoptions,345 and most states of Western Europe allow a member of
a same-sex couple to adopt the children of the other, 34' but this
remains far from a global trend.
The European adoption treaties do not mandate nondiscrimina-
tory treatment of prospective adopting parents based on sexual
orientation. The 1967 European Convention on the Adoption of
Children provides that states may in their discretion allow for
adoption either by two persons married to each other or by a single
person, 347 but makes no mention of sexual orientation. Nor do the
explanatory notes indicate-for reasons that are easy to sur-
mise-that the possibility of adoption by homosexuals was even
contemplated during the convention negotiations.34 The Council of
Europe's Committee of Ministers is now considering a draft revision
342. See Polikoff, supra note 324, at 161-62; Nelson, supra note 332, at 20.
343. Polikoff, supra note 324, at 166. California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont allow adoption by same-sex couples. Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Utah
expressly prohibit it. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Adoption, http://www.
hrc.org/issues/parenting/adoptions/adoption-laws.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2008); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985).
344. As Nancy Polikoff observes, however, this leaves many children adopted by same-sex
couples in the United States in the unfortunate position of having only one parent recognized
by law. Polikoff, supra note 324, at 160.
345. These are currently Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 114, 119-23.
346. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 42, at 109-10 (Finland); France Broadens Gay's Parental
Rights, CBS NEWS, Feb. 25, 2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/25/
ap/world/mainDSFVTSJOO.shtml (France); Act on Registered Partnerships, Law No. 40, Apr.
30, 1993 (Nor.), available at http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19930430-040.html; Law No. 87,
June 12, 1996 (Ice.), available at http://www.althingi.is/lagasofn/nuna/1996087.html,
translation available at http://eng.domsmalaraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/117;
Adoption and Children Act 2002, 2002, c. 38 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.
uk/acts/acts2002/ukpga_20020038_enl.
347. European Convention on the Adoption of Children art. 6, Apr. 24, 1967,634 U.N.T.S.
254, 260 (1968).
348. There is no mention of sexual orientation or same-sex couples in the Convention's
explanatory report. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the European Convention
on the Adoption of Children, ETX No. 058 (Apr. 24, 1967), available at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/058.htm.
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to the treaty that continues to provide for the possibility of discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation:
Article 7 - Conditions for adoption
1. The law shall permit a child to be adopted:
a. by two persons of different sex
i. who are married to each other, or
ii. where such an institution exists, have entered into a
registered partnership together;
b. by one person.
2. States are free to extend the scope of this convention to
same-sex couples who are married to each other or who
have entered into a registered partnership together.
They are also free to extend the scope of this convention
to different-sex couples and same-sex couples who are
living together in a stable relationship.349
The draft revision mandates allowing married or registered
different-sex couples to adopt, but permits states to discriminate
against married or registered same-sex couples. It further permits
states to discriminate against same-sex couples living in a stable
relationship where marriage or registered partnership is not a legal
option. Nothing in the draft convention prohibits states from
discriminating against homosexual individuals seeking single-
parent adoption.
As elsewhere, European treaty tribunals and agencies have been
slow to recognize a right against discrimination in parental rights.
The CoE's erstwhile Commission on Human Rights declined to
recognize any right of same-sex couples to obtain parental rights
over their partner's children, arguing that a same-sex couple
"cannot be equated to a man and a woman living together" as far as
parental authority over a child.35 The ECtHR's jurisprudence has
been more progressive, at least very recently. In 2001, the ECtHR
held that discrimination against homosexuals in custody decisions
violates the human rights to family life and nondiscrimination. In
349. Council of Eur. Parl. Ass., Draft Convention of the Council of Europe on the Adoption
of Children (revised), Doc. 11274 (2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int.
350. Kerkhoven & Hinke v. The Netherlands, App. 15666/89 (1992).
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Mouta v. Portugal,351 the applicant's custody over his daughter,
which was originally awarded based on the vindictive and unstable
behavior of his former wife following his divorce,352 was reversed by
a Portuguese appellate court at least partly, if not entirely, on the
ground of his homosexuality. 3 3 After asserting that a homosexual
father cannot ipso facto provide a home environment that is "the
healthiest and best suited to a child's psychological, social and
mental development," the court revoked the applicant's custody and
awarded visitation rights with the recommendation that he not "act
in a way that would make his daughter realize that her father is
living with another man in conditions resembling those of a man
and wife. ' 354 Noting that the appellate court's decision was based on
the applicant's sexual orientation, the ECtHR found in effect that
to base custody decisions on sexual orientation alone constituted
discrimination in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR taken in
conjunction with Article 14.
In the 2002 case Frettg v. France, however, the court shied away
from a rigorous equal protection approach.356 In that case, a single
homosexual man had been denied the opportunity to adopt a child
pursuant to French law, which allowed single, heterosexual men
and women the right to adopt.357 Although the Paris Social Services
Department concluded that "[a] child would probably be happy
with" the applicant, it decided that "his particular circumstances
as a single homosexual man" preclude him from being "entrusted
with a child."35 Because the applicant's unmarried status "could not
lawfully constitute the sole reason for the decision,"35 the govern-
351. 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (2001).
352. The applicant's former wife was initially awarded custody over the daughter by the
courts, but she denied the father his legal visitation rights and accused him (apparently
falsely) of child abuse. Id. 9 10-11. Eventually, a family court granted custody to the
applicant because the child's mother repeatedly refused to comply with court orders and
custody agreements, and because she could not or did not provide a home for the child, but
rather left her with the child's maternal grandparents, who had no appropriate living
arrangements for the child. Id. 9 12-14.
353. Id. 9 12-14.
354. Id. 9 14.
355. Id. 99 28, 36.
356. 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2004).
357. Id. 9 10.
358. Id.
359. Id. 9 13.
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ment based its decision exclusively on the assumption that a
homosexual was ipso facto substantially unfit to act as a parent.36 °
On application to the ECtHR, the court made the surprising claim
that "the right to respect for family life [in Article 8 of the ECHR]
presupposes the existence of a family and does not safeguard the
mere desire to found a family. 361 The court observed nonetheless
that, because French law grants a right to "all single persons" to
apply for adoption, the denial of the right to adopt to a homosexual
man on that ground alone implicated the applicant's rights under
Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 8.362
Emphasizing the primacy of the best interests of the child, the
court then noted that many EU states continue to deny single
persons and homosexuals the right to adopt children, which "total
lack of consensus" gave the states a wide margin of appreciation to
adopt regulations as they saw fit.363 Given that a minority of mental
health experts had opined that children might suffer in some way
under the parenthood of homosexuals, the court concluded that
France's decision "appears objective and reasonable" and that the
discrimination against homosexuals was consistent with Article 14
of the ECHR.3
64
The court's interpretation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR and
its own jurisprudence in Frettg was unexpected. It is facially
contrary to the U.N. Human Rights Committee's reading of Article
23(2) of the ICCPR, which affirms "the right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to found a family. ' 366 It is also
inconsistent with other human rights instruments, such as the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the
European Charter, which both recognize a human right to "found"
or "establish" a family. 366 It further conflicts with the ECtHR's own
approach to defining proportionality in Karner v. Austria, decided
360. Id. 1 10.
361. Id. 7 31.
362. Id. 33.
363. Id. 77 36, 41.
364. Id. 77 42-43.
365. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 23(2) (emphasis added); see U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 19: Protection of the Family, The Right to Marriage and Equality of
the Spouses (Art. 23), 4 (July 27, 1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/0/6f97648603f69bcdc12563ed004c3881?Opendocument.
366. American Declaration, supra note 2, art. VI; European Charter, supra note 1, art. 9.
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that same year, in which the court demanded that the state show
that the challenged measure be "necessary" to achieve a legitimate
goal.367 The evidence presented by France was very far from
showing that denying homosexuals the equal right to adopt was
necessary to protect children; indeed, the great bulk of evidence
showed the contrary. Finally, the decision in Frett conflicted with
the court's holding two years earlier in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,
in which it expressly interpreted Article 12 as securing a "funda-
mental right" not only to protection of a preexisting family but to
"found" a family.3
68
Beyond its jurisprudential inconsistencies, the court seems not
to have followed its own reasoning to its natural conclusion. The
logical corollary to the ECtHR's dictum in Frettg that Article 8 does
not safeguard the right to found a family is that the words
"[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life" '369
would not prevent the state from denying its citizens the right to
reproduce or forcibly sterilizing members of its population based
on scientifically unproven assumptions about class inferiority.
Unless the court did indeed intend to hold that the state could
forbid a homosexual the right to reproduce (e.g., by impregnating
a female friend or surrogate mother) consistent with Articles 8 and
14 of the Convention, it is unclear how concerns for the best
interests of a child would deny a homosexual the right to adopt an
orphan while upholding his undoubted right to maintain custody
of his own biological child. Indeed, the conclusion that the discrimi-
nation in Frettg was "objective and reasonable" is inconsistent with
the court's own reasoning in Mouta v. Portugal only three years
earlier.37 ° Putting aside the absence of evidence that parental
homosexuality harms children (or is transmitted to children, a
separate question),37' if homosexuals are presumptively unfit
367. Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 537 1 41 (2004).
368. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, [2002] E.C.H.R. 28957/95, 98.
369. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8.
370. Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47, 28, 36 (2001).
371. There is significant evidence that children raised by homosexual parents show no
more inclination to homosexuality than other children and are not otherwise harmed by
having homosexual parents. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, LESBIAN AND GAY
PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 8-12 (Wash., D.C. 1995), available at
http://www. apa.orgpi/lgbc/publications/lgparenting.pdf; J.S. Gottman, Children of Gay and
Lesbian Parents, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS 177 (F.W. Bozett & M.B.
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parents, it is no more reasonable to put their own children in
their custody than to put an orphan in their custody. The court's
unorthodox reasoning in Frettd indicated a continuing judicial
toleration of irrational homophobia as late as 2002.
The court did not, however, take long to reverse its position. The
Grand Chamber of the court overturned the Frett decision only six
years later in E.B. v. France.372 The facts of the case were substan-
tially the same as in Frettg; a single homosexual was denied
authorization to adopt a child based at least in part on the unsup-
ported assumption that homosexuals are unfit parents.373 The
applicant alleged a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with
Article 8 of the ECHR. 374 The court held fast to its problematic
interpretation of Article 8 as not including a right to found a family,
reiterating that the right presupposes the existence of a family.375
Emphasizing that the Convention is a "living instrument" that must
be interpreted in accordance with "present-day conditions, 376 the
court reversed Frettg by ten votes to seven.3 7
The published reasoning for the change of interpretation was
sparse. The court merely noted that France had to bear the burden
of proof and that its reasons for discrimination-primarily the
argument that children need a stable father-figure that the ap-
plicant had no way to provide-was not "particularly convincing
and weighty. '378 Presumably, the court had in mind the fact that, in
allowing single heterosexual parents to adopt, France implicitly
contradicted its own position on the importance of a father-figure.
Sussman eds., 1990); R. Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696-97 (1978); C. Patterson, Children of
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992); J. Schwartz-Gottman, Children of Gay
and Lesbian Parents, 14 MARRIAGE & FAM. REv. 177 (1989).
372. E.B. v. France, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2008).
373. Actually, it would be more precise to say that the facts in E.B. v. France favored
respondent France's position more than the facts in Frettg. In Frettg, the applicant's
homosexuality was the sole apparent ground for denial of authorization to adopt. In E.B., it
was one of two main objections raised against the authorization. See id. 11 71-73, 9 0-I1
to 0-415 (Costa, J., dissenting).
374. See id. 41.
375. See id.
376. Id. 9 46, 92.
377. Id. 2. While the court majority made perfunctory efforts to distinguish the facts in
Fretti from the facts before it, id. 71, the contradiction between the two decisions is
undeniable.
378. Id. 9 94.
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Whatever the court's de facto motivations, however, it established
a rule applicable among Council of Europe states to the effect that,
when single-parent adoptions are allowed, they must be authorized
without regard to the sexual orientation of the applicant.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY AND SEXUALITY
The emerging pattern in the most influential states toward
restraining government interference in and discrimination based on
noncommercial sexual behavior presents an edifying case study of
how human rights norms can develop as "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" '379 until they become interpretive
forces in customary international law. The rapidity of the develop-
ment and dissemination of these norms offers a unique insight into
the forces promoting and retarding the development of customary
law in a highly interconnected community of states with diverse
cultures. The pace of change in this case illustrates how the spread
of a human rights norm may proceed glacially until a critical mass
of states of sufficient influence have adopted the norm. At that
point, the trend may accelerate under propitious conditions.
In the case of sexual minority human rights, decriminalization
advanced slowly over the last fifty years, but as the number of
states abandoning criminal prohibitions increased, regional and
international human rights authorities began to find the reasoning
underlying decriminalization persuasive. The same logic that jus-
tified decriminalization took on a momentum of its own and soon
led to a similar pattern in the abandonment of arbitrary state
discrimination against sexual minorities in many states. The
combination of lobbying from influential states, international and
regional authorities, and civil society has snowballed, and the pace
of reform has consequently accelerated in the last twenty years.
The United States, for example, changed in only forty years from
a country where every state maintained prohibitions on oral and
anal intercourse to one where no state could constitutionally
prohibit such behavior,"' and two states clearly permit same-sex
379. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(c).
380. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,570, 572 (2003). These laws were apparently rarely
enforced. William Eskridge reports that, from 1880 to 1995, some 203 prosecutions for adult
consensual homosexual sex were pursued. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW 375 (1999).
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marriage. This is not to say that international pressure and
example are the only factors promoting the development of new
human rights norms. There are many other important influences
at play. Not least is the ideological aspect of the norms, which is
the subject of this part of the Article. The importance of ideology is
especially great here because the resistance to the spread of the
norms is itself clothed in ideological trappings.3"'
But upon what ideologies have the international organizations
and tribunals, as well as domestic political and legal elites, relied
in justifying extending human rights to sexual minorities? Two
main theories of human rights appear in the precedents dealing
with unconventional sexuality. While both of the theories some-
times make an appearance in the same case, they are conceptually
distinct and in some ways may be contradictory.
The first theory treats homosexuals, and to some extent bisexuals
and transsexuals, as more or less homogenous groups in need of
special protections. Under this approach, human rights of privacy
and nondiscrimination are extended to homosexuals, bisexuals, and
their sexual activities on the basis of the perception of these groups
as particularly disadvantaged and socially and politically under-
represented. This theory is essentially based on a human right to
freedom from arbitrary discrimination based on minority group
membership, because it relies upon a conception of sexual minori-
ties as fundamentally different in some socially important but
legally insignificant way.
The other group of approaches common in international legal
precedents reads the privacy, family, and other rights more broadly
to encompass substantive limitations on state regulation of private,
consensual, adult sexual behavior and to posit a general norm of
nondiscrimination based on sexual preferences and practices absent
a showing of tangible harm to identifiable persons. This class of
theories, typically based on something akin to a libertarian theory
of governance, invokes "the harm principle" to invalidate state
interference in or discrimination against unconventional sexuality.
These theories and the extent of their compatibility will be exam-
ined in the following pages.
381. The most prominent nonideological factors are psychological, an analysis of which
goes beyond the scope of this Article and my own competence.
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A. Sexual Minority Group Discrimination Theories
Some of the rationales justifying the extension of human rights
to sexual minorities advanced by legal and political elites have been
based on a view of homosexuals as a clearly defined minority group
entitled to protection from oppressive majoritarian legislation. One
commentator, Michele Grigolo, has concluded that the trend of the
ECtHR's jurisprudence is toward the granting of human rights to
homosexuals and bisexuals based on their perceived status as a
homogenous group.38 2 He views the concept of "sexual life" to have
been "narrowed and limited to a sphere of 'legal and judicial
toleration' of the homosexual legal subject."3 3 The Human Rights
Commission and ECtHR have both sometimes expressed views
superficially consistent with Grigolo's interpretation. In Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, the Commission found that U.K. criminal
statutes prohibiting homosexual intercourse directly affected
Dudgeon, the self-identified homosexual applicant, as a member of
"a particular class of persons whose conduct is thus legally re-
stricted."3"4 The Commission thus seemed to identify homosexuals
as a disfavored class.
38 5
The ECtHR used similar reasoning in both Lustig-Prean &
Beckett v. United Kingdom 6 and Smith & Grady v. United
Kingdom.38 v There, the court implicitly analogized homophobia to
racism:
382. Michele Grigolo, Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal
Subject, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1023, 1031-32, 1039-40 (2003).
383. Id. at 1039.
384. 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 86 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rts. 1980).
385. The ECtHR did not repeat the Commission's argument precisely, but instead
observed that "the impugned legislation constitutes a continuing interference with the
applicant's right to respect for his private life (which includes his sexual life) within the
meaning of Article 8(1)." Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 41 (1982).
While this language could apply equally to a heterosexual who wished to engage in illegal
homosexual intercourse, the court seemed to limit its holding in the following sentence: "In
the personal circumstances of the applicant, the very existence of the legislation continuously
and directly affects his private life .... " Id. (emphasis added). Although the reference to the
applicant's "personal circumstances" may be read to implicate his desire to engage in
homosexual intercourse, it may equally, if not more probably, be read to refer to his self-
identification as a homosexual.
386. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999).
387. Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 97 (2000).
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To the extent that [the service regulations prohibiting homosex-
ual enlistment in the military] represent a predisposed bias on
the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual
minority, these negative attitudes cannot, of themselves, be
considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification ...
any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a
different race, origin or colour. 88
In Smith & Grady, moreover, the court distinguished between the
case before it and KalaV v. Turkey, in which a judge advocate of the
Turkish Air Force was compelled to retire after adopting fundamen-
talist religious views.389 According to the court, the key difference
between the cases was that in KalaV, the applicant had been
"dismissed on grounds of his conduct" while the applicants in Smith
& Grady "were discharged on grounds of their innate personal
characteristics" (i.e., their status as homosexuals).39 °
State domestic practices extending human rights to sexual
minorities have sometimes proceeded from similar reasoning. In
Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Colorado
state constitutional amendment that would have prohibited any
state action or judicial decision that protected any person from
state, municipal, or private discrimination based on their "homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation." '91 In reaching that decision,
the Court explained that the amendment denied a class of citizens
the equal protection of the laws in "an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a
free society," whereas the U.S. Constitution "neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." '392 The Court could discern no
rational explanation for the statute except as an unconstitutional
expression of "animus toward the class it affects."39 In Romer, the
Colorado amendment was directed toward perpetuating discrimina-
tion against homosexuals and bisexuals as a class; it was not, to use
the ECtHR's distinction in Smith & Grady, designed to perpetuate
discrimination based on behavior per se, such as sexual activity.
388. Lustig-Prean, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 90; Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 97.
389. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 552 (1999).
390. Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 93.
391. 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996).
392. Id. at 621, 628-31.
393. Id. at 632.
[Vol. 50:797
STATE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY
In Lawrence v. Texas, however, the state had criminalized the
activity of same-sex intercourse, which was more akin to legislated
discrimination against specific behavior.394 Here, the Supreme
Court relied on the centrality of unconventional sex to the homosex-
ual identity395 and effectively merged the conduct-based discrimina-
tion with class-based discrimination. Much of the majority opinion's
reasoning emphasized that the Texas legislation at issue violated
the petitioners' rights to privacy not only because the motivation
for the law was moral condemnation of private, harmless behavior,
but rather because the sole motivation for the law was the crim-
inalization and marginalization of a class of persons-sexual
minorities-by regulating conduct tied to their identities.396 The
Court's references to the importance of a legally preserved "auton-
omy of self," and its statement that the state cannot "demean [the]
existence" of homosexuals or "control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct crime," while having broader implications
for all state regulation of private sexual behavior, seem to be
intended to condemn state regulations that punished homosexuals
and bisexuals qua sexual minorities.397 Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion, with its repeated references to homosexuals as a
"politically unpopular group" (echoing the majority opinion in
Romer v. Evans), followed the same logic.398
A similar emphasis on nondiscrimination against homosexuals
as a class is evident in various U.S. state supreme court decisions.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's 1993 decision finding the Kentucky
prohibition on homosexual conduct unconstitutional is an inter-
esting example.399 There, the court first held that legislation
criminalizing private, harmless conduct violates the state constitu-
tion.4 °° Yet, it switched philosophies in mid-opinion to hold that
394. 533 U.S. 558, 566 (2003).
395. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1616 (2d ed. 1988).
396. Lawrence, 533 U.S. at 562, 578.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 580, 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the United States, arbitrary
discrimination against a group may violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws if the group has been subjected to a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" and
constitutes a "discrete and insular minority." See Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
83 (2000).
399. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993).
400. Id. at 491.
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homosexuals constituted a "separate and identifiable class"
deserving of protection from discrimination based on their sexual
preference.401 Other state supreme courts have equally identified
homosexuals as a "separate and identifiable class" for purposes of
equal protection analysis.4 °2
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Egan v.
Canada, in which the court established that sexual orientation
was a prohibited ground for discrimination, similarly held that
"homosexuals, whether as individuals or couples, form an identifi-
able minority who have suffered and continue to suffer serious
social, political and economic disadvantage."4 3 The South African
Constitutional Court, in holding the law prohibiting homosexual
intercourse unconstitutional, also relied in part on the concept of
homosexuals as a coherent group deserving of protection against
discrimination.4 4 The court based its decision on the observation
that "[g]ay men are a permanent minority in society and have
suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage."4 5
The tension between casting the issue as a universal right to
liberty or privacy and a right to nondiscrimination clarifies why
judicial opinions condemning state-sponsored or tolerated disc-
rimination against sexual minorities tend to contain some inconsis-
tencies in their analysis. In Lawrence, the majority opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion were at odds on precisely this
issue."' The majority opinion purported to rest the unconstitution-
ality of the Texas statute primarily on a fundamental right to
privacy (a right to "substantive due process").40 7 The majority
401. Id. at 500.
402. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 351 (Ark. 2002); In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 401, 441-44 (Cal. 2008) (finding homosexuals to be a "suspect class" for whom
discriminatory measures must meet strict scrutiny); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 468-69 (Conn. 2008).
403. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 175 (Can.).
404. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister ofJustice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC)
(S. Aft.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36.
405. Id. T 26. Justice Sachs in his concurring opinion likewise concluded that "[a]t the
heart of equality jurisprudence is the rescuing of people from a caste-like status and putting
an end to their being treated as lesser human beings because they belong to a particular
group." Id. 129 (Sachs., J., concurring).
406. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 567, 578 (2003); id. at 583, 585
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
407. Id. at 572, 582 (majority opinion).
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referenced the minority status of homosexuals without apparently
relying on a right against arbitrary discrimination as a basis for its
decision.4 °8 Justice O'Connor's opinion was more explicit in resting
the unconstitutionality on a right of homosexuals as a class to be
free from arbitrary discrimination in the form of "equal protection
of the laws" analysis.40 9 In the U.S. state cases finding marriage
discrimination based on sexual orientation to violate fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the state constitutions, both the right to
found a family and a prohibition on arbitrary discrimination based
on minority class membership were invoked as grounds to strike
down the prohibition on same-sex marriage.410
The ECtHR has conflated these principles consistently. The court
has typically found discriminatory measures inconsistent with the
human rights to privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR),41' finding as an
afterthought that claims of discrimination (Article 14)412 may also
be implicated but raise no additional issues.413 The conflation can
be traced to the court's position that Article 14 confers only rights
derivative of the substantive human rights set forth in the Conven-
tion. In both Lustig-Prean & Beckett and Smith & Grady, the court
grounded its decisions on the Article 8 right to privacy. It held that
the claim of Article 14 discrimination did amount "in effect to the
same complaint, albeit seen from a different angle," as the Article
408. Id. at 571-72.
409. Id. at 564; id. at 583-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
410. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,441-46 (Cal. 2008); Kerriganv. Comm'r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424, 476 (Conn. 2008).
411. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8.
412. Article 14 provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Id. art. 14.
413. See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 116 (2000).
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8 claim, and therefore did "not give rise to any separate issue.'"414
In reality, the claims had quite different import. A decision purely
based on Article 8 would have amounted to a general prohibition on
arbitrary state interference in one's personal associations and
sexual conduct regardless of membership in a repressed group. The
assertion that this claim in the petition was dismissed, in the
court's words, because of their "innate personal characteristics" of
belonging to a "homosexual minority 41 was a claim of discrimina-
tion based on status under Article 14 respecting rights protected
by the Convention. There is a consequential difference between
deciding the case as a pure Article 8 claim and an "Article 14 taken
in conjunction with Article 8" claim. 41 ' Analyzing the Article 8 claim
without reference to Article 14, the court left it unclear whether the
minority group status of homosexuals was an important factor in its
decisions.
The ECtHR seems dimly aware of the problems of relying
exclusively on the position of homosexuals as a minority class, but
it has not clearly announced whether discrimination is impermissi-
ble because of the status of homosexuals as disfavored minorities or
because the state has no legitimate interest in regulating private,
harmless conduct of this kind. Relying exclusively on a view of
sexual minorities as a class worthy of protection may seem unduly
limiting to the court. The logical but unacceptable corollary of this
line of reasoning is that a self-identified heterosexual may be the
subject of criminal prohibitions and other discrimination to which
a self-identified homosexual (or perhaps bisexual) would be legally
immune. The Dudgeon (Commission) and Smith & Grady (the
court) reasoning in some ways implies that a heterosexual but not
a homosexual could have suffered discrimination for an instance of
same-sex intercourse consistent with European human rights law.
Yet, it must certainly have occurred to the Commission or court
that heterosexuals might have the same human right as do homo-
sexuals to engage in intercourse with someone of the same sex if
they so choose, especially in light of the copious social science
evidence showing that a relatively high percentage of self-identified
414. Id. 115-16.
415. Id. 93, 97.
416. Id. 116.
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heterosexuals have had sexual fantasies about or actual inter-
course with persons of the same sex at one time or another.417
Evidence of these considerations may be gleaned from the court's
decisions in Dudgeon, Lustig-Prean & Beckett, Smith & Grady, and
A.D. T. to rely on the Article 8 right of privacy to strike down state
interference rather than the Article 14 right against discrimination.
The identical reasoning would preclude a claim by homosexuals
of discrimination where the laws at issue penalized oral or anal
penetration in homosexual or heterosexual intercourse equally (as
they did under the U.S. state legislation in Bowers v. Hardwick41S),
unless one adheres to the position that heterosexuals do not have
417. See PAUL GEBHARD, ALAN B. JOHNSON & ALFRED C. KINSEY, THE KINSEY DATA:
MARGINAL TABULATIONS OF THE 1938-1963 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR
SEX RESEARCH (1979) (U.S.); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 472-74 (1953) (U.S.); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 656 (1948) (U.S.); Lee Ellis, Brian Robb & Donald Burke, Sexual Orientation in United
States and Canadian College Students, 34 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 569 (2005) (Canada
& U.S.); Lee Ellis, Donald Burke & M.A. Ames, Sexual Orientation as a Continuous Variable:
A Comparison Between the Sexes, 16 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 523 (1987) (Canada &
U.S.); E. Narring, S.M. Stronski Huwiler & P.A. Michaud, Prevalence and Dimensions of
Sexual Orientation in Swiss Adolescents: A Cross-Sectional Survey of 16 to 20-year-old
Students, 92 ACTA PAEDIATR. 141 (2003) (Switzerland); Preeti Pathela, Anjum Hajat, Julia
Schillinger, Susan Blank, Randall Sell & Farzad Mostashari, Discordance Between Sexual
Behavior and Self-Reported Sexual Identity: A Population-Based Survey of New York City
Men, 145 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 416 (2006) (U.S.); Gary Remafedi, Michael Resnick,
Robert Blum & Linda Harris, Demography of Sexual Orientation in Adolescents, 89
PEDIATRICS 714 (1992) (U.S.); Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Geoffrey L. Ream, Prevalence and
Stability of Sexual Orientation Components During Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 36
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 385 (2007) (U.S.); Stuart N. Seidman & Ronald 0. Rieder, A
Review of Sexual Behavior in the United States, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 330 (1994); Anthony
M.A. Smith, Chris E. Rissel, Juliet Richters, Andrew E. Grulich & Richard 0. de Visser, Sex
in Australia:" Sexual Identity, Sexual Attraction and Sexual Experience Among a
Representative Sample of Adults, 27 AusTL. & N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH 138 (2003) (Australia);
Bente Traeen, Hein Stigum & Dagfinn Soorensen, Sexual Diversity in Urban Norwegians,
39 J. SEx RES. 249 (2002) (Norway); William D. Mosher, Anjani Chandra & Jo Jones, Sexual
Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women 15-44 Years of Age, United States,
2002, ADVANCE DATA No. 362 (U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Ctr. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics), Sept. 15, 2005, at 14-15, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf; see also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 149, 183 (1982) (Walsh, J., dissenting in part) ("rhe fact that a person consents to take
part in the commission of homosexuals acts is not proof that such person is sexually oriented
by nature in that direction."). Judge Walsh's dissent notices this distinction in order to
preach "tolerance" for the unfortunate, "pathological" few who are "incurable" homosexuals,
as opposed to "those whose tendency comes from a lack of normal sexual development" or
other "curable" source. Id.
418. 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the same right as homosexuals to explore their sexuality.419 It is at
least possible that some men and women do not fully realize their
homosexual tendencies until they have had a chance to explore
them through interpersonal conduct. A law exempting homosexuals
but not heterosexuals from a criminal prohibition on oral or anal
intercourse would make every first instance of intercourse a crime
at the time committed where the person was uncertain of his or her
sexual orientation, but not a crime after the epiphany. Such a law
would be difficult to enforce, indeed.
Even were the classification not artificial, however, the distinc-
tion between heterosexuals and sexual minorities differs signifi-
cantly from other kinds of group discrimination, such as sex
discrimination and race discrimination. With some exceptions, race
and sex are not primarily determined by conduct, but by observable
characteristics. Sexual minorities are characterized by personality
traits-various degrees of intimate attraction to other members of
the same sex-which are typically expressed and observed by the
resulting intimate sexual conduct--conduct in which, as observed
earlier, heterosexuals can engage as well.42°
Yet, if conduct is considered a legitimate basis for classifying a
person, we find ourselves engaged in an elusive search for a dis-
tinction between identity-typing conduct and non-identity-typing
conduct. Presumably narcotics abusers do not define their core
identities as junkies, and persons who engage in consensual incest
consider that activity (defined as such) peripheral to their identities
as well. But one need not look far afield to find examples more
difficult to classify, not only because sexual conduct is personal and
intimate, and sexuality is part of most persons' core sense of self,
but because portioning out humanity into the neat categories of
homosexual and heterosexual is reductionistic. Private adult
masturbation (which has sometimes been outlawed)42' may well be
419. The counterargument is that, because such laws are virtually never enforced against
adult, consensual, private heterosexual behavior (e.g., heterosexual oral or anal intercourse),
Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 538-39 (1992), and
indeed because such laws are often limited in their scope to same-sex intercourse, see, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003), it is clear that the intent of the legislature is
to strike at the homosexual's identity through the only conduct by which they can express
their identities qua homosexuals.
420. See sources cited in note 417, supra.
421. In Indonesia, masturbation was a crime as late as 2003. Ahmad Junaidi, Revision
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fundamental to a healthy person's sense of sexuality,4 22 yet
presumably few would claim that the activity defines their very
identity. This brings us to the intractable conundrum of how much
attraction to or sexual conduct with persons of the same sex moves
a person from the "heterosexual" category to the "bisexual" cat-
egory, and from there to the "homosexual" category.
More fundamentally still, classifying human beings based on
putative personality characteristics, or even identity, is inherently
problematic. Treating homosexuals as members of a minority
class forces dichotomization of a full spectrum of human sexual
preferences and practices. Many men and women have engaged in
one-time or periodic homosexual encounters without necessarily
labeling themselves as homosexual or even bisexual.4 23 Forcing the
complexities of sexuality into two or three Procrustean categories
is unhelpful to understanding the conduct and whether state
regulation is necessary.
This is not to say that minority group analysis is never a helpful
approach to understanding how international human rights law
relates to sexuality; it merely indicates that this conceptualization
has its limitations. The relevance of sexual minorities as "classes"
or "groups" remains critical to the theory of nondiscrimination as
applied both to the minorities themselves and their sexual conduct.
A heterosexual who is prohibited from engaging in unconventional
sexual intercourse suffers less than does a homosexual, because
although both experience an interference with their rights of
liberty, privacy, and intimate association, the prohibition specifi-
cally targets and affects the homosexual's primary avenue for
sexual self-expression and attachment to another.424 As the ECtHR
has often (though inconsistently) recognized, a right to privacy or
Needed of 'Repressive'Articles, THE JAKARTA POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at 2.
422. See Eli Coleman, Masturbation as a Means of Achieving Sexual Health, in
MASTURBATION AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING SEXUAL HEALTH 5 (Walter 0. Bockting & Eli
Coleman eds., 2003); David Farley Hurlbert & Karen Elizabeth Whittaker, The Role of
Masturbation in Marital and Sexual Satisfaction: A Comparative Study of Female
Masturbators and Nonmasturbators, 17 J. SEX EDUC. & THERAPY 272 (1991); see also Barbara
L. Anderson, A Comparison of Systematic Desensitization and Directed Masturbation in the
Treatment of Primary Orgasmic Dysfunction in Females, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 568 (1981); Barbara L. Andersen & Jill M. Cyranowski, Women's Sexual Self-
Schema, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1079 (1994).
423. See sources cited in note 417, supra.
424. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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intimate association does not exhaust the human rights relevant to
unconventional sexuality or sexual minorities.425 Discrimination
against sexual minorities, not only per se but in a manner calcu-
lated to deny them access to resources and activities necessary for
the full development of their human identity on terms equal to
heterosexuals, must necessarily fail the court's proportionality test.
Such discrimination, if it benefits society at all, is unlikely to afford
a benefit approaching in magnitude the detriment it creates for the
public generally and sexual minorities specifically. Whatever its
effect on heterosexuals, it inevitably deprives sexual minorities of
their opportunity to achieve personal happiness and fulfillment in
the context of the culture within which they live. And, as Joseph
Landau has observed, "[o]ne cannot live a complete life without
being part of the broader culture at the same time"426 -an observa-
tion that sufficiently reflects the views of the international commu-
nity that it has found its way into several international human
rights treaties.427
Discrimination analysis, when properly utilized, also has the
advantage of accounting for the context-dependence of social
legislation. If homosexuals are truly a separate "class," then to
argue that it is nondiscriminatory to prohibit both heterosexuals
and homosexuals from engaging in oral or anal intercourse42 is
akin to claiming that a law prohibiting both the rich and the poor
from sleeping under bridges, begging in the streets, and stealing
food is evenhanded,429 or that an insurance policy exempting from
coverage diseases to which only women are susceptible is nondis-
criminatory on the ground that both men and women can be free
from the disease.4"' Such arguments ignore the diversity of contexts
425. See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 127 (2000).
426. Joseph Landau, Marriage as Integration, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 323,
325 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). Presumably, intolerance of unconventional sexuality is not
a core element of any state's culture except, perhaps, that of the Holy See.
427. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 15(1),
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life.'); Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 14(1),
Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988) ("The States Parties to this Protocol recognize the
right of everyone: a. To take part in the cultural and artistic life of the community.").
428. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
429. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE 117-18 (Calmann-L6vy ed., Paris, 1923) (1894).
430. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Feminism and International Law: Theory, Methodology
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in which different groups of persons live. Class membership may
have meaning in human rights analysis not because the minority
class is entitled to rights different from the majority's, but because
the rights lose their meaning when taken out of context.
As noted in Part I, treating different classes of persons unequally
may be justified if the discrimination is necessary to fulfill a
pressing need in a democratic society and a proportional (in ECtHR
analysis)43' or "reasonable and objective" (in HRC analysis)432
measure for the achievement of a legitimate state purpose. In the
context of regulation of unconventional sexuality or discrimination
against sexual minorities, states have typically sought to justify
their action on the grounds of preservation of public morality or
ordre public. 43 3 No state seriously puts forward the argument that
same-sex intercourse among a minority of the population threatens
state security, causes riots, or leads to a criminal lifestyle. States
have defended some forms of discrimination, however, as necessary
for public morality purposes. For example, as noted, states have
often claimed that discriminatory ages of consent prevent adoles-
cents from being influenced by early homosexual experiences.434
These arguments, besides being uniformly based on poorly sub stan-
tiated assumptions about how sexuality develops, assume that the
state has a legitimate interest in preventing members of society
from becoming homosexual, or at least engaging in homosexual
experimentation.
and Substantive Reform, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 658, 663 (2000).
431. In elaborating the standard of proportionality, the court recently stated that it
requires not only that the measure at issue be "in principle suited for realising the aim
sought," but that it was also "necessary ... to achieve that aim." Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 24, 41 (2004).
432. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 13 (Nov. 10,
1989), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by the
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (Sept. 4, 1992).
433. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bowers,
478 U.S. at 196, 212; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 7 45-46 (1982).
434. E.g., Wolfmeyer v. Austria, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 7 21, 23 (2006); L. & V. v. Austria,
36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55, 7 24 (2003); X. v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 63, 154 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1978). Other states may phrase their homophobia in more neutral
terms, as in Hong Kong: "The reasons [for the age discrimination] are that men between 16
and 21 often have only a limited and possibly distorted knowledge of homosexual activity;
they might be curious about and inclined to experiment with new activities and consequently
be easily led into committing homosexual acts ...." Chan, supra note 74, at 72.
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This assertion brings us to the question of whether the preven-
tion of homosexuality is a legitimate state purpose-a matter to be
explored in detail in subsequent pages. Here, it suffices to observe
that, even assuming arguendo that the prevention of homosexuality
is a legitimate state purpose, many forms of discrimination have no
reasonable relation to the purpose of "preventing" homosexuality
and, indeed, are not intended for such purpose. For example, there
is no reason to believe that denying equal housing or inheritance
rights to homosexual couples effectively discourages homosexuality.
The purpose of much discrimination is little more than the dehu-
manization of sexual minorities by validating the very biases that
gave rise to them-specifically, the illusion of heteronormative
superiority-thereby promoting continuing discrimination.435 And
the reason such laws have often been found discriminatory based on
sexual orientation, beyond the fact that they are usually designed
precisely for that reason, is the dissonance between the ostensible
purposes of such laws and the inappositeness of regulating
unconventional sexuality to accomplishing them.
The most obvious example is the continued prevalence of
prohibitions on same-sex marriage, which has often been stridently
defended by state authorities and commentators as necessary to
ensure the sanctity of marriage as a bond to foster procreation
for the perpetuation of the human race.436 Even the ECtHR has
435. Cf. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
(CC) 125 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36 (impugning
"differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of the sense of
dignity and self-worth associated with membership of the group').
436. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 515-16 (Conn. 2008)
(Zarella, J., dissenting); Deane v. Conaway, 932 A.2d 571, 619-21 (Md. Ct. App. 2007);
EGALE Can. Inc. v. Canada, [2001] 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122, 205, rev'd, [2003] 225 D.L.R.(4th)
472 (Can.) (holding that same-sex couples cannot claim equal treatment to different-sex
couples because the latter "may, as between themselves, propagate the species and thereby
perpetuate humankind. Same-sex couples cannot."); Chairperson of the Immigr. Selection
Bd. v. Frank, Case No. SA 8/99 (Sup. Ct. Namib. Mar. 5, 2001), available at http://www.
saflii.orglna/cases/NASC/2001/1.html, quoted in Hubbard & Cassidy, supra note 46, at 263
(describing the "family institution" under the Namibian Constitution and various regional
and international human rights treaties as "a formal relationship between male and female,
where sexual intercourse between them in the family context is the method to procreate
offspring and thus ensure the perpetuation and survival of the nation and the human race');
Explanatory Statement, Resolution on Discrimination Against Transsexuals, EUR. PARL.RES.
A3-16/89, at 10-12, 1989 O.J. (C 256) 33 (quoting the French Cour de Cassation as denying
a right to sex reassignment because transsexuals "constitute a risk for society, and if they
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recently accepted that "protection of the family in the traditional
sense is, in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason which might
justify a difference in treatment" between different sex couples and
same sex couples if the measures taken to protect or encourage such
families are proportional to the goal sought.4"7
One problem with such claims is evident from their appeal to
abstract normative values without reference to any connection
between the discriminatory regulation and the protection of the
values invoked. Opponents of same-sex marriage rarely acknowl-
edge the fact that heterosexual marriage is no longer widely con-
sidered either necessary or sufficient for fostering procreation.43
Very few states require marriage as a precondition to procreation. 439
Reproduction occurs frequently outside of marriage and is rarely if
ever a criminal act in modern state practice. Conversely, although
some states historically made the impossibility of procreation due
to impotence or sterility a basis for divorce, that is no longer the
case.440 Many heterosexual couples marry with no intent to
procreate, nor are they required to do so by law.44'
spread, for the human race"); MERIN, supra note 42, at 143 (describing the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Constitutional Court] decision against extending marriage to
same-sex couples on similar grounds); Turcescu & Stan, supra note 21, at 297 (quoting
Romanian deputy Emil Popescu as stating "incest is preferable to homosexuality since at
least the former preserved the chance of procreation'); see also Fongaro, supra note 247, at
479-80 (quoting the author of the preliminary comments on the French Code Civil as defining
marriage as "the association of a man and a woman who unite to perpetuate the species, to
help one another through mutual aid to carry the burden of life, and to share their common
destiny") (my translation).
437. Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 537 40 (2004).
438. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 431-33 (Cal. 2008). But see Farkas, supra
note 181, at 567 (recounting the Constitutional Court of Hungary's finding that marriage is
protected under law because it fosters procreation).
439. Cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 98 ("Mhe inability of any
couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded asperse removing their right to enjoy
the [right to marry].').
440. See, e.g., Salvador P6rez Alvaraez, La incidencia de la Ley 13/2005 en el
reconocimiento de los matrimonios entrepersonas del mismo sexo celebrados en el dmbito de
la Uni6n Europea, 57 REVISTA ESPA1ROLADE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (R.E.D.I.) 842,849-51
(2005) (describing how the procreative requirements of Spanish marriage law were
abandoned by 1981); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 431-33 (Cal. 2008) (U.S.).
441. See, e.g., Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *7 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (U.S.); Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs,
2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/
17.html; JEAN CARBONNIER, TERRE ET CIEL DANS LE DROIT FRANQAIS DU MARIAGE [The
Complete French Law of Marriage] 334 (Paris: Librairie Gdnbrale de Droit et de
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Even were procreation the purpose of state-sponsored or sanc-
tioned marriage, the argument would still be a non sequitur.
Whether same-sex marriages are allowed or prohibited can have at
most a tenuous relation to procreation rates in different sex
marriage. Laws disadvantaging unconventional sexuality and life-
styles may offer a kind of indirect public approval of the procreative
possibility, but the incentive is neither clear nor direct.442 Of course,
it would be absurd to argue that a homosexual denied the right to
marry another person of his or her own sex will switch sexual
orientations and marry someone of a different sex. Outlawing oral
and anal intercourse or same-sex marriage merely stigmatizes
sexual minorities and forces them into clandestinity; it cannot turn
them into heterosexual baby factories by legislative fiat. A direct
way of encouraging procreation (indeed, one sometimes adopted),
443
if such a policy is considered beneficial to the state, is to reward
procreation with subsidies or benefits, because these can reach the
persons who may be able and inclined to procreate.
Finally, the very premise of the argument that the state has a
legitimate interest in fostering procreation is less persuasive in a
badly overpopulated world. Putting aside the legitimate question
of whether population decline is in fact problematic, it is implausi-
ble to claim that the survival of the "human race" is threatened by
a dearth of reproduction given that the U.N. estimates that the
Jurisprudence 1950) ("If marriage is only completed by procreation, the logical consequence
of sterility is [automatic] divorce.'); MERIN, supra note 42, at 31-33; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 444 (1998); see also infra note 539.
442. History confirms repeatedly that pro-fecundity policies rarely work even among
heterosexuals. One case in point is Communist Romania, which, in spite of a homophobic
legal code and "a comprehensive pro-natal programme," failed to reverse declining population
trends. Turcescu & Stan, supra note 21, at 291. Similarly, an aggressive program of
propaganda, financial incentives and punishments, and other measures deployed in fascist
Italy in the 1920s and 1930s failed to reverse or appreciably slow declining birth rates in that
country. See CHRISTOPHER DUGGAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITALY 218-19 (1994).
443. In the United States, the federal and state governments reward procreation through
numerous measures. At the federal level, for example, the Internal Revenue Service provides
a subsidy of up to $1,000 per year for every child, see IRS, Publication 972: Child Tax Credit,
at 2, OMB No. 1545-0074, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf, plus up to
$6,000 per year to pay for child care services, see IRS, Publication 503: Child and Dependent
Care Expenses, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p503.pdf. Every state provides low-
income families with subsidies for child medical care (some services being free). See U.S.
Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Insure Kids Now!, http://www.insurekidsnow.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
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current world population of 6.5 billion is likely to grow to approxi-
mately 9.2 billion by 2050,444 and, indeed, "at the world level,
continued population growth until 2050 is inevitable even if the
decline in fertility accelerates." '445 All available data better support
the hypothesis that the continued propagation of humankind at the
current rate is more likely to be disastrous than desirable.446 There
are certainly some states in which the population of the ethnic
majority is declining, especially relative to immigrants, but the
concern in such cases is not really with the propagation of the
human race so much as the national race. The state may, in some
limited circumstances, arguably have a legitimate interest in
preventing an absolute population decline, but state intolerance
toward homosexuality correlates inversely with declining national
population.447
Considering how weak is the case for justifying state recognition
of marriage and the state grant of substantial benefits to married
couples based on a procreation incentive, on what basis can state
favoritism toward married couples be justified? The most plausible
explanation seems to relate to the state's interest in fostering
supportive relationships between unrelated individuals and en-
suring stable homes for any children, discussed above.44 As some
state authorities have recognized expressly,449 the arguments for
444. See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects:
The 2006 Revision, Exec. Summary at 5 (2007), U.N. Doc. ST/ESAISER.A/261/ES, available
at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/English.pdf.
445. Id. at 7.
446. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRUCH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 13-21
(1990) (summarizing evidence that the world's growing population is overwhelming the
ecosystem's capacity to sustain life); DONELLA H. MEADOWS, JORGEN RANDERS & DENNIS L.
MEADOWS, LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE passim (2004) (summarizing the
evidence and presenting computer models based on population growth, food production,
pollution and other data to demonstrate the risks of overpopulation).
447. Almost all of the eighty-one states that continue to impose criminal penalties for
same-sex intercourse are developing countries, and almost all world population growth is
occurring in developing regions "and especially in the group of the 50 least developed
countries." See World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, supra note 444, at 5.
448. See supra discussion in Part I.C.1.
449. See HCJ 721/94 El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749, 15
(Isr. Sup. Ct.), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/law/aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm. In the U.S.
judicial approach to identifying indicia of intimate relationships, an analysis of mutual
financial commitments, exclusivity, mutual emotional reliance, and the term of the
relationship are considered. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornush, Note, A More Perfect
Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
2008]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
limiting such relationships to heterosexual couples are thin. It is
difficult to imagine any reasonable justification for prohibiting
same-sex marriage except in terms of discrimination against ho-
mosexuals and bisexuals as a class on the grounds of their sexual
orientation. And, where the cause of discrimination can be traced
to nothing more than hostility to a minority group whose activities
do no tangible harm to themselves or the majority, the protection
of that group from arbitrary discrimination may require tailoring
the legal theory to the form that the discrimination takes. Framing
the right as a universal right to intimate association alone may
increase the ability of heterosexuals to engage in sexual experi-
mentation without addressing insidious forms of discrimination
against bisexuals and homosexuals.
B. Legal Moralism, the Harm Principle, and Privacy
1. The Harm Principle in State Practice
Given that the major human rights treaties proclaim as their
fundamental purpose the preservation of human dignity and
autonomy,45 ° the subject at hand raises the question of whether the
state is ever justified in interfering with or discriminating based
upon private sexual behavior between two consenting adults. The
term "autonomy" denotes a basic condition of freedom from state
interference and adverse discrimination, but the term "dignity" is
value-laden. The term has been used, for example, to justify
restrictions on consensual sexual conduct such as pornography in
the name of preventing the dehumanization of women,451 or the
deterrence of individuals from engaging in violent sadomasochistic
sex.452 In such cases, the state's interest in preserving human
1164, 1175-77 (1992). It is telling that this analysis is not necessarily affected by the fact that
the members of the couple belong to the same sex.
450. See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, pmbl., para. 1, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 2263 (XXII), pmbl., para. 1 (Nov. 7, 1967); ICCPR,
supra note 1, pmbl., para. 1; UDHR, supra note 1, pmbl., paras. 1, 5 & art. 1.
451. See, e.g., Regina v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452, 456 (Can.) (Gonthier, J., concurring).
452. See, e.g., K.A. & A.D. c. Belgique, App. Nos. 42758/98 & 45558/99, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005); Laskey, Jaggard & Brown v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997). In these
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dignity (however conceived) may override the value of human
autonomy to engage in acts that compromise one's own dignity or
the dignity of others. Human rights discourse has, however, tended
toward treating the preservation of autonomy as itself a critical
component of human dignity. Because liberty is the basic condition
under international human rights law,453 when the state and the
individual disagree as to what conduct infringes upon that individ-
ual's own human dignity, the individual's conception of his or her
own dignity is entitled to some deference. The circumstances under
which the state's conception of human dignity can trump the
individual's underlies much of the debate on the limits of state
interference with sexuality.
Legal protection of privacy and freedom of intimate association
plays a central role in preserving both dignity and autonomy by
limiting the state's power to interfere with any individual's chosen
path toward self-actualization through interpersonal relation-
ships.45 4 Laurence Tribe has noted that "virtually every intrusion
upon association works a displacement of human personality."455
The major human rights treaties allow such intrusions only upon
a showing of sufficient state interest. 5 The question, then, is when
state regulation of private, consensual conduct can be justified as
consistent with international human rights law and the moral
theory underlying it.
International human rights law imposes a burden of justification
on the state seeking to discriminate against a disfavored class or
individual conduct that falls within the scope of the defined
freedoms of speech, association, or privacy. This burden is increased
cases, however, the preservation of the health of the individuals seems to have played a
supporting if not predominant role.
453. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 1, art. 3.
454. Cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) ("The legal commitment to
long-term mutual emotional and economic support that is an integral part of an officially
recognized marriage relationship provides an individual with the ability to invest in and rely
upon a loving relationship with another adult in a way that may be crucial to the individual's
development as a person and achievement of his or her full potential.").
455. TRIBE, supra note 395, at 974; see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALiTY 22
(1963) ("Interference with individual liberty may be thought an evil requiring justification
... for it is itself the infliction of a special form of suffering.... This is of particular importance
in the case of laws enforcing a sexual morality."). This view may be traced back to liberal
philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham.
456. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 1, arts. 29(2), 30.
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when the state seeks to regulate or discriminate based on intimate,
private conduct between consenting adults. Because any interfer-
ence must be proportional and "necessary in a democratic society"
or reasonable and objectively necessary to accomplish a legitimate
state purpose, the basis for regulation must first be grounded in a
theory of legitimate state interests. In this regard, state authorities
have been notably unsuccessful in justifying discrimination against
unconventional sexuality as necessary or even helpful to preventing
some societal harm or promoting some public benefit. The realm of
intimate association between consenting adults is considered the
most fundamental kind of privacy interest. The European Commis-
sion of Human Rights has long insisted that "a person's sexual life
is an important aspect of his private life" protected by Article 8 of
the ECHR.457 Similarly, the European Parliament has publicized its
"unshakeable attachment to the principle that each individual is
entitled to have his privacy respected and to self-determination in
sexual matters.458
Such interests can be divided into three classes. First, the state
has an interest in protecting or a duty to protect its citizens from
tangible harm. Second, the state has an interest in fostering the
improvement of the physical and mental welfare of its citizens
through economic growth, improved standards of living, and
participation in self-governance. Third, the state may arguably have
an interest in preventing the spread of immoral behavior (a theory
known as Legal Moralism).
State authorities, in seeking to explain the regulation of intimate
conduct, have rarely even attempted to justify the regulation as
advancing either of the first two state interests. Protection of
morality is the default justification for such regulation. Yet, both
municipal courts and international human rights authorities
increasingly have viewed purely moral justifications for the
regulation of intimate conduct with suspicion, and the theory of
minority group discrimination has rarely fully expressed the
human rights values at stake. The legislation, cases, and decisions
discussed in Part I evidence a striving by domestic and interna-
457. E.g., X. v. Germany, App. No. 5935/72,3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46,54 (1976);
X. v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 63, 126 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1978).
458. EuR. PARL. RES. 812, 4 (1983).
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tional authorities alike to identify some basis for the evaluation of
novel human rights claims touching all persons, regardless of class
membership.4"9 They have sought to apply a broad theory of human
rights that can express and protect the values at stake while
balancing the state's interest in regulating conduct to achieve the
polity's legitimate goals.
A general theory of human rights has undoubted attractions. If
applied properly, it achieves justice by treating like cases identi-
cally and does not provoke criticism for doctrinal self-contradiction
resulting from ad hoc reasoning or messy political compromises.
The natural place to turn has been political philosophy. Ethicists
have provided these authorities with a great deal of food for
thought. The broadest of their theories, libertarianism, in its most
extreme form rejects all state regulation not necessary to prevent
concrete harms to identifiable individuals.46 ° In On Liberty, Mill
proposed his libertarian philosophy concerning the proper limits of
governmental power:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant.... The only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independ-
ence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding
liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty
of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and senti-
ment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral,
or theological.... Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as
459. See supra discussion in Part I.
460. Other philosophers have proposed limits on state powers of coercion to their own
visions of "harm." Kant, for example, would have permitted state coercion only to prevent
citizens from interfering with each others' freedom of action. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35-37 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1999)
(1797).
2008] 893
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly,
from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within
the same limits of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons
combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or
deceived.
... The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it.
46 1
Mill objected to state regulation of personal conduct purely on
moral grounds unless necessary to prevent identifiable harm.46 2
Significantly, Mill did not include as a harm mere offense to public
moral sensibilities:
There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any
conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an
outrage to their feelings .... But there is no parity between the
feeling of a person for his own opinion and the feeling of another
who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the
desire of a thief to take a purse and the desire of the right owner
to keep it.463
Regulation unnecessary to prevent or remedy an injustice or
prevent such harm can never be justified in Mill's view regardless
of the moral view others may take at the conduct in question.
Libertarianism, with its focus on protecting individual auton-
omy and liberty, and its seemingly bright line between permissible
461. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859).
462. Id. at 15.
463. Id. at 84. The question of whether the public nature of sexual conduct can justify
state regulation based on its offensiveness to viewers is beyond the scope of this Article, the
focus of which is intimate sexual conduct (which by definition is not public) and
discrimination based on sexual proclivity or orientation. On offense as a basis for state
regulation generally, see 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1988) (discussing theories of the role of offense to others as a basis for
criminal prohibitions).
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and forbidden state regulation, seems to fit naturally into a human
rights framework. It should not be surprising, then, that Mill's
harm principle has found its way into judicial and other analyses of
both international human rights and domestic constitutional issues
in the United States, Europe, and other developed countries. Both
states and international authorities have increasingly invoked
libertarian theories to support limitations on governmental power
and to erect barriers against discrimination in the realms of
personal privacy and intimate association.464
Among state legislatures that have adopted a libertarian phi-
losophy of state regulation of sexuality, Australia465 and Portugal4"'
stand out for having decriminalized all sexual behavior involving
only consensual, private, adult conduct. When the latter decriminal-
ized homosexual conduct in 1974, it specifically abolished prohibi-
tions on consensual adult incest, adultery, and prostitution as well
on the theory that any regulation of intimate adult association
and sexuality exceeded the state's legitimate authority.46 7 The U.K.
Parliament's 1967 decision to abolish the offense of "buggery" was
based on the report of a Committee whose reasoning could have led
to the same outcome:
The law's function is to preserve public order and decency, to
protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to
provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corrup-
tion of others .... It is not, in our view, the function of the law to
intervene in the private life of citizens, or to seek to enforce any
particular pattern of behaviour ... [There must remain a realm
of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude
terms, not the law's business.
We do not think it is proper for the law to concern itself
with what a man does in private unless it can be shown to be so
464. It is interesting to note that the libertarian Jeremy Bentham argued explicitly in an
unpublished 1785 essay that state regulation of homosexual activity could not be justified.
Jeremy Bentham, Paederssty (1785) (unpublished manuscript), transcribed in Offences
Against One's Self, 3 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389 (1978) (pt. 1) & 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (1978)
(pt. 2) (Louis Crampton ed.).
465. Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994, § 4(1) (AustI.).
466. See Ana Cristina Santos, Sexual Orientation in Portugal: Towards Emancipation, 9
S. EuR. SOC'Y & POL. 159, 166-67 (2004).
467. See id.
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contrary to the public good that the law ought to intervene in its
function as the guardian of that public good.468
The decision was also based in part on the arguments of H.L.A.
Hart to similar effect (and equally inspired by Mill's harm princi-
ple).469
Municipal courts, too, have invoked the harm principle to justify
overturning statutes regulating sexual conduct. The New York
Court of Appeals wrote in 1980 that "although on occasion it does
serve such ends, it is not the function of the Penal Law in our
governmental policy to provide either a medium for the articulation
or the apparatus for the intended enforcement of moral or theologi-
cal values. '47° The court went on to note that "[n]o substantial
prospect of harm from consensual sodomy nor any threat to public
as opposed to private morality has been shown. 471' The Arkansas
Supreme Court similarly held in 2002 that "the fundamental right
to privacy implicit in our law protects all private, consensual,
noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults" and cannot
be infringed by any state legislation unless through "the least
restrictive method available" to protect a "compelling state inter-
est. 472 The court based this conclusion on the proposition that "the
police power [of the state] may not be used to enforce a majority
morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others. 473 Other
U.S. state courts have similarly focused on constitutional tests that
require the state to justify discriminatory measures by indicating
a tangible harm prevented by the discrimination as well to justify
the claim that the discrimination serves a compelling, important,
or legitimate (depending on the standard of scrutiny) state
interest.474
468. GR. BRIT. COMM. ON HOMOsExuAL OFFENCES & PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN
REPORT: REPORT OFTHE COMMIrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 10, 61
(1963).
469. HART, supra note 455, at 50-52; see RICHARDS, supra note 41, at 24.
470. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 n.3 (N.Y. 1980).
471. Id. at 943.
472. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ark. 2002) (internal quotation omitted).
473. Id. at 353.
474. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436 (Cal. 2008) (requiring that
discrimination based on sexual orientation meet the strict scrutiny standard of being
necessary to serve a compelling state interest); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 421-32 (Conn. 2008) (requiring that discrimination based on sexual orientation at least
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In some cases, U.S. state courts have invoked Mill's philosophy
explicitly. The Kentucky Supreme Court in 1909 found the state
government incompetent "to invade the privacy of a citizen's life
and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is con-
cerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not
directly injure society." '475 The court cited Mill's On Liberty as a
politico-ethical basis for its position.47 Revisiting this libertarian
approach explicitly in 1993, the court invalidated the Kentucky law
prohibiting homosexual conduct as "beyond the reach of state action
by the guarantees of liberty in the Kentucky Constitution."477 In
finding the Pennsylvania prohibition on "deviate sexual inter-
course" unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court equally
relied on Mill:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free
from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but
not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct
does not harm others.... Many issues that are considered to be
matters of morals are subject to debate, and no sufficient state
interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular
belief is followed by a number of people .... Spiritual leadership,
not the government, has the responsibility for striving to
improve the morality of individuals.47
The court then went on to quote liberally from On Liberty to similar
effect."'
meet the intermediate scrutiny standard of being substantially related to an important state
interest); Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *9 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan.
20, 2006) ("When tradition is the guise under which prejudice and animosity hides, it is not
a legitimate state interest.... Similarly, expressing moral disapproval of a class is not
sufficient to sustain a classification where there is no other legitimate state interest.'), rev'd,
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Mo. 1986).
475. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 385 (Ky. 1909).
476. Id. at 386.
477. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,496 (Ky. 1993); see also id. at 487,502-03
(Combs, J., concurring) ("It may be asked whether a majority, believing its own happiness
will be enhanced by another's conformity, may not enforce its moral code upon all. The
answer is that, first, morality is an individual, personal-one might say, private-matter of
conscience ....").
478. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980).
479. Id. at 50-51.
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Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes been influenced
by a libertarian philosophy of government with respect to sexual
conduct. The majority in Eisenstadt v. Baird, although disclaiming
that its decision passed judgment on moral legislation per se,48
nonetheless implied that sexual privacy and family life decisions
could not be subjected to arbitrary state interference on moral
grounds: "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." ''
Fourteen years later, the 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Bowers v. Hardwick relied in its reasoning on the idea that states
were free to regulate private behavior based entirely on majority
moral revulsion.4 2 The dissenters argued a contrario that "privacy
embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not
others nor to society as a whole, 48 3 implying that privacy rights
may trump the state's interest in moral legislation. Indeed, the
dissent later made this point expressly. First, it remarked on the
"theological nature of the origin of Anglo-American antisodomy
statutes, 4 4 then concluded:
A State can no more punish private behavior because of reli-
gious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of
racial animus. "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices,
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect. 485
In reversing Bowers less than two decades later, the Court
majority took up the same theme; it asked essentially whether the
majority of citizens may use the power of the State to enforce their
moral views through the criminal laws and concluded that it could
480. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
481. Id.
482. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The majority opinion misleadingly
characterized the prohibited conduct as homosexual intercourse, but the law at issue in fact
criminalized heterosexual oral and anal intercourse as well.
483. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
484. Id. at 211 n.6.
485. Id. at 211-12 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
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not, at least where the views interfered in private consensual
sexual conduct.486 Noting that the decision in Bowers related to a
Georgia statute that criminalized anal and oral sex between
heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, the Court observed that the
prohibition was "as consistent with a general condemnation of
nonprocreative sex" as with persecution of homosexuality.487 The
majority was referring to its decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut488
and Eisenstadt v. Baird,489 which found state laws prohibiting the
use of contraception to violate the penumbral privacy rights implicit
in the Bill of Rights. But the majority in Lawrence did not expressly
base its decision on a penumbral privacy right. It instead struck
down the statute as a violation of substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment without drawing a clear line between
constitutionally permissible and impermissible morality-based
legislative interference with the so-called due process right.49°
In his dissent, Justice Scalia interpreted the majority opinion
as a blanket rejection of all legislation based on purely moral
criteria. 491 Although the Court did not recognize a fundamental
right to sexual privacy as such in Lawrence v. Texas, other decisions
of the Court on the subject seem to imply a view that the state has
no rational or legitimate interest in regulating private, harmless
486. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
487. Id. at 570.
488. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
489. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
490. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
491. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('This effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation."). Justice Scalia's position was that outlawing sexual behavior as immoral based
on religious prejudices was a "rational basis" for state regulation. Id. at 589.
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sexual conduct.492 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion,
echoed Romer v. Evans, emphasizing that
"a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," [is] not
[a] legitimate state interest.
... Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm
the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.493
Municipal courts in other countries have invoked the harm
principle as well. In overturning the South African prohibition on
homosexual conduct, for example, the Constitutional Court found
the right to sexual privacy limited by the harm principle: "If, in
expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming
one another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach of our
privacy." '494 The law prohibiting male homosexual intercourse could
not withstand constitutional scrutiny, the court held, because "[i]t
has no other purpose than to criminalise conduct which fails to
conform with the moral or religious views of a section of society." '495
492. In Romer v. Evans, it will be recalled, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
Colorado state constitutional amendment denying sexual minorities all right to state
protection from public or private discrimination. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Court's objection
to the statute was based at least in part on the perception that a state constitutional
amendment solely promulgated to vilify a group 'lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests." Id. at 632; see also id. at 634. If the point of the amendment was to harm
sexual minorities, precluding them from state protection against discrimination based on
sexual orientation was a rational way to go about it. The Court's objection, then, must have
been that the State of Colorado had no "legitimate interests" in preventing discrimination
against sexual minorities and unconventional sexual conduct. Yet, if the state had a
legitimate interest in criminalizing such conduct, as the Court held that it did only ten years
earlier in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), it is unclear what was illegitimate about
precluding sexual minorities as such from discrimination. It is possible the Court majority
implicitly assumed that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating private sexual
conduct that creates no harm to any person.
493. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580, 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court's decisions in these cases have motivated lower courts to find laws pro-
hibiting heterosexual oral intercourse unconstitutional in military disciplinary circumstances
as well, see, e.g., United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534, 2006 WL 3490409, at *3 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004), implying that the days of the U.S. ban on homosexuals in the
armed forces are numbered.
494. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC)
32 (S. Aft.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36 (emphasis added).
495. Id. 26.
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The court thought such a legislative rationale was entitled to no
weight in justifying discrimination.496 "The enforcement of the
private moral views of a section of the community, which are based
to a large extent on nothing more than prejudice," the court
concluded, "cannot qualify as ... a legitimate [governmental]
purpose." '497
The ECtHR has employed comparable reasoning in its more
recent decisions. In finding discriminatory ages of consent to violate
the human rights to equal treatment and privacy in S.L. v. Austria,
it held:
To the extent that [the impugned law] embodied a predisposed
bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual
minority, these negative attitudes cannot of themselves be
considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for
the differential treatment any more than similar negative
attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour.498
In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR buttressed its decision
to require states that permit sex reassignment surgery to treat
postoperative transsexuals as having changed their sex for all legal
purposes by observing that "[n]o concrete or substantial hardship
or detriment to the public interest has indeed been demonstrated
as likely to flow from any change to the status of transsexuals ....""
Here again, the court's reasoning put great weight on the absence
of detriment to society.
Finally, international authorities have sometimes invoked
libertarian-type arguments to defeat discrimination against
unconventional sexuality. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in
Toonen v. Australia rejected Tasmania's justification for its laws
criminalizing homosexual intercourse as necessary for the protec-
tion of morals; "moral issues," the government asserted, "must be
496. Id. 27.
497. Id. 1 37; see also id. 108 (Sachs, J., concurring) ("[Male homosexuality] is repressed
for its perceived symbolism rather than because of its proven harm.... [The threat was that
same-sex passion in itself is seen as representing to heterosexual hegemony.") (emphasis
added).
498. 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, 44 (2003).
499. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 91 (2002).
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deemed a matter of domestic decision."' 0 According to the Commit-
tee, acceptance of this proffered justification would "open the door
to withdrawing from the Committee's scrutiny a potentially large
number of statutes interfering with privacy."50 1 Whatever the
Committee's unstated reasoning for affirming its own jurisdiction,
it rejected the notion that promoting state morality could per se
justify an intrusion on sexual privacy.
A telling indicator of the influence of the harm principle on both
domestic courts and international tribunals is their tendency to
frame questions regarding the permissibility of legislation dis-
criminating against sexual minorities and unconventional sex in
terms of whether the legislation is "legitimate" or "necessary." The
ECHR expressly requires that moral regulation be "necessary in a
democratic society."50 2 In S.L. v. Austria, the ECtHR stated that
discrimination based on sexual orientation must pursue a "legiti-
mate aim" and have an "objective and reasonable justifica-
tion"'5 3-indeed, "particularly serious reasons by way of justifica-
tion" because of the private, consensual, and harmless nature of
unconventional sexuality.50 4 It follows, then, that an objective
showing of harm could render an unconventional sexual practice
illegal, as the ECtHR has in fact held. In Laskey, Jaggard & Brown
v. United Kingdom, °5 and K.A. & A.D. c. Belgique,5 °6 the applicants
had been convicted of engaging in sadomasochistic sex. In both
cases, the ECtHR, objecting to the "extreme nature of the practices
involved" and the attendant risk of harm, found the conduct not
protected by Article 8 even though it was admittedly consensual,
private, and had never resulted in any significant injury. In Laskey,
the deciding factor for the court, like the Human Rights Commis-
sion,50 7 appears to have primarily been concern about the potential
for serious injury of the condemned practices, not with "the sexual
500. Toonen, supra note 76, 8.4.
501. Id. 8.6.
502. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
503. S.L. v. Austria, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, 36 (2003); L. & V. v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 55, 44 (2003).
504. S.L., 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 37; accord Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 37
(2004).
505. 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997).
506. Apps. No. 42758/98 & 45558/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (available in French only).
507. Laskey, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at TT 58-61.
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proclivities of the applicants" or any moral dimension of the
regulation. 0
8
In K.A. & A.D., in which the applicants were heterosexual, the
court similarly noted the bleeding, unconsciousness, and scarring
that resulted from the practices, the copious imbibing of alcohol,
and the failure to heed the victim's cries for cessation of the
torture." 9 The court found the measures intended to protect both
"the rights and freedom of others" and public health.510 As to
whether the criminal prohibitions on sado-masochistic sex were
necessary and proportionate, the court noted that however broad
the right to private sexual practices, they are limited by the
victim's willingness to participate, which means that the practices
must occur in an atmosphere of respect for the "victim's" right to
withdraw consent.511 Although the law at issue forbade the
intentional wounding or harm of another person regardless of
consent, the court found the government's prohibition valid on the
narrow ground that, in the case at hand, that right was not
respected by the applicants.512 In light of the earlier Laskey
decision, however, it seems that the explicit basis for the court's
decision is deceptively narrower than the court iself represents. The
two cases are consistent only if in K.A. & A.D. the court would have
upheld the government's regulation of the conduct regardless of
whether the victim's right to withdraw consent had been somehow
guaranteed by the applicants, on the theory that Belgium (like the
United Kingdom in Laskey) has the right to prohibit extreme sado-
masochistic practices to prevent possible injuries." 3
508. Id. 7 43-47.
509. K.A. & A.D. c. Belgique, Apps. No. 42758/98 & 45558/99, 7 13-17, Eur. Ct. H.R.




513. A most interesting distinction was suggested by the applicants between legally
sanctioned forms of assault and injury, such as those occurring in boxing, wrestling, cosmetic
surgery, or circumcision. Laskey, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59. The Commission's explanation
for the distinction was that boxing was subject to increasing regulation. Id. 7 61. This is
hardly convincing, however, as even regulated boxing typically results in severe, even
permanent damage of a kind absent in the sadomasochistic sex practiced by the applicants.
Id. 44. The most cogent explanation for a distinction may be the moral theory offered by
Lord Templeman: "Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult of violence.
Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivilised." Id. T 20.
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Nonetheless, the ECtHR has developed its jurisprudence in a
legal environment in which the "protection of morals" is a textually
valid basis for state regulation of private conduct without express
reference to harm. In developing its margin of appreciation juris-
prudence defining what kinds of regulation are proportional and
"necessary in a democratic society" to meet a pressing social need,
the ECtHR has come to weigh several factors, including the "moral
climate" of the state at issue, public demands for regulation and its
enforcement, and trends in Council of Europe member states. 14
And in so doing, the court has left open the door to arguments in
favor of discriminating against harmless unconventional sexuality.
The problem with the court's factors from a jurisprudential
perspective is that each is extralegal. The first two, relating to the
view of the conduct from the standpoint of public morality in the
regulating state, merely justify the court in deferring to the state
whenever it undertakes an invasion of privacy for popular reasons
such as a "public demand for stricter enforcement of the [chal-
lenged] law." 1' Yet, privacy can hardly be called a "human right" or
"fundamental freedom" if its invasion is sanctioned whenever
private conduct is socially unpopular.516 Indeed, just as a right to
freedom of speech is only truly necessary to protect unpopular
speech, unpopular conduct requires more principled and thorough
protection against state intrusion than popular conduct. A prohibi-
tion on publicly approved conduct will eventually yield to public
demands for repeal in any democracy. Perhaps this is why, after
Yet, even this explanation, superficially appealing as it is, falls short of justifying a criminal
prohibition of sadomasochism while boxing and countless horror, martial arts, and action
motion pictures, video games, and other media in which the public either views or
participates in the infliction of pain on others for entertainment or pleasure, are officially
sanctioned. Probably the real distinction between the prohibited and the accepted activities
is that the former involve sex and the latter do not. This suggests that either puritanical
sexophobia or, more likely, a distaste for associating violence or cruelty with sex (ideally, an
expression of love, which is, again ideally, the very opposite of cruelty), but in any case
certainly not repugnance to cruelty or violence underlies the criminalization of
sadomasochistic sex. A fuller exploration of this subject would exceed the scope of this
monograph.
514. E.g., Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 46 (1989); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 1 56-57, 60 (1982).
515. Norris, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46.
516. Cf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943) ("One's ...
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.).
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finding that legislation penalizing oral and anal intercourse was
strongly supported in Northern Ireland and popularly deemed
"necessary to preserve prevailing moral standards," the court
paradoxically held that the resulting invasion of privacy could not
be justified by the moral indignation provoked by the prohibited
conduct.51 ' The importance of these factors even in the court's own
jurisprudence is open to question.
The many judicial invocations of some form of the harm principle
cannot, however, be interpreted to reflect an international consen-
sus on how conflicts between sexual privacy and state regulation
should be resolved. Even these state and international authorities
are unwilling to countenance the extreme proposition that interna-
tional law prohibits them to regulate harmless conduct based solely
on elite or majority moral repugnance toward the conduct. Almost
all laws proceed in a sense from a moral vision; even ostensibly
morally neutral laws may proceed from apriori moral values. Laws
providing incentives for well ordered economic behavior, for
example, may arise from the utilitarian conviction that the public
benefits of economic efficiency outweigh the loss of freedom caused
by the regulation. A law requiring citizen military service may
prevent no harm, but it increases state security. The "harm" that
such laws prevent is not a tangible one directed at any identifiable
individual but is more in the nature of a sacrifice of concrete,
expected public benefits (the second justification for discrimination,
discussed above). Mill himself granted that state coercion could be
justified to secure social justice.518 This expanded notion of harm as
encompassing the degradation of valued public benefits, such as
providing children with stable families, increasing economic growth,
etc., is more defensible as a limitation on state intrusions on the
most sensitive and personal internationally-recognized human
rights (assuming the connection between the regulation and the
517. Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1 57; accord Norris, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 46. Mashood
Baderin has used similar reasoning to argue that the U.N. Human Rights Committee's
interpretation of the Article 17 right to privacy as precluding laws criminalizing oral or anal
intercourse should not apply in Islamic states, where "[h]omosexuality is generally seen to
be strongly against the moral fabric and sensibilities of Islamic society and is prohibited
morally and legally under Islamic law." MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND IsLAMIc LAw 117 (2003).
518. Mill, supra note 461, at 79.
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achievement of these benefits is empirically verified rather than
assumed or imagined).
The view that states may regulate even private or intimate
harmless conduct without providing any measurable benefit to the
public has, nonetheless, never lacked defenders. In the realm of
intimate association, two ethical bases for such regulation are
commonly invoked: (1) cultural traditions disfavoring the impugned
practice, and (2) religious-based moral revulsion to the impugned
practice. 19 The justification for discriminating against uncon-
ventional sexuality on either basis is typically grounded on either
of two propositions. First, the regulation is justified as reaffirming
a majority public cultural or religious belief that, if nothing else,
contributes to societal solidarity by identifying a common, if
harmless, enemy. Obviously, the enemy (the would-be practitioner
of unconventional sexuality) is excluded from this sense of solidar-
ity, but it is considered an acceptable price for the benefit to the
remainder of society. Alternatively, the regulation is said to be
justified to protect the majority against the discomfort of knowing
that someone, somewhere, is freely enjoying a sexual experience
that they find distasteful or have been told is wrong.
2. Social Benefits of Punishing Immorality
The justification based on creating solidarity in identifying
practices reviled by society as a whole has found many vehement
defenders, because it can be used to shoehorn purely moral
regulation into the category of a public good. States often justify
oppression of or discrimination against sexual minorities based on
cultural traditions, and these have been supported by the writings
of some influential academics, lawyers, and judges."' In Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity, James Fitzjames Stephen argued that purely
moral government regulation could be justified if the object of
regulation was "good" (meaning approved by the majority "[iun any
given age and nation") and the regulation was likely to be effective
519. Usually these cultural traditions are tied to religious beliefs, but in some cases the
causation may be reversed.
520. Judge Walsh, dissenting in Dudgeon, quotes Devlin, for example. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 149 (Walsh, J., dissenting, 9).
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at reasonable expense.521 The basis of the right to limit the freedom
of others for purely moral reasons is grounded, in Stephen's view,
in the potentially limitless importance of the effects of the acts and
thoughts of each person on any other. 2 2 Total moral tolerance of the
harmless activities of other people is only possible, he concluded,
"when men have become completely indifferent to each other-that
is to say, when society is at an end."523 Stephen's argument is finally
based, then, on a utilitarian appeal to the value of social cohesion
through shared condemnation of difference.
Similarly, in opposing the deregulation of homosexual inter-
course in England, Patrick Devlin argued that "society" must have
a "right" to preserve its own culture and the ethical norms underly-
ing it, or it will face dissolution.5 24 Society cannot function, Devlin
declared, without intolerance based on religion or irrational
feelings.525 These utilitarian positions have been echoed and
modified more recently by others. Some, such as William Galston,526
claim that liberal democratic states should have room to promote
liberal virtues that perpetuate the state ideology, and (with
particular relevance to the question of sexuality) the "stability" of
families should rank among these virtues.
Certainly the very definition of "society" assumes some level of
shared morality, although it is important to exaggerate neither the
extent of detail that the community must share nor the conse-
quences of allowing dissent. H.L.A. Hart observed that, accepting
that shared morality is a necessary component of social cohesion, it
is a non sequitur to claim that there should be no limits on a
temporal majority's ability to circumscribe the liberty of all in the
name of promoting the shared morality of the present.527 This
would be equivalent to postulating that society consists of little or
nothing more than the common majoritarian morality of the
521. JAMES FITJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 137, 145, 159 (1873).
522. Id. at 138.
523. Id. at 143.
524. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 5-12 (1972).
525. Id. at 17. Devlin would perhaps have differed from Stephen by disclaiming the state's
right to impinge on fundamental rights. Jeffrie Murphy ably analyzes this aspect of Devlin's
argument. See Jeffrie Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 84-85
(1995).
526. WILLIAM A. GALTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 220 (1991).
527. See HART, supra note 455, at 50-52.
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moment-and every last shred of it-an obvious overstatement.
Many components of any given society's shared culture have little
moral valence, such as a preference for spicy food or a propensity
to venerate accomplished athletes and entertainers. It is equally
important to recognize that, under the right circumstances, many
moral beliefs held by a majority of society can be discarded or
ignored without threatening to tear the fabric of society itself.
Repeated legal experiments in cultural engineering, including
Brown v. Board of Education in the United States or the abolition
of apartheid in South Africa (both defended by inter alia the
perceived necessity of separating races for the preservation of
morality), have demonstrated as much." 8
Accepting arguendo that social cohesion and family stability
(however defined) have value, it does not follow that these values
are best expressed through the deterrence of difference. Tolerance
of harmless difference is itself a social value; it might credibly be
argued it ranks higher among the values that a liberal democratic
culture should share than those alleged to justify discrimination.
International human rights law clearly favors such tolerance in
promoting the right to dissent in speech and association." 9 In
contrast, what kind of "social cohesion" does intolerance of harm-
less difference foster if not illiberality and the atavistic and
irrational pleasure that the majority feels upon sharing an illusory
feeling of superiority induced by the collective castigation of any
who seek to express themselves and live their lives according to
their idiosyncratic inclinations? Unless circumscribed by some
limiting principle, the arguments for social conformity as defined by
the majority mock the very values of autonomy and liberty that
international human rights law seeks to promote.3 °
528. This implies a response to the more moderate assertion that human rights law should
accept moral regulation if it is designed to overcome an "inherent evil" or to promote virtues
consistent with a prevailing state ideology of liberal democracy. If the state, as Galston
advocates, is left a free hand to promote "liberal virtues," see generally GALSTON, supra note
526, at 213-40, these virtues would seem to include the protection of privacy and freedom of
association, and the toleration of harmless differences in sexual preferences or intimate
interaction.
529. See UDHR, supra note 1, art. 19.
530. Stephen would rejoin that regulation based on cultural preferences should be limited
to cases in which a large majority of society has long, "strenuously and unequivocally,"
objected to a practice. STEPHEN, supra note 521, at 159. A pure majoritarian approach of this
kind remains inimical to human rights and even constitutionalism, as it sets no necessary
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Alternatively, it may be argued that unconventional sexuality
does harm the state in some palpable way. This argument necessar-
ily assumes that states continue to have political reasons for
incorporating moral views about harmless sex or family arrange-
ments into their legal codes (e.g., to promote gross economic growth,
to ensure a large supply of military recruits, etc.). Whatever force
(if any)53' the assumption that states maintain such an interest may
have, that interest must be balanced against the very substantial
interest of each individual in controlling and expressing his or her
own sexuality. As the ECtHR and many state courts have recog-
nized, such basic rights should only be compromised in the service
of an exceptionally pressing and weighty state interest, a standard
difficult to meet in regulating harmless adult, consensual sexual
conduct.532 Several of the court's decisions, especially those finding
limits on government power, so long as the "vice" punished has been long and stridently
disfavored by a large majority. If most members of a society believed that the failure to
attend church should be punishable by a long term of imprisonment, this could under some
circumstances constitute a sound basis for such regulation in this view. Again, this is
precisely the kind of enforced conformity against which international human rights law's
protections are most necessary. Punishing or deterring harmless dissent in subservience to
majority cultural prejudices forecloses individual freedom and self-realization for no purpose
other than to reaffrm the majority in holding those prejudices. The desire to force others to
adhere slavishly to cultural prejudices recalls Thomas Jefferson's judgment on self-subjected
conformity to preexisting systems of thought: "Such an addiction is the last degradation of
a free and moral agent." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, Mar. 13, 1789,
in THE ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON 172 (Jean M. Yarbrough ed., 2006).
531. No modern state prohibits sexual abstinence or the use of contraceptives, at least
partly because so few states perceive themselves as underpopulated. As David Richards
observes, the state may have had a legitimate role in encouraging procreation
when there was massive infant mortality ... and a correspondingly desperate
need to have large numbers of children, at least some of which [sic: whom]
might survive to perform needed tasks in a basically agrarian way of life. But
such a context is no longer present in industrialized societies with modern
health care and growing worries about overpopulation ....
RICHARDS, supra note 41, at 69-70; see id. at 111-12. Or, in the words of Judge LaForme of
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice:
[I]t could reasonably be argued ... that [reliance on procreation] appears to be
a mere pretext used to rationalize discrimination against lesbians and gays.
One could reasonably reach the conclusion that the real, although unstated,
purpose of the restriction is to preserve the exclusive privileged status of
heterosexual conjugal relationships in society.
Halpern v. Canada, [2002] 215 D.L.R.(4th) 223, 1 242-43 (Super. Ct. Ont.) (LaForme, J.),
rev'd on other grounds, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.).
532. Even the strictest legal moralists do not necessarily argue that state discrimination
against unconventional sexuality and sexual minorities can be justified. See, e.g., Murphy,
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prosecutions based on the videotaping and controlled public
exhibition of pornography incompatible with human rights law,
accord with the treatment of liberty of intimate association and
privacy as the ultimate values at stake. In Scherer v. Switzerland,
for example, the court held that a bookshop/video store that
privately showed homosexual pornography in a back room for
"those in the know" could not be prosecuted for publishing obscene
items consistent with the right to free expression protected by
ECHR Article 10.531 In A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR
confirmed that videotaped private homosexual intercourse not
involving any physical harm and made with no intent of public
distribution was protected by Article 8."' Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court's broad statement of its philosophical premise in
Lawrence included among the most important kinds of liberty
sexual behavior as "the most private human conduct. 535 In the
same case, the Court referred to its precedential decision in Roe v.
Wade53 finding a constitutional right to abortion as establishing
"the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions
supra note 525, at 76. Stephen himself put several limitations on his criteria for legitimate
regulation of harmless behavior, including that it generally must not enter "into a direct
contest with a fierce imperious passion, which the person who feels it does not admit to be
bad, and which is not directly injurious to others." STEPHEN, supra note 521, at 148. This is
less an ethical limitation for Stephen than a pragmatic one, but it would appear to preclude
government condemnation of unconventional sexuality, at least among those drawn to it by
a "fierce imperious passion." Id. Stephen also argues that legislation should not be
"meddlesome," id. at 158, which, although obscure in meaning, seems to imply that laws
should not regulate behavior of insignificant social consequence (if his statement is not to be
interpreted as a candid acceptance of the harm principle). Even so, it argues strongly against
discrimination against unconventional sexuality. Stephen even argues that legislation ought
"in all cases whatever scrupulously to respect privacy," meaning familial, love, and friendship
relations. Id. at 160-62. Here, too, Stephen is obscure; his language could arguably preclude
government regulation on or limits to any of the behavior under discussion here, from
homosexual intercourse to same-sex marriage. It could also preclude the criminalization of
spousal abuse, polygamy, or some kinds of slander. It is, in short, too vague to serve as a
guide to the legitimacy of governmental regulation of harmless behavior. The point, though,
is that even such a confirmed legal moralist as Stephen has difficulty accepting limitless
government regulation of harmless differences in intimate behavior, however strongly
socially condemned these differences may be.
533. 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 276, 10,53-54 (1994). But see Reiss v. Austria, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep.
CD 90 (1995) (finding that the display of a homosexual pornography videotape in a bar was
not "private" conduct protected by Article 8).
534. A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33, 26, 37-39 (2000).
535. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
536. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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affecting her destiny." '537 This Roe language is reminiscent of the
Court's conclusion in Lawrence that Texas could show no legitimate
state interest to "justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual. 538
Subordinating individual freedoms of this nature to such political
exigencies would seem to be inconsistent with the very purpose and
spirit of international human rights law. It is precisely the function
of human rights to protect dissenters from social control unless
necessary for the protection or promotion of society for a legitimate
end consistent with democracy and human dignity, liberty, and
development of human potential. The importance to human dignity
and autonomy of the right to privacy and intimate life can hardly
be overstated.539 Another commentator has aptly observed: "It is an
individual's intimate associations that give him his best chance to
be seen (and thus to see himself) as a whole person rather than as
an aggregate of social roles"54 -roles often defined for him or her
in social contexts by others. The trust, interdependence, and
interpersonal permeability that mark sex and intimate association
as sensitive and important components of each individual's identity,
self-conception, and intimate social relationships also justify their
treatment as rights deserving of unusual protection against
arbitrary state infringement.
3. Sexuality, Religion, and Human Rights
The social repugnance to unconventional forms of intimacy and
sexuality, manifested at some point or another in the laws of almost
537. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
538. Id. at 578.
539. See Richards, supra note 41, at 79 ("We may say, paraphrasing Lincoln on slavery,
that if the right to intimate life is not a basic right, then nothing is.") (citation omitted). In
any case, as a factual matter, no country in the world requires procreation as a matter of law
as a precondition to the validity of marriage, although some may provide that the marriage
implies a sexual (procreative or not) relationship. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 148, at 589-90
(Germany). But see Halpern v. Canada, [2002] 215 D.L.R.(4th) 223, 239 (Super. Ct. Ont.)
(LaForme, J.), rev'd on other grounds, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.) ("[lit
is well established ... that a marriage is valid and not voidable despite the fact that one
spouse refuses to have sexual intercourse, or is infertile, or insists on using contraceptives
when having sexual intercourse.").
540. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635-36
(1980).
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all states, arises primarily from official religious condemnation
of these practices. Opposition to same-sex marriage or domestic
partnership is particularly strident in states closely affiliated with
homogeneous and well-organized religious orders.541 Even rela-
tively secular states continue to deny any right to same-sex
marriage or the equivalent largely based on religious opposition.54 2
Religious activists have also opposed bills and laws in many
countries that would prohibit persecution or discrimination based
on sexual orientation.543
The reason so many globally successful religions oppose uncon-
ventional sexuality and seek to impose doctrinal control over
sexual behavior generally is not difficult to understand. Religion is
characterized by faith, which is the uncritical belief in the unproven
or unprovable, and usually scientifically improbable, assertions
made by other people who have claimed some unique insight into
mystical events or divine thoughts. Because faith is by definition
difficult to transmit through rational and objective evidence,
religions must rely heavily on socialization; they depend on
541. In the constitution of highly Catholic Poland, for example, marriage is defined as a
union of a man and a woman specifically to preclude same-sex marriages. KONSTYTUEJA
RZEEZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (Constitution of Poland) art. 18 (1997), available at http://www.
sejm.gov.pllprawo/konst/angielski/konl.htm; see Neely Tucker, New Constitution Could
Closet Poland's Emerging Gays, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 13, 1997, at 5A. In Italy, the
opposition of the Catholic Church to same-sex marriage has stymied discussions of same-sex
marriage in parliament. See MERIN, supra note 42, at 156. In Russia, the Kremlin's new ties
to the Russian Orthodox Church are thought by some to doom any possibility of that state
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage in the near future. Graeme Smith, Lonely Crusader
of the Urals, Russian Champion of Same-sex Marriage Fighting an Uphill Battle, THE GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 15, 2006, at Al.
542. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 42, at 81,84, 138 (France, Norway); Chan, supra note 74,
at 76 (Hong Kong); Robyn Emerton, Neither Here nor There: The Current Status of
Transsexual and Other Transgender Persons Under Hong Kong Law, 34 H.K. L.J. 245, 265(2004) (Hong Kong); Weiss, supra note 4, at 285 (Singapore); Outrage as Same-Sex Union Bill
Vetoed, CANBERRA TIMES, June 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10117183 (Australia);
Hanna Rosin & Richard Morin, As Tolerance Grows, Acceptance Remains Elusive, WASH.
POST, Dec. 26, 1998, at A01 (citing a U.S. survey finding that, of Americans describing
homosexuality as "unacceptable," a majority cited religious objections as the reason); Laura
Sheeter, Latvia Cements Gay Marriage Ban, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4531560.stm (Latvia); Uganda: State Homophobia, supra
note 199 (Uganda); Homosexuelle und Kirche [Homosexuals and Church], Kirchliche
Segnung gleichgeschlechtlicher Partnerschaften: Ubersicht [Church Belling of Same-Sex
Partnerships: Overview], http://huk.orgtaktuell/segnung-uebersicht.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2008) (Germany).
543. See, e.g., Press Release: Human Rights Watch, supra note 152.
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inculcating beliefs in the subject before the subject is mature
enough to develop the intellect and practical experience suffi-
cient to question and critically evaluate the claims of the religion
with reference to real world experience.544 With only a few excep-
tions,545 it is in the nature of an internationally successful religion
to foster fertility, using parents as the primary means of transmit-
ting religious beliefs directly to their children,546 the more numer-
ous the better. The process continues indirectly throughout
adolescence with (sometimes mandated) exposure to indoctrinat-
ing institutions such as churches, religious schools, and social
activities.547 This strategy is globally effective; even in a state as
544. Socialization is, of course, only one method organized religions use to grow and
maintain dominance. More extreme tools include extreme penalties such as death for
renouncing, insulting, or disagreeing with the religion. See, e.g., Islamic Penal Code of Iran
[1996] arts. 513-14, available at http://mehr.org/IslamicPenal-Code--ofIran.pdf (prescribing
execution or imprisonment for insulting Islam, Mohamed, or "the founder of the Islamic
Republic of Iran"); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Sudan, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/79/Add.85 (Nov. 19, 1997) (noting that Sudan
imposes the death penalty for apostasy, which is deemed incompatible with Article 6 of the
CCPR); BADERIN, supra note 517, at 79 (death for apostasy in Islam); JAMILA HUSSAIN,
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 138 (1999) (same); Mashood A. Baderin, A Macroscopic Analysis
of the Practice of Muslim State Parties to International Human Rights Treaties: Conflict or
Congruence?, 1 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 265, 295-96 (2001) ("[U]nder Article 126 of the 1991
Sudanese Penal Code, apostasy from Islam is a criminal offence punishable with death if
proclaimed or made public expressly or by action.... To protect the sensitivity of the Muslim
population, utterances and publications that revile God, His Prophets and the Islamic faith
are prohibited in many Muslim States."); see also Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 22(a) (Aug. 5, 1990), U.N. Doc.
A/45/5/21797, at 199 ("Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such
manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah.") (emphasis added). The
Catholic Church merely indirectly threatens eternal damnation for the "sins" of apostasy and
blasphemy. See CATECHISM OFTHE CATHOLIC CHURCH 817, 1031, 1035, 1472, 1488, 1857-
58, 2087-89 (2d ed. 1997).
545. Buddhism, for example, by no means emphasizes procreation as a religious duty. See
Harris T. Lifshitz, Overpopulation: No Strength in Numbers, 6 FAM. L.Q. 93, 102 (1972). Yet,
ironically, the two great civilizations with the closest ties to Buddhism, India and China, also
suffer from the greatest overpopulation. See WORLD FACTBOOK 2008, supra note 49.
Evidently, the religion's focus on chastity and withdrawal from worldly pleasures has not
exerted much influence. In any case, Buddhism's apathy toward, if not discouragement of,
procreation may partly explain its eclipse as a major global religion in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
546. This was demonstrated clearly in the erstwhile common law presumption of religio
sequitur patrem. See, e.g., F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688, 689 (U.K.); In re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch.
143, 148 (U.K.).
547. See Joseph A. Erickson, Adolescent Religious Development and Commitment: A
Structural Equation Model of the Role of Family, Peer Group, and Educational Influences,
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religiously tolerant and diverse as the United States, inter-
generational transmission of parental religious ideology tends to be
generally successful.5 4' The more children each adherent has, the
more likely the popularity of the faith will grow rapidly over time.
Religious control over procreation is, among other things, a game of
numbers, and the growth of hierarchical religions relies heavily on
the subordination of sexuality (and indeed the subordination of
women generally) 49 to the parental role.
31 J. Sci. STUD. RELIGION 131, 132,143-46, 149 (1992); Bruce Hunsberger, Parent-University
Student Agreement on Religious and Nonreligious Issues, 24 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 314,316-
19 (1985); Scott M. Myers, An Interactive Model of Religiosity Inheritance: The Importance
of Family Context, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 858, 858, 862-64 (1996); Darren E. Sherkat,
Counterculture or Continuity? Competing Influences on Baby Boomers'Religious Orientations
and Participation, 76 Soc. FORCES 1087, 1088-92, 1098-1103 (1998). There is significant
evidence that homophobia is correlated to the transmission of conservative religious and
social values. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 380, at 224.
548. See Christian Smith, Robert Faris, Melinda Lundquist Denton & Mark Regnerus,
Mapping American Adolescent Subjective Religiosity and Attitudes of Alienation Toward
Religion: A Research Report, 64 SOc. RELIGION 111, 126-28 (2003) (finding that two-thirds
of American twelfth graders over the last twenty years report that their religious beliefs are
mostly similar or very similar to those of their parents, while less than a quarter said they
were mostly or very different).
549. Many theistic religions seek to relegate women to a reproductive role with minimal
rights and powers outside of the home even today. In Catholicism, for example, matrimony
is strongly encouraged with a primary view to sponsor "ordered to the procreation and
education of the offspring." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 544, at 1
1601, 1652. With regard to Islam, the Qur'an puts men "a degree above" women and puts
them in a paternalistic relationship to them. See QUR'AN 2:228, 4:34. Many Islamic states
have codified various manifestations of religious sexism through, for example, discriminatory
divorce and inheritance rights in favor of men, restrictions on dress, and disenfranchisement.
See Baderin, supra note 544, at 279-87. In Iran, this sexism is effectuated in many ways by,
for example, establishing legal rules to disregard or devalue women's testimony in criminal
trials and making the payment of blood money much lower for the murder of women than
for men. See, e.g., Islamic Penal Code of Iran [1996] arts. 119, 128, 300-01, available at
http://mehr.org/Islamic PenalCodeof Iran.pdf. This was reaffirmed in Article 6(b) of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference's Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, see
supra note 544, at 199, which posits that "[t]he husband is responsible for the support and
welfare of the family." Even in relatively liberal Protestant England, the subordination of
women through marriage was so extreme that Blackstone could blandly declare that "the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection and
cover she performs everything...." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 442 (1832).
David Richards posits an interesting parallel of and interaction between the sexist
degradation of women and homophobia not so much as a matter of religion as of politics and
philosophy. See generally RICHARDS, supra note 41, at 109-15.
914
STATE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY
Encouraging or demanding procreation has been particularly
useful to the two most dominant religions today, Catholicism
(over 17.3 percent of the world population-with some 1.1 billion
adherents) and Islam (over 20.1 percent of the world population,
with some 1.3 billion adherents).5 ' The Catechism of the Catholic
Church, which has claimed that the predominant purpose of
marriage is procreation at least since the Council of Trent in
1563,s5' still states today: "The deliberate use of the sexual faculty,
for whatever reason, outside of marriage is essentially contrary to
its purpose. 552 Masturbation, fornication, and homosexuality are
accordingly labeled immoral, "gravely disordered conduct"-in the
last case to the point of being reviled as a "grave depravity ...
contrary to the natural law." '553 Marriage, on the other hand, entails
an "obligation of ... fecundity," and "it is necessary that each and
every marriage act remain ordered per se to the procreation of
human life." '554 Thus, "every action which, whether in anticipation
of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development
of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a
means, to render procreation impossible is intrinsically evil. '55 5 In
November 2000, the Pontifical Council for the Family extended its
condemnation to same-sex partnership arrangements, calling them
"a deplorable distortion of what ought to be a communion of love
and life between a man and a woman in a reciprocal gift, open to
life."55
6
Both the Qur'an and Islamic law condemn homosexuality be-
tween adults557 in unequivocal terms.5 ' Other popular, hierarchi
550. WORLD FACTBOOK 2008, supra note 49, at 1-2; Baderin, supra note 544, at 265. At
present, fifteen states have constitutionally declared Islam as the official state religion.
551. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT 16-41 (1997).
552. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 544, at 2352.
553. Id. 9 2352-53, 2357. In Paul's letters to the Corinthians, he states that homosexuals
will not inherit the "kingdom of God." 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.
554. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 544, at 9 2363, 2366.
555. Id. 2370.
556. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND "DE FACTO" UNIONS (July 26,
2006), available at http://www.vatican.va.
557. The Qur'an appears to offer homosexual pederasty as a reward in paradise, QUR'AN
52:24 ('And round them shall go boys of their own, as fair as virgin pearls'); 56:17 ("Round
about them shall go youths never altering in age"); 76:19 ("And round about them shall go
youths never altering in age; when you see them you will think them to be scattered
pearls."). Pederasty was common in the Middle East from about 800 C.E. to the mid-
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cally organized religions, such as Mormonism,559 Orthodox
Judaism,56 ° the Eastern Orthodox Church,561  and the Russian
Orthodox Church 562 also condemn unconventional sexuality and
incorporate duties of fertility into their ethics.563 Indeed, religious
groups have long led the charge against any recognition of homosex-
ual human rights, sometimes through the language of vilification
and hatred,5 64 but more often through political influence and
nineteenth century. See STEPHEN 0. MURRAY & WILL ROSCOE, ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES
(1997); Maarten Schild, The Irresistible Beauty of Boys: Middle Eastern Attitudes About
Boy-Love, 1 PAIDIKA (1987). Modern Muslims often deny this reading of the Qur'an, however,
due to the modern distaste for the practice.
558. QUR'AN 4:16, 20-21, 7:80-84, 26:162-68; Baderin, supra note 517, at 196. The Qur'an
is widely considered by Islamic scholars to dictate at a minimum what is required and
forbidden to Muslims. See YUSUFAL-QARADAWI, THE LAWFULAND THE PROHIBITED IN ISLAM
18 (1984).
559. See The First Presidency and Council of the Twelve Apostles of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, The Family: A Proclamation to the World (Sept. 23, 1995) ('We
declare that God's commandment for His children to multiply and replenish the earth
remains in force. We further declare that God has commanded that the sacred powers of
procreation are to be employed only between man and woman, lawfully wedded as husband
and wife."), available at http:/www.lds.org/Static%20files/pdf/Manuals/TheFamily.A
ProclamationToTheWorld35538_eng.pdf; Brooke Adams, LDS Backs Amendment Against
Gay Marriage, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., July 8, 2004, at Al.
560. Genesis 1:28, cited in HCJ 721/94 El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC
48(5) 749 (Isr. Sup. Ct.) (Kedmi, J., dissenting), available at http://www.tau.ac.illlaw/
aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm ('The bond that makes two persons-of the two sexes-a 'couple'
in the linguistic social meaning, is characterized by their decision to share their lives; and
'shared' in this context means, among other things and especially, cohabitation, whose
primeval- and conceptually necessary-purpose is to bring children into the world ......
(Israel); Leviticus 18:22, 2d:13.
561. Basil of Caesaerea, Canons 7, 62, in THE SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 604, 608
(Philip Schaff & Henry Wace eds., 1994); Smith, supra note 541, at Al. Turcescu and Stan
recount in detail the vigorous but ultimately unavailing attempts of the Romanian Orthodox
Church and its parliamentary allies to oppose the decriminalization of homosexual
intercourse. See Turcescu & Stan, supra note 21, at 292-98.
562. E.g.,Council of Eur. Parl. Ass. Deb., 30th Sess. (Oct. 2, 2007), Doc. No. AS(20007) CR
30, available at http://assembly.coe.int [hereinafter Parade Debate] (describing Patriarch
Alexy II of the Russian Orthodox Church as calling a petition for a homosexual parade as
"propaganda for sin" and comparing homosexuality to kleptomania).
563. This is not to say that smaller religions do not also foster fertility cults. Some tribal
religions in Africa, for example, make ancestor-worship, eternal life, or other (often
postmortem) benefits contingent on reproduction. See Gerber, supra note 142; Huncar, supra
note 46, at F2. This is merely to say that a cult of fecundity may be a necessary but
insufficient factor in a religion's widespread success.
564. See, e.g., Parade Debate, supra note 562 (comparing homosexuality to kleptomania);
Wintemute, supra note 150, at 129, 151 n.74 (quoting Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant
religious authorities in Israel and Latvia comparing homosexuals to vampires,
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insistence that government elites legally impose the religious
understandings of morality and conceptions of the family on the
state.56 5
State government officials have often explicitly acknowledged
the basis of regulation of unconventional sexuality in the dominant
state religion. Religious views are commonly invoked by legislators,
executive officials, and courts to justify the continued prohibition on
homosexual intercourse, the refusal to recognize nondiscrimina-
tion rights based on sexual orientation, and even the suppression
of free speech and association by sexual minorities. In Orthodox
Russia, for example, the mayor of Moscow recently refused homo-
sexuals the right to organize a parade on the basis that it would
outrage religious leaders. 6 In Argentina, the Supreme Court cited
"Catholic ethics" in upholding the government's refusal to register
a gay rights organization. 67 In the United Arab Emirates, the
Minister of the Interior recently claimed that the torture and
imprisonment of homosexuals could be justified as "respecting
religion which forbids this type of behavior. 568 Such justifications
for the denial of the most fundamental human rights to sexual
kleptomaniacs, and pedophiles, or urging their execution); MEPs Urge Member States, supra
note 43 (noting "inflammatory/hate/threatening language" used by religious leaders in the
EU regarding sexual minorities).
565. See, e.g., Resolution on Homophobia in Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6TA(2006)0018,
C; Council of Europe Doc. 8755, supra note 43, Draft Recommendation 3, Explanatory
Mem. 3 (noting opposition from religious leaders to equal rights for homosexuals); JOHN
GALLAGHER & CHRIS BULL, PERFECT ENEMIES 13-24, 78,209 (1996) (U.S.); DIDI HERMAN, THE
ANTIGAY AGENDA 78-80 (1997) (U.S.); MERIN, supra note 42, at 84 (Norwegian Lutheran
State Church opposition to same-sex marriage); DAVID RAYSIDE, ON THE FRINGE 113-39
(1998) (Canada); Fish, supra note 307, at 32 (Spain); Wintemute, supra note 150, at 128 ("In
Britain, we now have the Christian Institute, which opposes every single proposal for equal
treatment of LGBT individuals and same-sex couples.") (U.K.); Shawn Pogatchnik, Northern
Ireland Grants Gay Couple Legal Recognition, TulsAWORLD, Dec. 20, 2005, at A5 (Northern
Ireland); Reilly, supra note 296 (opposition to same-sex partnership employment benefits to
U.N. employees from Islamic states and the Holy See); Smith, supra note 541, at Al (Russia);
Dias, supra note 149 (Brazil). That said, in many cases religious groups-usually small or
minority denominations such as Episcopalians-have opposed discrimination against
homosexuals. See, e.g., Neil Katsuyama, Church Backs Gay Rights by Calling Off Weddings,
YALE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?
ArticleID=27872.
566. Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 13.
567. Eugene Robinson, Argentina's Gays Battle Intolerance, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991,
at A43.
568. Gays Arrested in Dubai, supra note 46, at A61.
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minorities are far from rare even in states with a tradition of
recognizing human rights generally."6 9
At core, all explicit state justifications for excepting unconven-
tional sexuality from the protection of international human rights
to privacy, family life, and association are reducible to religious
justifications. They may originate in a psychological revulsion of
some kind, but their rationalization appears uniformly in guise of
moral objections that, because of the absence of any basis in
demonstrable societal or individual harm, must ultimately appeal
to a religious tenet. Yet, these arguments are fundamentally
incompatible with international human rights as a concept for two
reasons.
First, if human rights may always be derogated based on
majority religious beliefs, they can never be meaningfully interna-
tional. Religions differ radically in the kinds of conduct they
stigmatize as immoral, and these reasons may have no rational
justification as necessary for the promotion of democracy or human
autonomy and liberty. Unrestrained Legal Moralism is funda-
mentally incompatible with human rights as a concept, because it
treats the majority's prejudices and beliefs in matters having no
necessary effect on their own lives as more worthy of respect than
an individual's control over his or her own life. This is a position
toward which the ECtHR has recently moved, albeit solely so far
with respect to Islamic fundamentalism. v° Legal Moralism requires
no evidence that the majority has the slightest real interest in
the regulated behavior, yet it elevates the majority's wishes on
the subject to a place of virtual supremacy. If human rights are
universal rights, they must remain impervious to derogation based
569. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep.
186, 1 24 (1989) (describing a decision by the Supreme Court of Ireland holding antisodomy
laws constitutional because inter alia "[h]omosexuality has always been condemned in
Christian teaching as being morally wrong"); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.
149, 56 (1982); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 1 111-12 (Eur. Comm'n
Hum. Rts. 1980); Nolen, supra note 46, at A15 (describing a case in which a Ugandan cabinet
minister justified fining a radio show discussing homosexuality because the show
contravened "God's moral values").
570. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 7 123 (2003) ("In the Court's view,
a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the
Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal
that underlies the whole of the Convention.").
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on moral objections not founded on a demonstrable connection to
tangible social or individual harms or societal benefits. 71
Second, whenever a religious majority imposes its moral values
on a minority by prescription without a showing of harm, there is
an inexorable risk of offending each dissenting individual's right to
freedom of conscience and religion, both of which are fundamental
components of international human rights law.572 Given that, in any
state, heterogenous religions and moral belief systems exist-and
the human right to freedom of religion and conscience must nec-
essarily encompass dissent in the handful of states that claim a
homogenous religion-it is inconsistent with these principles for the
state to allow a religion or a group of religions to define the legal
parameters and consequences of intimate association for all persons
in that state.573 A theocentric approach to human rights law5 74 that
subordinates individual liberty and conscience to the religious
beliefs of the majority or governing elite with no further justifica-
tion inherently contradicts the concept of international human
rights. The incompatibility of pure Legal Moralism with interna-
tional human rights law is presented starkly when considering the
case of majority religions whose elites present sexist practices as
divinely ordained. No viable theory of international human rights
law could accept sex discrimination as justifiable purely on moral
grounds. Discrimination based on sexual orientation must equally
be justified as serving some more concrete state interest.575
571. Keep in mind that this argument relates to state derogation of human rights, not to
state regulation in general. For example, the argument does not imply that state regulation
of dog fighting or public littering on Legal Moralist grounds would be illegitimate because
there is no human right to torture animals for pleasure or deface the environment. It is
possible, perhaps, to argue that these activities are merely expressions of a more
fundamental right to liberty, but even so, as the courts and human rights authorities have
stressed, the objection to religious-based regulation of sexuality relates to the importance of
sexuality and family life to an individual's personal identity, self-realization, and self-
expression.
572. See American Declaration, supra note 2, arts. III-IV; ECHR, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10;
ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 18, 19.
573. The Supreme Court of Canada arrived at this conclusion with respect to Canada's
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
574. E.g., BADERIN, supra note 517, at 51.
575. For an argument equating discrimination based on sexual orientation with other
forms of discrimination, see DAVID RIcHARDS, IDENTITYAND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS 84-170
(1999).
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International human rights law cannot in the long run survive
subordination to state-sponsored religion for this reason. Sexuality
issues reveal and provoke this conflict due to the historical and
political importance of controlling sexuality in every major religion.
A secular theory of human rights, unlike a religious theory, must
justify its limitations on freedom and privacy with reference to
some demonstrable harm or sacrifice of an articulable benefit to
society. The unaccountable invocation of divine mandate does not
suffice. Reference to the harm principle or some variant by state
authorities are among the first shots fired in a fundamental conflict
between international human rights law and state-sponsored
religion. The treatment of sexuality issues in the crossfire may
foreshadow how this conflict will play out with respect to other
rights, such as the right to due process of law or nondiscrimination
on the basis of race or religion. It may, in the alternative, merely
indicate the evolution of an exceptionalism in which sexuality and
family life are entitled to greater immunity to moralistic regulation
than other kinds of human rights. But imputing such a limited
future role to the harm principle is premature. The usefulness of
the harm principle for evaluating state regulation impinging on
other, nonintimate rights, such as freedom of public speech and
association, is quite evident.
C. Intimate Exceptionalism and Opinio Iuris
Some forms of discrimination in state measures to subsidize
specific kinds of relationships are inevitable so long as preferences
in favor of marriage, recognized cohabitation, and other forms of
regulated intimate association remain dominant in states.576 It
could easily be argued that, normatively, the state has no especially
convincing interest in offering encouragement to couple relation-
ships (as opposed to no relationships or relationships between three
or more unrelated people).577 But whatever one's position on the
576. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 49 (1982) (holding that
"some degree of regulation" of any form of sexual conduct can be "justified as necessary in
a democratic society) (internal quotation marks omitted).
577. The author thanks Chrystin Ondersma for drawing his attention to this debate. That
said, Grigolo's question: "Can we assume that more than 40 men, who met for 10 years and
engaged in sado-masochistic practices, were doing so just for 'sex' and 'flesh', and remained
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ethics of the issue, a human right to immaculate freedom of
intimate association is not a position embraced by even the most
egalitarian states.578 Whatever the rhetoric used, the application of
Mill's harm principle by both municipal and international authori-
ties has been intended to extend primarily, if not exclusively, to
cases of government regulation of private, adult, consensual sexual
conduct and discrimination based on such conduct. Most, though
not all, 79 tribunals have explicitly or implicitly limited the applica-
tion of Mill's harm principle to this context.8 ° Although some
scholars and advocates581 and indeed the EU Parliament in 2001582
have called for absolute deregulation of and nondiscrimination
with respect to intimate relationships or at least sexual conduct,
even this limited constraint is not a position popular with most
states. States evidently believe that they continue to have a
legitimate interest in encouraging specific kinds of enduring,
supportive human relationships. Although much of the reasoning
of legal authorities looks superficially like Libertarianism, in fact,
states and international tribunals continue to act as if regulation of
even private sexual conduct is legitimate where such regulation
completely indifferent to each other?" Grigolo, supra note 382, at 1043, is not especially
relevant. The pertinent question is whether they have an ethical right to succeed to each
others' pensions because two persons committed to a relationship of indefinite duration have
a legal right to such succession, and the answer is not obviously affirmative.
578. Denmark, for example, has hesitated to merge the concepts of cohabitation and
marriage, because it apparently wishes to encourage different-sex marriage. See MERIN,
supra note 42, at 70.
579. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly stated that, as a matter of Pennsylvanian
constitutional law, the harm principle limits the government's police power "generally,"
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,98 (Pa. 1980), and did not limit its holding to private
conduct, see id. at 100 (Roberts, J. & O'Brien, J., dissenting).
580. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also Jordan v. State, 2002 (11)
BCLR 1117 (CC) (S.Afr.), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za (holding that the
prohibition on prostitution conducted in private quarters is not protected by a right to
privacy); F. v. Switzerland, App. No. 11680/85,55 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 178, 180-81
(1988) (same).
581. E.g., Grigolo, supra note 382, at 1028, 1042-43 (calling for the total deregulation of
intimate association); Wayne Morgan, Queering International Human Rights Law, in LAW
AND SEXUALITY: THE GLOBAL ARENA 208 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman eds., 2001). Morgan
professes that his goal is to "break down" the "heteronormative system" and to undermine
its assimilating tendencies. Id. at 215-25.
582. Resolution on the Situation Concerning Basic Rights in the European Union,
2001/2014(INI), EUR. PARL. DOC. P5_TA(2003)0012, 102, available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu (calling on EU member states to afford the same rights to married and
unmarried couples).
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serves a greater societal interest, such as prohibiting some forms of
commercial sex, preventing the social subordination of women, or
deterring subtle forms of familial exploitation. Thus, with few
exceptions, states consistently deny there is a human right to have
polygamy and group marriage recognized by the state, and almost
every state in the world continues to criminalize some forms of
consensual intimate conduct, such as violent sadism and incest." 3
In this light, the fact that several states that have granted equal or
nearly equal human rights to sexual minorities continue to exclude
adoption, custody, and artificial insemination rights from the scope
of equal rights may be explained by the necessity of balancing the
privacy right to intimate association with the public interest in
protecting children from family relationships that are perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as disadvantageous. In short, almost all states
continue to believe their regulation of at least some intimate
conduct on purely moral grounds is consistent with international
human rights law.
Yet, states must justify all such restrictions as consistent with
human rights, and the practices of the great majority of states of
the world respecting sexual minorities and unconventional sexual-
ity cannot easily be reconciled with any self-consistent human
rights jurisprudence or even ethical theory. Any explanation for
the absence of a strict correlation between state commitments to
international human rights generally and their recognition of equal
human rights for sexual minorities58 4 must account for the role of
583. See, e.g., Decision 20/1999, MK. 1999/56 (Hung. Const. Ct.), available at
http://www.mkab.hu/contenten/en3/O4989404.htm (upholding criminal laws prohibiting
incest); Karst, supra note 540, at 672 (incest); Robert Wintemute, De l'galiti des orientations
sexuelles a la libertg sexuelle: Jurisprudence europdenne et comparge, in LALIBERTtSEXUELLE
161,176-83 (Daniel Borrillo & Dani61e Lochak eds., 2005) (discussing limitations in Canadian
jurisprudence on sadomasochistic practices); cf. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 149, 49 (1982) ("In practice there is legislation [regulating consensual, private
intimate conduct] in all the member states of the Council of Europe."). But see, e.g.,
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.) (recognizing and permitting
polygamous marriages where it is an historic custom), discussed in Williams, supra note 289,
at 36; Baderin, supra note 544, at 275-79 (discussing the position of Islamic states denying
that international human rights law can contravene divine law mandating the allowance of
polygamy).
584. Jim Nickel refers to these as "Universal Rights Applied to Minorities" to distinguish
them from special group rights proper. See JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 54 (2d ed. 2006).
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organized, fundamentalist religions in undermining the uniform
application of human rights.
Fundamentalist religious opposition to the recognition of the
rights discussed throughout this Article has impeded state recogni-
tion of these entitlements as human rights and international
consensus on their status as such. Nonetheless, the trend toward
limiting state discrimination in the realms of sexuality and family
life is unmistakable. As described in Section I, in the last fifty
years, countries criminalizing homosexual intercourse have gone
from a large majority to a clear minority, and this minority is under
significant international pressure to abandon criminal penalties.
The number of states officially recognizing and granting rights to
persons involved in same-sex relationships has expanded rapidly in
the last two decades. In only the last five years, as many countries
have adopted laws permitting full same-sex marriage. One of the
final frontiers in equal rights-equal access to adoption and
procreation rights for same-sex couples-has burgeoned in the same
brief period, and has received new impetus in 2008 from the
ECtHR. At the same time, states that have abolished antisodomy
laws or instituted same-sex partnerships or marriage have very
rarely reversed course. The trend has been hastened by the ex-
pansion of the scope of several NGOs' mandates-most notably
those of Amnesty International in 1991, Human Rights Watch in
1994, and by academics and NGOs in the Yogyakarta Principles in
2007-to encompass monitoring and pressuring state govern-
ments to discontinue practices that discriminate against sexual
minorities." 5 State governments are progressively retreating out of
their citizens' bedrooms and locking the door with constitutional
rights and, it appears probable in the near future, international
human rights.
This brings the discussion back to the most potentially compel-
ling distinction between the regulation of familial and sexual life
and regulation that may intrude on other human rights. The former
class of rights has been characterized by courts, international
human rights authorities, and academics as different from other
585. Peter R. Baehr, Amnesty International and Its Self-Imposed Limited Mandate, 12
NETHER. Q. HM. RTS. 5 (1994); Wilets, supra note 52, at 36-37; Masha Gessen, Amnesty
International Adopts Lesbians and Gay Men, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 22, 1991, at 52.
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rights-as deserving of special protection because of their centrality
to individual self-conception, autonomy, and identity. This descrip-
tion of the rights at stake is surely accurate, but no more so than it
would be if applied to many other human rights, such as freedom of
speech, of religion, of political association, or against arbitrary
discrimination. The operative distinction does not appear to be
whether the right is important to the individual's identity so much
as whether the state sacrifices something of real value in giving it
broad scope. States are increasingly recognizing that the costs of
discrimination based on sexual orientation to the affected individu-
als, the consistency of human rights doctrine and ethics, and the
atmosphere of respect for liberty and toleration of harmless dif-
ference cannot be justified by any meaningful countervailing benefit
to the state.
Although a confluence of state practices may be an influential
source of evidence of the development of a customary international
norm,586 opinio iuris sive necessitatis must show the emergence of
a mature rule accepted as binding on the international community
before one can safely conclude that the human rights to privacy,
intimate association, family life, and freedom from arbitrary dis-
crimination have been recognized as applying to sexual minorities
and unconventional sexuality to the same extent as heterosexuals
and heterosexual intercourse. And the discussion in Part II of this
Article makes abundantly clear that only a handful of states have
yet adopted the position that human rights to sexuality and
unhindered arrangement of family life should be free from regula-
tion except when some definite harm is shown, and that human
rights of sexual minorities will be honored in the same way and to
the same extent as those of heterosexuals.
One of the most interesting aspects of the key movements in the
international community toward abolishing discrimination based
on sexual orientation and extending the freedom of intimate
association to unconventional sexuality is its almost uniformly
inward-looking character. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Lawrence v. Texas was framed as a constitutional
decision rather than the enforcement of an international human
586. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(c).
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rights norm.5" 7 The Court's references to foreign and ECtHR
practices were apparently epiphenomenal."' The same may be said
of the egalitarian trends advanced by courts and legislatures in
Canada,5"9 Israel, 9 ' and South Africa. 91 Each state's judicial
decisions cited to decisions of the ECtHR and courts in other
jurisdictions merely to confirm a transnational trend supporting
what was apparently a constitutionally preordained decision rather
than as a source of authority.592 Indeed, almost every domestic
tribunal that has overturned laws discriminating against sexual
minorities or unconventional sexuality, and almost every state
legislature that has abolished discriminatory legislation or adopted
antidiscrimination legislation, has done so without relying on
international human rights law as a basis of authority.593 Instead,
587. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
588. The U.S. state court opinions having a similar effect have also avoided relying on
human rights treaties or customary international law.
589. The Canadian Supreme Court decision opening the door to homosexual marriage did
not rely on international law, and the provincial decisions found discrimination against
homosexuals in marriage laws to be contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms rather than international human rights law. Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Crtien accordingly explained Canada's decision to allow same-sex marriage as a response
to an "evolution of society" rather than a demand of international human rights law. Press
Release, Family Research Council, Gay Marriage in Canada Is a Wake-Up Call to America
(June 18, 2003) (on file with author).
590. The legislative history of Israel's prohibition on discrimination based on sexual
orientation indicates a concern with "the rules accepted today in the enlightened world" but
not international law per se. HCJ 721/94 El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, [1994] IsrSC
48(5) 749, 9 (Isr. Sup. Ct.) (Dorner, J., concurring), available at http://www.tau.ac.illaw/
aeyalgross/Danilowitz.htm. Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court decision prohibiting
discrimination in employee benefits, was premised upon an Israeli "judicial principle" and
"Israeli statutory law." No reference was made to international law. Id. 77 11-12 (Barak,
Dep'y C.J.).
591. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC)
77 9-10, 17 (S. Afr.), available at 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36.
592. E.g., id. 7 42 ('If nothing else, the judgments in Dudgeon and Norris are indicative
of the changes in judicial and social attitudes in recent years.').
593. For example, in the U.S. state cases overturning state prohibitions on same-sex
marriage, the state supreme courts uniformly and exclusively on state and federal precedents
without relying on international precedent or often even mentioning international human
rights law. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). The same is also true, although sometimes to a
lesser extent, of the state court decisions finding prohibitions on same-sex intercourse
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
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these movements have been premised upon domestic constitutional
understandings of liberty, privacy, and nondiscrimination.
The conspicuous exception is of course Europe through the
European Union and the Council of Europe. In 1998, for example,
the EU Parliament adopted a resolution prospectively denying its
consent to any country seeking to join the EU that, "through its
legislation or policies, violates the human rights of lesbians and gay
men," calling on applicant countries to "repeal all legislation
violating the human rights of lesbians and gay men," and calling on
the Commission to consider respect and observance of "human
rights of gays and lesbians" when negotiating the accession of
applicant countries.594 In 2001, it called upon "the eighty [sic]
countries in the world which still prohibit homosexuality in their
domestic law to change this legislation without delay. ' 595 In 2004,
the Parliament passed a resolution "having regard to" both the
UDHR and the European Charter, calling on the EU Council and
Commission "to address and take concrete measures in respect of
those countries which have laws that discriminate on the grounds
of sexual orientation" and calling on all countries that criminalize
homosexual intercourse to abolish those laws.5 96 But even so, the
ECtHR has not yet recognized that the right to family life extends
to homosexuals and others who seek same-sex marriage.
Perhaps most telling for purposes of discerning the opinio iuris,
many states have explicitly denied that international human rights
law encompasses nondiscrimination, marriage, or other rights for
sexual minorities or to unconventional sexuality. In 2004, the
United States criticized the report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Health for asserting that the "correct understanding of funda-
mental human rights principles, as well as existing human rights
594. Resolution on Equal Rights for Gays and Lesbians in the EC, EuR. PARL. RES. B4-
0824 & 0852/98, 1998 O.J. (C 313), J, 2, 3.
595. Resolution on Human Rights in the World in 2000 and the European Union Human
Rights Policy, EUR. PARL. RES. A5-0193/2001, 116. The Parliament may have
underestimated this number by excluding countries that have no law explicitly prohibiting
homosexual intercourse. However, as noted above in Part ILA, some countries regularly
prosecuted and punished homosexuality pursuant to more general laws relating to
"obscenity," "hooliganism," and similar terms. In these countries, homosexuality is of course
illegal as well.
596. Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2004 and the EUs
Policy on the Matter, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2005)0150, pmbl. & 215.
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norms, leads ineluctably to the recognition of sexual rights as
human rights. 597 The United States representative specifically
asserted that international human rights law does not guarantee
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.598
Similarly, the Belgian Conseil d',tat, in its advisory opinion on
draft legislation opening marriage to same-sex couples, expressly
disclaimed any duty under international human rights law to
permit same-sex couples to marry on the same terms as different-
sex couples. 99 In deciding to replicate the Netherlands's decision to
allow same-sex marriages, the Belgian government determined that
the "evolution of Belgian society," as opposed to an international
obligation, justified the liberalization."°0 Other states have taken
similar positions."' The Supreme Court of Namibia, as just one
example, has explicitly interpreted the African Charter, the UDHR,
and the ICCPR to afford family rights only to heterosexuals.0 2 In
597. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, 54 (Feb. 16, 2004), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49.
598. Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, U.S. Rep. to the U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights,
Statement on the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/49 (Mar. 30,2004), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/humanrights/20 0 4/
statements/0330WiliamsonHealth.htm. Given the ambiguity created by the unusual
phrasing of Ambassador Williamson's statement, it is perhaps fairest to reproduce his words
verbatim:
Most troubling, however, is the Special Rapporteur's apparent confusion about
what constitutes international human rights law. We would like to know why
he appears to believe "General Comments" produced by treaty bodies, as well
as Summit documents, principles, and guidelines, constitute international
human rights law, as he has erroneously suggested in his discussion on
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. In fact, it is not inter-
national human rights law.
Id.
599. See Fiorini, supra note 227, at 1044.
600. Id. at 1045.
601. It is interesting that hostility to the human rights of sexual minorities is most
strident in states whose records of compliance with even well established human rights
norms has been sporadic or outright deficient. In some states, this denial extends even to the
right to homosexual intercourse, and in a disappointing number of states finds expression
in tacit or even explicit toleration of the persecution of sexual minorities. The President of
Zimbabwe, for example, in 1995 made a bone-chilling speech declaring of homosexuals: "We
do not believe they have any rights at all." Derrick Z. Jackson, Mugabe's Anti-Gay Tirade,
GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 14, 1995, at A17.
602. Chairperson of the Immigr. Selection Bd. v. Frank, Case No. SA 8/99 (Mar. 5, 2001,
Sup. Ct. Namib.), discussed in Hubbard & Cassidy, supra note 46, at 262-63.
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very few states indeed have national, regional, or international
tribunals interpreted international human rights treaties to require
general nondiscrimination against homosexuals, especially in
marriage and other family rights.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of state rejection of the
extension of human rights to sexual minorities is the concerted
attempts of a large group of states to keep the issue off the interna-
tional human rights agenda. The Group of 77's objections in 1991
to the possibility of the U.N. Development Programme including
freedom for homosexual activity among the forty criteria used to
construct the Human Freedom Index, for example, ultimately led
to the replacement of the index altogether with a Political Freedom
Index excluding any reference to sexual orientation. °" Similarly,
twenty developing states opposed the inclusion of any reference to
nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation in the U.N. Fourth
World Conference on Women's Platform of Action in 1994.04 More
recently, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, moved unsuccessfully in the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights to delete any reference to a duty of states to
investigate discriminatory murders and summary executions based
on sexual orientation from the report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.06
The evidence is abundantly clear that, beyond parts of Europe
and a few isolated states elsewhere, the trend toward recognition
of rights to unimpaired sexual privacy and nondiscrimination for
sexual minorities remains an aspirational goal for international
law. Even in the most progressive states, the recognition of these
rights has been based on state-level policy preferences first, with
acknowledgment of the relevance of the ECHR-a regional if
influential treaty-following in the wake. Predictions about the
further development of these norms should also be tempered by the
fact that vestiges of legally sanctioned discrimination continue to
exist in Council of Europe member states as well. Nonetheless, the
603. See Sanders, supra note 42, at 89.
604. See id. at 89-90 & n.92.
605. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, Third Committee Approves Draft Resolution
Calling for Effective Action To Eliminate Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
U.N. Doc. GAJSHC/3731 (Nov. 25, 2002); see U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the
59th Session, Supp. 3, U.N. Docs. E/2003/23, E/CN.4/2003/135 (Oct. 1, 2003).
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absence of any cogent secular moral justification for discrimination
against sexual minorities implies that international human rights
law must evolve to encompass them eventually if it is to avoid
conspicuous hypocrisy. As Eric Heinze has observed, "[I]f we are to
preserve the internal logical and moral consistency of human rights
law, naturalism compels us to recognize rights not explicitly named
in, yet conceptually implied by, extant human rights norms."60 6 The
freedom to decide how to develop and express one's sexual identity
without suffering oppression or discrimination is most certainly
conceptually implied by, if not inseparable from, the recognized
rights to intimate association, privacy, family life, and nondiscrimi-
nation enjoyed by heterosexuals. Moreover, there is every indication
that general principles of law recognized by the states that
generally respect human rights are converging rapidly on norms
rejecting all but the most serious and cogent of justifications for
state intermeddling in private, intimate association and sexual
liberty, and state-initiated or tolerated discrimination against
sexual minorities.
The developments presented here illustrate not only how norms
of customary international law can begin from the domestic
practices of individual states and gradually evolve into interna-
tional practice, but also how doctrinal consistency, ethical theories,
religious dogma, and other idealistic forces can stimulate and
accelerate this process. An especially important aspect of the
ideational dynamics revealed in this study are the roles of political
and legal elites within the state. Specifically, secular doctrinal and
ethical arguments tend to appeal most to both national and
international judges and elites acting on behalf of intergovernmen-
tal organizations, while state legislative and executive elites rely
much more on religious and cultural ideas. Given the political forces
acting on (or, equally important, not acting on) the respective elites,
these preferences are not at all surprising. Most state executive and
legislative elites are far more exposed to popular pressures and
cannot rely solely on a consistent theory of ethics or legal doctrine
to justify their positions on sensitive political issues. The tension
between secular and religious forces is especially strong in states
characterized by strongly religious populations governed by an
606. ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT 127 (1995).
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independent and secular judicial system-a description applicable
to most modern democracies. This helps explain both the movement
toward doctrinal consistency in the treatment of sexual minorities
in recent years and the slow pace of its progress. As for states that
continue to resist recognition of such rights, it suffices to note that,
when political and legal elites institutionally subscribe to the same
fundamentalist religious precepts, both legal and social pressures
suppress any internal forces working for change (for example,
dissent or advocacy by gay rights groups), and pressure from the
international community is likely to meet strong and unified
resistance.
CONCLUSIONS
The very nature of international human rights law commits
states to accepting the international community's interest in
protecting the most intimate forms of individual conduct from some
forms of state interference or discrimination. There is no paradox
in international law peeking into the boudoir to ensure that the
state refrains from doing so. Some state regulation of intimate
conduct is of course inevitable, and the tension between the
centrality of the concept of autonomy to human rights and the
relatively narrow state interests in regulating intimate conduct
have generated revealing theories about the relationship between
organized religion, political power, and international human rights
theory.
In terms of how this tension has played out in practice, the
survey of international practices regarding sexual minorities
and unconventional sexuality in Part I confirms, with only a few
exceptions, Kees Waaldijk's hypothesis of a "standard sequence" of
"legislative recognition" of a human right to sexual freedom:
(1) decriminalisation, followed or sometimes accompanied by the
setting of an equal age of consent, after which (2) anti-discrimi-
nation legislation can be introduced, before the process is
finished with (3) legislation recognising the same-sex partner-
ship and parenting. °7
607. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 142, at 439-40.
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In fact, Waaldijk's predicted sequence reflects not only new
legislative developments since his writing, but the sequence of
judicially driven liberalizations as well, which has often been the
primum mobile of human rights in this area. More remarkable still,
in many cases, judicial action has taken these rights all the way
from decriminalization to recognition of same-sex marriage and
parental rights within a few decades, sometimes with legislative
action lagging behind.
This trend in state practice is gradually driving toward world-
wide recognition that, first and most basically, state laws crim-
inalizing unconventional sex between or among consenting adults
in private, at least on a noncommercial basis, violate the human
rights to privacy and intimate association of the participants. This
principle is indeed as established a human rights doctrine as any
other, and is resisted primarily by those states that object to
international human rights norms more generally (while nonethe-
less becoming parties to its major treaties).
Recognition of a broad human right against discrimination
based on sexual orientation has not, however, gathered as broad a
consensus. Although international authorities have made moves
toward recognition of a nondiscrimination principle, state practice
indicates continued and widespread resistance to accepting a duty
to protect sexual minorities against arbitrary government or private
discrimination. Rights to family life and parental rights have been
much less universally acknowledged. It would be premature, then,
to declare that a substantial consensus of states recognizes the
application of human rights to sexual minorities and unconven-
tional sexuality on an equal basis.
Except respecting issues of family law, resistance has been based
upon a claim that such discrimination is necessary to protect ordre
public or public morality, both of which in the right circumstances
can justify derogating from accepted human rights norms. Yet, this
basis for disclaiming the application of human rights to sexual
minorities itself holds the promise for the future retraction of
objections. To invoke an exception or qualification to a general
obligation to sustain a state policy logically implies acceptance of
that obligation. The question then becomes whether the state can
justify the discrimination by showing that it is a measure appropri-
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ate for serving a legitimate state interest. From this position, the
ultimate triumph of a nondiscrimination norm is inevitable,
because arguments that discrimination based on sexual orientation
serves a legitimate state interest can rarely if ever survive sus-
tained scrutiny upon examining the available empirical evidence.
On the other hand, arguments opposing same-sex marriage and
parental rights have been based on less propitious reasoning. In
many cases, the arguments have been framed on purely textual
readings of human rights instruments, which have so far uniformly
been interpreted to guarantee only a right to marry persons of a
different sex. By framing the right narrowly in this manner, the
larger issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation seems
to disappear. This is a subjective interpretive choice, but it is one
that enjoys the support of the great majority of the international
community and thus reflects state practice, because of continued
and widespread support for "traditional"-at least traditional
Christian-'views of the family." 8
Whether these widely accepted readings of the ordre public
exception and the right to family life are self-consistent and accord
with the more general purpose and doctrine of international human
rights law is a separate question. Perhaps the emerging interna-
tional trend toward condemning state action designed solely to
persecute or officially disapprove of a specific class of persons and
toward requiring a showing of harm to justify interfering in the
liberty of intimate association and sexual choices will ultimately
become a first order rule of human rights law. At the very least, a
norm is developing to reject intrusions on such fundamental
liberties based merely on the discomfort some officious members of
society feel at knowing someone, somewhere, is having a good time
in a way they find unpleasant to imagine. Nothing could be more
incompatible with the modern understanding of human rights than
regulation that limits human freedom for no other purpose than to
reinforce existing popular prejudices. This is the interpretation of
the ICCPR's and the ECHR's requirements that limitations on
608. It reflects Christian views, because both Judaism and Islam permit polygyny, which
is not a practice generally accepted in the international community as consistent with human
rights law. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 28, Equality of Rights
Between Men and Women (Article 3), T 24, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.l0 (Mar. 29,
2000).
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protected human rights be "necessary in a democratic society" most
confluent with modern international human rights theory and, it is
safe to predict, most likely to prevail ultimately in the international
community.
The last frontier in this evolution will be the recognition of full
rights to same-sex marriage and equal parental rights. Opposition
to these rights is likely to break down along with the traditional
values that tie marriage to gender hierarchy and reproduction. The
concept of marriage is mutable enough for this evolution; marriage
is a socially constructed concept reflecting protean political and
cultural understandings. °9 Despite the many histrionic claims that
same-sex marriage threatens to undermine whatever value state
recognition gives heterosexual marriage,610 as William Eskridge has
pointed out, states are not at all selective in whom they will allow
to marry, whether they are deadbeat parents, child molesters, or
convicted rapists.61 All of these benefit from a human right to found
a family by marrying a (different sex) adult of their choice. In any
case, much more influential factors are undermining heterosex-
ual marriage,6"2 and world legal trends strongly incline toward
breaking down sexist relational hierarchies and rigid family
laws.61 3 Accelerating that disintegration are claims of same-sex
couples to public recognition of their equal right to choice of
intimate association regardless of whose devotion to any particular
religious tradition that choice may shock or offend. Although same-
sex couples denied the right to marry suffer significant discrimina-
tion in the allocation of societal wealth and benefits relative to
different-sex couples who may marry, and this discrimination is
609. See generally William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419 (1993).
610. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 42, at 83.
611. ESKRIDGE, supra note 216, at 105-07.
612. For example, the modern developments of gender equality, decreasing birth rates,
and other legal and sociological events creating or promoting what Anthony Giddens has
called "relational mobility" probably play a much more significant role in undermining the
institution of marriage. See MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 126-28, 320-23
(1977); Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marriage Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8-13 (2000); Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault
in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 782 (1996). See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY (1992).
613. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 187-92 (1989).
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certainly difficult to justify in itself,6 14 it has been observed that few
same-sex couples probably seek formal marriage for the material
benefits so much "as for the opportunity to say something about
who they are and to obtain community recognition of their rela-
tionship." '615 It is, in short, a claim to a general value integral to
fundamental and universal human rights enjoyed by individuals not
significantly different in position and certainly no different in
human needs and aspirations.
That sexual minorities cannot be described as a group occupying
an international position of special economic and political power
means that the forces shaping the development of sexual human
rights norms must be located somewhere other than the most
obvious sources. Although special interest lobbying has undoubtedly
played some role in the development of the norms domestically in
developed countries, such influence can account neither for the
rapidity of its international dissemination nor for the judicial origin
of the rights in most countries.616 One of the central insights to be
derived from this study, then, is that international human rights
can ultimately become embodied in state practice though originat-
ing in primarily ideological factors.
The divergence between religious ideology and emerging human
rights ideology sets sexual rights apart from many other human
rights. Few such rights encounter much mainstream religious
opposition." 7 The most obvious analogy is rights against dis-
crimination based on sex and gender. Women as a group have
historically been, and to a lesser extent continue to be, deprived of
political and economic power worldwide." 8 The role of ideology in
the advancement of the human rights of women contains obvious
parallels to that of sexual minorities. Both groups have suffered
614. See Karst, supra note 540, at 684, 687.
615. Id. at 651; see Rune Halvorsen, The Ambiguityof Lesbian and Gay Marriages: Change
and Continuity in the Symbolic Order, 34 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 207, 212, 226 (1996); see also
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609,645 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J.) ("[I]t must be recalled
that the rights deprivation that triggered s. 15 [denial of marriage benefits to same-sex
couples] is not economic. It is something which is fundamental to the person.").
616. Cf. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446-47 (Conn. 2008) (reciting
evidence that homosexuals lack substantial political or economic power in the United States).
617. The obvious exception is the right to freedom of religion and conscience, which is
understandably popular among smaller religious groups and less popular in hierarchical
majority religious groups and in states proclaiming a national religion.
618. See generally Fellmeth, supra note 430, at 662-64.
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systematic disempowerment. Both groups encounter strong oppo-
sition to their human rights claims based on cultural and religious
ideologies. But women's rights claims have enjoyed a recognition
and legitimacy that continues to be withheld from claims of sexual
rights more generally. Part of the explanation may indeed be
political and economic. Women account for a half of the world's
population, while self-identified sexual minorities account for only
a small portion. Although it certainly cannot be said that women
have achieved the rights now recognized exclusively by virtue of
exercises of their power, their sheer number and visibility in society
have aided their cause considerably.619 Sexual minorities, in con-
trast, remain invisible or face great dangers merely for identifying
themselves as such in a large part of the world. There has never in
history been an openly gay or bisexual voice leading the government
of any powerful nation toward equal human rights based on sexual
orientation. The ability of sexual minorities to advocate their own
rights internationally is severely crippled by their social, legal, and
political ostracization or invisibility.
The confluence of factors that has promoted the cause of women's
human rights is not, then, equally propitious for claims of sexual
human rights. But at least one of the factors that has made
women's human rights claims so compelling is present in this case
as well-the logical consistency of sexual minority claims to human
rights with the same claims made by heterosexuals. This purely
secular ideational factor has surprising explanatory power for the
movement toward recognition of sexual minority human rights,
especially when formulated as "minority group rights" comparable
to claims made in the past by ethnic minorities, religious minori-
ties, and women. The proposition that ideas can by themselves
exert an endogenous and powerful force in international politics is
still sometimes disputed, but that conclusion is strongly supported
by this study.
Claims to sexual liberties more generally, independent of
minority group rights, also evidence a significant idealist influence
in international relations. These claims push states seeking to rely
619. Cf. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 441-43 (discussing the significant advances toward equality
through political and economic power made by women in the United States in contrast to
those made thus far by homosexuals).
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on conservative rationales for limiting human freedom or discrimi-
nating between various kinds of sexual activities and orientations
to adopt secular justifications for state regulation that may not, in
the end, allow them to sustain longstanding cultural and religious
practices. Resistance to this trend has been substantial, and more
should be expected. Human beings do not give up their deeply held
beliefs of any kind easily. But, pace theorists who claim that only
political, economic, and military power can explain state behavior
on the world stage, the rapid and large-scale global movement
toward acceptance of expanded human rights to privacy, associa-
tion, and family life provides evidence that ideological consistency
creates a certain momentum of its own that can shape the develop-
ment of new norms of international law.
